

## TWO NOTES ON LYSANDER

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### 1. *The abolition of the decarchies*<sup>1</sup>

CONSIDERING THE EVIDENT importance of Lysander's organisation of a Spartan empire, we are curiously ill-informed about the detail. We are uncertain about his mere physical movements in almost every month of the crucial period between Aigospotamoi and Pausanias' settlement at Athens. Though there are general statements in plenty, we can name only one city in which a decarchy was certainly set up, Samos (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.7; cf. Parke 52). Question has also been raised about the duration of the decarchies, whether they were abolished at the end of 403 (see, e.g., Beloch 3<sup>2</sup>.1.16) or in 402 (Parke 53–54), or continued down to 397, as R. E. Smith has maintained (*CP* 43 [1948] 150–153), reviving an old heresy.<sup>2</sup>

The case for 397 rests on Xenophon. The basic text, the only one to mention the abolition of the decarchies, is *Hell.* 3.4.2, Lysander's plan to restore them in 396: καὶ αὐτὸς συνεξελθεῖν αὐτῷ (sc. Ἀγησιλάῳ) ἐβούλετο, ὅπως τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν καταστήσειε μετ' Ἀγησιλάου. A little later we hear of political disturbance in the cities, 3.4.7: ἅτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὐσης ὥσπερ ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου. In contrast to this all was quiet and peaceful in 398 when Derkyllidas crossed from the Chersonese into Asia, 3.2.9: τὰς πόλεις ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας; cf. 3.2.11. The factor which disturbed the cities, it is argued, was the ephors' abolition of the decarchies, which must therefore intervene between the middle of 398 and the middle of 396. The occasion suggested is the negotiation between Derkyllidas and the Persians in the summer of 397 (3.2.19–20), when Derkyllidas proposed that the king should leave the Greek cities autonomous, while Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos offered peace εἰ ἐξέλθοι τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρμостαι ἐκ τῶν πόλεων; and they made a truce while these proposals were referred to Sparta and the king.

<sup>1</sup>The following are referred to by name alone: K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 1–3 (Strassburg 1912–1923); D. Lotze, "Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg," *AbhSächs* 57 (1964); Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* 5, 4th ed. revised by H. Stier (Stuttgart 1958); H. W. Parke, "The development of the second Spartan empire," *JHS* 50 (1930) 37–79.

<sup>2</sup>I have traced it back as far as G. R. Sievers, *Geschichte Griechenlands* (Kiel 1840) 22, n. 18, who seems to present it as his own inspiration.

The occasion will not do. The withdrawal of harmosts was not a term of the truce actually concluded, but one of the conditions proposed for a definitive peace which was never ratified;<sup>3</sup> the Greek army remained in Asia and the war went on. If at this time the ephors removed the decarchies,<sup>4</sup> this was a unilateral gesture to which the king made no response, and it hardly needs saying that the supposed gesture is not in the least characteristic for Sparta. Nor is it in general profitable to squeeze implications out of Xenophon as if he were an author who weighed every word and carefully related one passage to another. He liked Derkyllidas (though not everyone did; cf. Ephoros, *FGrHist* 70 F 71), and this colours his picture of Asia under Derkyllidas' government,<sup>5</sup> but he would not allow his feeling for Derkyllidas to interfere with the praise of Agesilaos. So in the *Agesilaos*, where he also needed the concept of political disturbance in the Greek cities in order to bring out the contrast with Agesilaos' good government of them, the disturbance is dated from the fall of Athens (1.37): παραλαβὼν πάσας πόλεις ἐφ' ἃς ἄρξων ἐξέπλευσε στασιαζούσας διὰ τὸ τὰς πολιτείας κινηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔληξαν, ἐποίησεν ὥστε κτλ. This passes over Derkyllidas and Lysander alike,<sup>6</sup> but at *Hell.* 3.4.7 Lysander was part of the story, so the decarchies are mentioned. Conflicts like these must not be treated too solemnly.

