

Fig. 1 Space Shuttle SRB-PREP configuration.

Table 2 Comparison of SRB-PREP to other high altitude platforms

Attribute	SRB-PREP	Nike-Black Brandt	Taurus-Orion
Research altitudes, km	50-80	100-350	70-250
Maximum payload weight ^a	3200 lb/SRB	970 lb	550 lb
Maximum payload volume	>1000 ft ³ /SRB	27 ft	18 ft
Cost/payload, lb	\$110 ^b	\$475	\$455
Usable flight time, s	150	440	480
Pointing capability	none	P/L provided	P/L provided
Maximum launch acceleration, g	2.5	19	25
Reliability (FY 82,83) ^c	1.00	0.94	0.93
Launch rate (FY 86)	30	8	10
Launch sites (FY 86)	2	4	4

^aSRB-PREP payload weight limited here by 1% penalty on Orbiter design payload-to-orbit capability. ^bThis is a pessimistic cost/lb assessment assuming Orbiter payload is displaced for PREP payload. As shown in the text, SRB launch is effectively zero if Shuttle payload capacity is volume limited. ^cReliability data excludes developmental flights.

perienced by ground-based observatories and aircraft-based platforms.

It is important to note (see Fig. 2) that SRB's reach their maximum altitudes directly in the important Ozone layer—a height at which rockets spend little time as they continue upward. Because balloons and aircraft also cannot reach this altitude, little in-situ research has been performed in the Ozone layer. For this reason atmospheric researchers have recently characterized this region as the 'ignorosphere'.

The recognized advantages which sounding rockets enjoy over PREP are their accurate pointing capability and their variety of launch sites. Lack of postseparation pointing is perhaps the largest obstacle in the way of SRB-PREP meeting the requirements of many researchers. It is also worth noting that sounding rocket acoustics/vibration loads are somewhat lower than SRB loads.

Returning to Tables 1 and 2, we conclude that SRB-PREP offers a variety of research applications which are enhanced by the great payload weight and volume carrying capacity of the SRB and are fundamentally limited only by the unpointed nature of the rockets.

Turning now to ongoing engineering analysis issues, several areas of technical concern are discussed. First among these are the twin problems of SRB inflight stability and postflight floatability. Both of these are influenced by the incremental mass and center of gravity shift which would be incurred on SRB's equipped with PREP payloads and support structures. Preliminary analysis has shown that PREP payload weights of less than a ton (per SRB) will not significantly affect either current Shuttle-SRB stability or SRB floatability performance. This can be most easily understood in light of the fact that all STS solid rocket boosters now in use employ ballast in their forward skirts to maintain adequate flight stability. An equal exchange of forward skirts ballasts for useful payload would not change SRB dynamic stability or floatation characteristics.

Other difficulties which the SRB design forces on PREP design are at times the severe loads experienced on water impact as well as the possibility that salt water may be introduced into the forward skirt after landing. These problems should not be of great concern, however, because development flight instrumentation (i.e., sensors and avionics) has been successfully flown in the forward skirt on many SRB flights. Complications could also result from STS requirements to man-rate PREP experiments so that they could ride aboard the Shuttle system. Although it is worth noting here that the Get-Away-Special program has adequately addressed this problem for a wide variety of both simple and relatively complex Orbiter-based experiments over the past three years, care will have to be taken in this area if SRB-PREP comes to fruition.

III. Economic Feasibility

It is important to examine the relative costs of launching a pound of PREP payload onto a suborbital trajectory to the




Fig. 2 The upper atmosphere displays many complex processes, some of which can only be assessed in-situ by SRB-PREP.

costs of launching a pound of payload onto a similar trajectory by sounding rockets. For this purpose, the Black-Brandt and Taurus-Orion are used for comparison. It is also important to assess the economic impact on the STS which results from exchanging STS orbital payloads for SRB-PREP suborbital payloads.