The attraction of a late date for the abolition of the decarchies is that it brings us into a period when Spartan commanders controlled large parts of the coast of Asia and the cities had to attend to orders from the ephors, whereas in 403, or at any time before Thibron's expedition of 400, the cities were nominally under Persian control. On the other hand there was certainly a political reaction against Lysander in Sparta in 403/2, and the reversal of his policy for Athens provides a likely context for the general abolition of the decarchies. We need to take a closer look at what was then happening in western Asia Minor and the extent of the influence Lysander or Sparta might exercise there. Surviving ancient sources have little to say about anything outside Athens at this time; modern historians, even Ed. Meyer, have not enough considered the effects of Kyros' temporary removal from the scene after his father's

<sup>3</sup>Smith (152) contemplates that it might have been ratified; or, without that, that the condition might still have been fulfilled because some Spartans wanted peace.

<sup>4</sup>These are the issue in *Hell.* 3.4.2,7, but we need not pedantically take harmosts and decarchies as separate issues.

<sup>5</sup>At *Hell.* 3.2.9 his mind is especially on the contrast between Thibron and Derkyllidas; cf. 3.2.6-7.

<sup>6</sup>Astonishingly, the name of Lysander is not so much as mentioned in *Ages.*, which accounts for the omission of the decarchies here and illustrates Xenophon's irresponsibility. For present purposes it makes no difference whether *Ages.* was written before *Hell.* or after.

death. The basic question is, who was in effective control of the cities at the relevant times.

There is no doubt that in 413/12, when Persia was trying to recover the Greek cities, the responsibility lay with Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.5.5), who had been given the satrapy of Sardis after putting down the revolt of Pisouthnes (Ktesias, *FGrHist* 688 F 15.53). When Kyros arrived in spring 407,<sup>7</sup> his father had given him the satrapies of Lydia, Great Phrygia, and Kappadokia (*An.* 1.9.7) and appointed him "commander of all the forces which assemble in the plain of Kastolos" (*ibid.*, and *Hell.* 1.4.3, *An.* 1.1.2). Thus in 407 Tissaphernes lost Lydia, and if he retained any territory at this time it can only have been a separate government of Karia, where his *οἶκος* was in 397 (*Hell.* 3.2.12). The main question is what happened after the death of Dareios II in spring 404. According to Xenophon, Tissaphernes then procured the imprisonment of Kyros, but the summary of these events in *An.* 1.1.3 is so concise that we cannot tell how long the imprisonment lasted. When his mother Parysatis obtained his release, ἀποπέμπει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, which should mean that she also obtained his restoration to his previous command in full, but 1.1.6–8 shows that this is not how Xenophon understood the situation. There it is said that the Ionian cities had originally been given by the king to Tissaphernes,<sup>8</sup> but they had all revolted to Kyros except Miletos, which he was besieging with the help of exiles expelled by Tissaphernes; with his mother's support he was urging Artaxerxes to assign the Greek cities to himself, but the king was content to let this civil war go on, under the (false) impression that it was wasting Kyros' resources; and by paying in the tribute of the cities he took from Tissaphernes Kyros further helped to conceal his real intentions. For Xenophon, then, Kyros had no official standing on the west coast. This is further substantiated in the account of Orontas' trial at 1.6.6: this man had for a time held the citadel of Sardis against Kyros, and alleged that he did so by Artaxerxes' order, and this clearly shows that Kyros was not then satrap of Lydia, which must have reverted to Tissaphernes.

Other sources tell a different story. The epitome of Ktesias (*FGrHist* 688 F 16.59) speaks only of διαβολή by Tissaphernes and of the rescue of Kyros by his mother, after which, though he was ἡτιμωμένος παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, Kyros went off πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν σατραπείαν; the parallel version of Plutarch (*Artox.* 2–3, printed by Jacoby as 688 F 17) is fuller and more dramatic, but like the epitome it makes no reference to a period of imprisonment, short or long, and it ends with Kyros installed in the

<sup>7</sup>For this chronology see Ferguson, *CAH* 5.483–485; Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953) 2, n. 1; Lotze 71–86.

<sup>8</sup>In the context, τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκ βασιλέως δεδομέναι can only mean an appointment made by Artaxerxes immediately after his accession.

position agreed at 2.5, satrap of Lydia and τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσσης στρατηγός. Ktesias was in a position to pick up what was being said at court, and for these last years his witness is not to be neglected. But it would not be hard for him to mistake the formal detail about Kyros' position in the west, whereas Xenophon was present at that end and his account is in this respect circumstantial; I would attach particular weight to the detail from the trial of Orontas, where there is no obvious motive for misrepresentation. Diodoros 14.12.8 (Kyros' enrolment of Klearchos), and 19.2 (start of the Anabasis), describes Kyros as the ruler τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ σατραπειῶν, but we do not know the ultimate source of this or how accurately Diodoros reflects it. Given Kyros' wide command at an earlier stage and the *de facto* position in 401, it would be an easy slip for anyone to refer to him as satrap or the like at the moment when he set off up country.<sup>9</sup> I would conclude that Xenophon might be wrong about the formal imprisonment of Kyros at Sousa, but that his statement of the formal position in the west is correct; if this latter is also wrong, my argument is that much weakened, but it is not destroyed.

There was then an interval during which, so far as Persia was concerned, Tissaphernes had a free hand with the coastal cities. Meyer however maintained<sup>10</sup> that Lysander kept *de facto* control of them, and handed them over to Kyros when he returned to the west, and that this is what Xenophon meant when he said that they had revolted from Tissaphernes to Kyros. This does not seem to me to be a tenable interpretation of *An.* 1.1.6, 9.9, where ἀφειστέκασαν surely implies that the cities had been in Tissaphernes' hands; and it raises acutely the question where Lysander was when Kyros returned and whether he was then in a position to hand cities over to him. Though we are doubtful of the details, he could have been on the eastern side of the Aegean at any time down to his return to Sparta τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους, and Xenophon certainly thought that he was at Samos immediately before this (*Hell.* 2.3.6-9); but Xenophon places him there for only a short part of summer 403 (2.4.28-30), and for further enlightenment (or the reverse) we must turn to Diodoros and Plutarch.

Diodoros 14.10.1-2 takes its start from Sparta's victory over Athens, and is thus properly placed under 404/3. It alleges a fresh appointment of Lysander as ναύαρχος, with instructions to go round the cities installing harmosts and oligarchies; and 10.2 deals with the tribute imposed on the "defeated," before going on to Sparta's dealings with Dionysios of

<sup>9</sup>Cf. ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν in Xen. *An.* 1.1.3 (above), which looks like the same slip; but Kyros may in fact have been reinstated in his satrapy of Great Phrygia, where he had a palace at Kelainai in 401 (*An.* 1.2.7).

<sup>10</sup>See the change of mind announced in *Theopompos Hellenika* (Halle 1909) 112-113, and incorporated by Stier in his revision of *GdA* 5 (45-46).

Syracuse. The reappointment of Lysander is technically a mistake, since apart from the general rule stated in Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.7 we know that his brother Libys was *ναύαρχος* for 404/3 (2.4.28); and the instructions sound spurious, for there was no need for a fresh voyage to install harmosts after the war was over, nor can there have been many democracies left in the former Athenian empire by the end of 404. We need not simply discard this piece. The chances are that Diodoros has here misunderstood a section of Ephoros devoted to the growth of the Spartan empire, in which he reached back into the past and described the proceedings of Lysander before the fall of Athens, explaining how the empire grew out of the wartime measures of Lysander and others; the *κατὰ γένος* method of Ephoros involved much backward reference of this kind, and it sometimes confused Diodoros.<sup>11</sup> There is no solid support here for an Aegean voyage by Lysander after his return to Sparta in 404.