Consider first the cost to launch each pound of sounding rocket payload against the per-pound cost of launching a Shuttle-PREP payload. Taking the Black Brandt as a paradigm, the \$400,000 mission expense to launch a (heavy) 950-lb scientific payload results in a launch cost figure-of-merit near \$475/lb; similarly, the smaller Taurus-Orion vehicle results in a launch cost figure-of-merit near \$455/lb. Now consider the economics of PREP. By 1986, the cost to launch a pound of Shuttle payload into orbit will exceed \$1200/lb⁴; it must be remembered, however, that 11 lb of SRB-PREP payload can be substituted in exchange for each lb of Orbiter payload. Therefore, every 11 lb of PREP payload which displace a lb of revenue-producing STS payload should cost the STS about \$1200 of lost revenue. Taking the 11:1 exchange ratio into account, it can be seen that PREP payload launch costs should be in the neighborhood of \$110/lb, if revenue producing payloads must be sacrificed. Although we will demonstrate below that revenue producing payloads need not be sacrificed in exchange for PREP payloads, it can be seen that even under this pessimistic assumption, PREP is a far less expensive transportation system than the either Black Brandt or Taurus-Orion.

The impact on Shuttle launch performance and revenue structure resulting from the substitution of PREP payloads for

Orbiter payload are now examined. Taking the FY85-FY86 timeframe as a representative sample of the Shuttle manifest,⁵ we find that only 30% of the scheduled NASA STS flights are currently weight constrained and unable to carry additional payload into orbit. The other 70% are either volume constrained or exhibit weight-carrying capacity margins ranging from 1200 to 9600 lb. Because the Shuttle only suffers a 1-lb payload-to-orbit penalty for each 11 lb of additional SRB weight, it can be seen that substantial PREP payloads could be boosted without sacrificing required lift capability.

The 55% of the FY85-FY86 Shuttle flights which are volume constrained cannot, by definition, garner additional revenue from satellites or equipment placed in the Orbiter's payload bay since there is no place to put them. Therefore any excess weight carrying capacity on such flights is not available for sale as a revenue-producing commodity for orbital transportation. SRB-PREP missions could be conducted on such flights without reducing Orbiter payload weight to orbit (since excess lift capability is present). On this basis, we conclude that the majority of the FY85-FY86 Shuttle flights (those which are volume limited/weight capable) could lift PREP payloads without sacrificing revenue producing Orbiter payloads. The net effect of this important result is that launch costs associated with such PREP flights should be largely limited to the cost of integration the PREP payload into its SRB,⁶ and that the STS system could be operated at higher performance efficiency without need of revenue loss if PREP payloads were carried.

IV. Summary

SRB-PREP, though not without drawbacks, is technically attractive. Chief among its deficiencies is a lack of stabilized pointing. Among PREP's greatest assets are its capability to lift large volume, heavy-weight payloads above the obscuring lower atmosphere (and directly into the important ozone layer), where they have access to a high-vacuum environment. PREP can lift several times the payload weight and many times the payload volume of sounding rockets. Further, PREP offers the capability of sustaining higher and higher flight rates as a direct by-product of its intimate association with the Space Shuttle. As demonstrated in this Note, the excess boost capability which most Shuttle flights exhibit (due to full payload bay volume utilization), indicates that SRB-PREP payloads could be launched at zero cost/lb revenue loss to the Space Transportation System.

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ORBIT-RAISING AND MANEUVERING PROPULSION: RESEARCH STATUS AND NEEDS—v. 89

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Advanced primary propulsion for orbit transfer periodically receives attention, but invariably the propulsion systems chosen have been adaptations or extensions of conventional liquid- and solid-rocket technology. The dominant consideration in previous years was that the missions could be performed using conventional chemical propulsion. Consequently, major initiatives to provide technology and to overcome specific barriers were not pursued. The advent of reusable launch vehicle capability for low Earth orbit now creates new opportunities for advanced propulsion for interorbit transfer. For example, 75% of the mass delivered to low Earth orbit may be the chemical propulsion system required to raise the other 25% (i.e., the active payload) to geosynchronous Earth orbit; nonconventional propulsion offers the promise of reversing this ratio of propulsion to payload masses.

The scope of the chapters and the focus of the papers presented in this volume were developed in two workshops held in Orlando, Fla., during January 1982. In putting together the individual papers and chapters, one of the first obligations was to establish which concepts are of interest for the 1995-2000 time frame. This naturally leads to analyses of systems and devices. This open and effective advocacy is part of the recently revitalized national forum to clarify the issues and approaches which relate to major advances in space propulsion.

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