Two neighbouring chapters are also relevant, 14.12 and 14.13, both placed under 403/2. 14.12 tells the whole story of Klearchos' post-war intervention at Byzantium: how the Byzantines, suffering from *stasis* and Thracian war, asked Sparta for a general, and they sent Klearchos who made himself tyrant; so the Spartans sent out Panthoidas, who defeated Klearchos and shut him up in Selymbria, but he escaped and was taken into Kyros' service. This differs substantially from Xenophon's version (*An.* 2.6.2–6; cf. 1.1.9, 2.1, 3.4), in which Klearchos carried on a virtuous and disinterested fight against the Thracians for the protection of the local Greeks up to the moment when Kyros summoned him for the Anabasis. Klearchos himself is presumably the source for much of this, if not the whole, and parts of the story are notably unconvincing, especially the reasons given for his exile from Sparta (2.6.3–4); we should not be justified in treating Diodoros' account of the activities of Panthoidas as false.<sup>12</sup> The chronology is obscure in detail, but Klearchos' original mission to help Byzantium could hardly be later than the first half of 402, and Diodoros' archon-date 403/2 should be right.<sup>13</sup>

This has two points of interest for the present problem. (a) The opening sentences show that there was no Spartan officer in Byzantium when the city applied to Sparta, and this means that the harmost Sthenelaos, whom Lysander left in charge of Byzantium and Kalchedon

<sup>11</sup>Many examples could be cited: cf. my note in Gomme's *Commentary* to Thuc. 5.67.2.

<sup>12</sup>Panthoidas appears otherwise only in Plut. *Pelop.* 15.6, as a harmost killed near Tanagra in the 370's. Beloch (2<sup>a</sup>.2.276) suggested that he might be the *ναύαρχος* for 403/2, which is possible but not necessary.

<sup>13</sup>It is not clear that he could have had any evidence for this, unless his chronographic source included Klearchos as an isolated one-year tyranny. More probably it is just a piece of narrative which he wished to put in somewhere, and it had to come before the start of the Anabasis, which his source did date.

at the end of 405 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.2), had since been removed. Parke (57) noted this, and guessed that he was no longer needed there after the surrender of Athens. I doubt if this is sufficient, for Byzantium is a key point where one would expect to find a harmost if any remained at all;<sup>14</sup> it is at least as likely that Sthenelaos or his successor had been withdrawn as part of a general change of system. For what it is worth, it may also be noted that there is no suggestion in the narrative that the Byzantine *stasis* was between upholders and opponents of a government imposed by Sparta, or that Panthoidas wished to restore any sort of Lysandran regime. (b) It is clear that Lysander himself was not in the Hellespont in 402.

14.13 deals with Lysander's plans to change the Spartan constitution, his attempts to bribe the oracles, and the papers that were found in his house after his death; it is a timeless piece in that the plans and the approaches to oracles are not related to specific events in his life. Plutarch (*Lys.* 20.7–9) gives an alternative version of the visit to Ammon, dated in a sense to 403 (below), and adds that he reserves the Ephoran version till later; and in 24–26 we have an elaborate account of Lysander's plans, drawn from several sources and partly coinciding with Diodoros, with a direct reference at 25.3–4 to Ephoros (*FGrHist* 70 F 206) which coincides more exactly. The subject comes up at 24.2 in connection with Lysander's quarrel with Agesilaos in 396, but this is not a date for the plans, since Plutarch here speaks of his deciding to put into practice what had been prepared long ago. There are no public events in the Ephoran part of the story except for a trial when envoys from Ammon came to Sparta to accuse Lysander of trying to corrupt the oracle (25.3–4; cf. Diod. 14.13.7), and it is far from clear when Ephoros thought this trial took place, if indeed he thought about it at all. It seems most likely that Ephoros simply collected in one place all the stories about Lysander's plans for the constitution—Diodoros' chapter covers everything from his victory over Athens to the discovery of documents after his death—and if that is so the chapter is not evidence of the attribution of any particular part of the story to the specific year 403/2; and that is all that concerns us here. Diodoros' reason for putting it under 403/2 may be just that the opening ties up with his last reference to Lysander in 14.10.1–2 under 404/3 (above).

The central chapters of Plutarch's *Lysander* (15–21) show him in one of his less chronological moods, more interested in the moral effect of the introduction of gold and silver into Sparta (17) or in the dramatic presentation of the story of Pharnabazos' letter (below) than in the

<sup>14</sup>Note that there was a harmost of Byzantium and a Spartan force in Kalchedon early in 400 (*An.* 6.2.13, 7.1.20), before the outbreak of war with Persia and at a time when the Spartans were trying to conciliate Pharnabazos (7.1.2–3, etc.).

precise sequence of events. The forward and backward jumps are bewildering, especially in 15, but in most cases we can recognise the pieces out of which the miscellany is constructed: thus, when he tells us in 15.5 how Lysander collected all the flute-girls from city and camp for a musical accompaniment to the demolition of the walls, we recognise an adaptation (by Theopompos?) of Xenophon's phrases in *Hell.* 2.2.23, and we know that we have gone back to the surrender of Athens early in 404. Two pieces are not so easily placed: the voyage to Thrace (16.1) and the story of Pharnabazos' letter (19.7 ff.).

The latter is more immediately relevant. Pharnabazos complained to Sparta about Lysander ravaging his territory, and the ephors first executed his subordinate Thorax, then sent for Lysander himself. In alarm he asked Pharnabazos for a letter to exculpate him; the satrap wrote it, but while sealing the letter he cunningly substituted another denouncing him, with suitably dramatic results when Lysander presented it to the ephors. This does not sound like the stuff of serious history, but we must enquire about its dramatic date. Two other versions survive, neither helpful: Polyaeus 7.19 indicates neither context nor date; Nepos *Lys.* 4 puts it in a separate appendix at the end of the life, introducing it with the words *nam cum Lysander praefectus classis in bello multa crudeliter avaraque fecisset*—which so far as they go suggest that Nepos conceived the complaint as made before the end of the war.

Plutarch alone gives a context, though his introduction is indefinite enough. Emerging at the end of 18 from a discussion of the honours paid to Lysander after the war, he turns in 19 from his ambition to his cruelty, especially in his treatment of Miletos and other cities. Not much notice was taken of the victims' complaints till Pharnabazos wrote in, *ἀδικοῦμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τὴν χώραν ἄγοντος καὶ φέροντος*; why Lysander should have been doing this is not explained—it is only after 400 that it became a standard exercise for Spartan commanders in Asia. The sequel shows that we are meant to take the complaint as made early in 403. After the opening of the letter, Lysander with difficulty obtained permission to go to pay a vow to Ammon. While he was away the kings (in the plural, i.e., Agis as well as Pausanias) determined to loosen Lysander's dangerous grip on the cities by expelling his friends and handing power over *τοῖς δημόταις* (21.2), whatever that may mean; hence much political movement, the first open sign of which was Thrasybulos' attack on the Thirty. At that Lysander returned and persuaded his countrymen to support the oligarchs, and the known events of summer 403 begin to unwind in a more or less normal way.

Judeich (*Kleinasiatische Studien* 30–36) heroically contrived to accept all this, at least as a framework. He put Lysander's return to Sparta, *τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους*, as early as possible, observing (28, n. 1) that

Xenophon sometimes distinguishes autumn from summer, so this might be put before the onset of autumn; and he put Lysander's mission to Athens as late as the uncertain chronology of summer 403 would permit. In between we have to fit in an autumn and winter voyage to Thrace and the Hellespont; recalled in spring, Lysander had just time for a quick excursion to Ammon before he came back and set off for Athens. This needs only to be thus spelt out to be seen as impossible, as Beloch noted (3<sup>2</sup>.1.16, n. 1); but considering the way these chapters are constructed it would be permissible to take the Hellespontine voyage out of Plutarch's context and try fitting it into Lysander's life as we know it.

Clearly Lysander was not recalled in disgrace in 405 or 404, and indeed Thorax was alive when Lysander left him in 404 as harmost at Samos (Diod. 14.3.5). 402 and 401 need not be considered, for a Hellespontine voyage in these years would collide with the activities of Klearchos and Panthoidas. We are thus confined to 403, the year which Plutarch indicates. We might squeeze in a spring voyage if we drop the subsequent visit to Ammon, only then it is politically improbable, after this at least partial disgrace, that Lysander should at once be able to put through his policy of maintaining the Thirty, and obtain the command himself. There might be time for an expedition in the autumn, if he left Athens immediately after Pausanias' first clash with the men of the Peiraeus, the last time his name is mentioned in Xenophon's account of the events at Athens (*Hell.* 2.4.30); this was Beloch's solution (*ibid.*), and it has the advantage that Lysander's recall comes in a period when we know, because of Pausanias' later acquittal, that he was in political eclipse. But there is nothing else positively in favour of this supposition, and one may wonder if it is worth racking the chronology to find a place for this story, which is as likely to be just low-grade fiction, a fable about the cleverest of the Greeks being outwitted by a still more wily Persian.

The question of the Thracian voyage may be postponed, for even if it belonged to 403 it would bring Lysander no closer to the cities which, on Meyer's thesis, he handed over to Kyros. We are left with the certainty that he was available and powerful till late in the summer of 404, and a faint possibility that late in 403 he was, if not in Ionia, at least on the Asiatic side of the Aegean. Two pieces of evidence however, slight but positive, show that there was in fact an interval during which the Lysander-Kyros combination lost control of some important cities.

(a) Diodoros (13.104.5–6) says that Lysander sponsored an oligarchic revolution at Miletos, and that Tissaphernes<sup>15</sup> gave a refuge in Lydia

<sup>15</sup>The text has *Φαρνάβαζον*, and *εἰς κλαῦδα φρούριόν τι τῆς Λυδίας* (P: *κλυδίας* cett.). From 13.36 to the end of the book Diodoros uses the name Pharnabazos for a composite figure conflating the two satraps. There is no doubt about this, in spite of Judeich (32, n. 2): at 36.5, 37.4–5, 38.5, etc., "Pharnabazos" unquestionably refers to



to no less than a thousand democratic refugees. This comes between Arginousai and Aigospotamoi, evidently in summer 405, and there is no reason to doubt that it is in its right place in the narrative sequence. When we next hear of Miletos, Tissaphernes held the city and Kyros was besieging it (*An.* 1.1.7; cf. 9.9). In the interval Tissaphernes had got control, and this will be the occasion of the stratagem described in Polyaeus 7.18.2.

(b) *IG* 2<sup>2</sup>.1.48–49 (Tod 97.8–9), towards the end of the first of the two decrees of 403/2 on the stone, praises Ephesos and Notion for their kindness to Samian refugees. The kindness can only be to friends of Athens who had been expelled from Samos when it surrendered to Lysander in the autumn of 404, and it means that at this time there was not in either city a government obedient to Lysander. Ephesos had at one time been so much Lysander's city that a statue of him was set up in the Artemision (Paus. 6.3.15); and he was not the man to allow Samian refugees in a city which he controlled. There must have been a positive change of régime, which Lysander was not at the time able to reverse, and the likely answer is that in the late summer both cities were in the hands of Tissaphernes, the enemy of Kyros and therefore of Lysander. It is improbable that he controlled only those cities for which we happen to have evidence. I conclude that the interval in which Kyros lost control was more than a matter of a few weeks, in fact that through the summer of 404 and possibly well into 403 Tissaphernes was in effective possession and used his opportunity to expel the party of Lysander from the cities.

It is not however easy to establish the relative chronology, for neither Xenophon nor any extant writer treats this period in detail except as regards Athens. 404/3 was counted in Babylon as the first year of Artaxerxes II, so Dareios died before 1 Nisan = 10 April 404.<sup>16</sup> That leaves ample time for Kyros' imprisonment and release in the course of summer 404, and he could thus have been back in the west before

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Tissaphernes, whereas at 40.6, 45.6, etc., it as certainly means Pharnabazos. Diodoros must have become aware of his mistake (he could not have arrived at the odd combination at 46.5–6 without realising it), and apparently he preferred to persist with it rather than go back and correct it, which throws an interesting light on his methods; but he allowed himself a fresh start in Book 14, where Tissaphernes recovers his name at 23.6 and thereafter, while Pharnabazos is himself at 11.2–4, etc. This means that in Book 13 one can determine only from the context which satrap is meant; at 104.6, since we are dealing with Miletos, Tissaphernes is probable and *Αυδίας* makes him certain. Wesseling's *Βλαυδα*, accepted by Vogel, is not specially plausible: *Blaudos* (Steph. Byz. s.v.; Strabo 567), *Blaundos*, etc., seem to prefer the ending in -os, and Miss B. M. Levick suggests *Klannoudda* here, which ends -da in *Tab. Peut.* 9.4, its only appearance except for the ethnic on coins (cf., e.g., W. M. Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* [Oxford 1895] 588–592).

<sup>16</sup>R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology*<sup>2</sup> (Chicago 1946) 16, 32.

Lysander went home. But we can be sure that at that time Kyros had not won over Ephesos or Notion (as he did in the end: Xen. *An.* 1.1.6; cf. 1.4.2), and the Athenian decree (*IG* 2<sup>3</sup>.1, above) offers a strong presumption that these two cities had not changed hands again before the prytany of Pandionis in 403/2. We have no good basis for a guess at the length of his detention in Persia, which could easily have lasted into 403.<sup>17</sup>

So in many or most of the Greek cities of Asia the governments installed by Lysander were deposed in the first instance by Tissaphernes and not by Sparta. That might be only a temporary interruption, and the next question is what happened when one of these cities went over to Kyros; his first partisans, as a legacy from the years 407–405, were probably Lysander's friends, but we must not too quickly assume that he restored the decarchies. We have detail only for Miletos, and not enough there. In 405 Tissaphernes had befriended a substantial body of democratic refugees (*Diod.* 13.104.6, above). Later, Xenophon reports (*An.* 1.1.7, which need not be wholly objective) that the city proposed to go over to Kyros, but Tissaphernes intervened, killing some and exiling others. Tissaphernes' friends are presumably the democrats, and the city held out because they feared for their lives if the others regained power; of the exiles whom Kyros took up, we know only that they were his partisans expelled by Tissaphernes, and it is a reasonable assumption that there was at least an overlap between them and the group Lysander had supported. In other cities there may have been less bitterness in the background, and at its simplest the issue may have presented itself as a choice between Persian masters, or as a guess which of them was more likely to win. The contest must have been diplomatic as well as military, and if a city did not want its decarchy back it would not have been politic for Kyros to insist. Sparta comes into it only to the extent that Kyros, who wanted Spartan help in his bid for the throne, had a motive for respecting the prejudices of the group in power there.

His original hopes had depended in part on his personal friendship with Lysander, as Xenophon allusively explains at *Hell.* 2.1.14; but the same sentence gives priority to his *φιλία* with the city of Sparta, and his need to keep on terms with them outlasted this first period of Lysander's power. When the time came for the Anabasis, the help was in a measure forthcoming (*An.* 1.4.2), and no one hints that it was procured through Lysander. The first clear sign of a revival of the latter's influence comes in the dispute over the succession between Agesilaos and Leotychidas,

<sup>17</sup>Meyer (173) declares without argument that Kyros returned in summer 403; Cavaignac, *REH* 25 (1924) 312, preferred 404 for the not very substantial reason that the *νικητήριον* he sent to Lysander (*Plut. Lys.* 18.2) stood in the Akanthian treasury at Delphi, not on the monument of the nauarchs, which was therefore not yet ready.

and the earliest date that anyone has proposed for that is spring 400,<sup>18</sup> well after Kyros' death. At the critical time, late in 402 and over the winter, he probably had to deal with men of Pausanias' way of thinking.

Kyros' hope of Spartan help explains how a Spartan decision about the decarchies could affect the cities of Asia while he was in control. So long as we concentrate on the direct relations between Sparta and these cities, the concern of Xenophon in *Hell.* 3.4.2, we naturally look first to periods in which Sparta could directly settle the form of their government; and that, as has been said, is the attraction of the view that the decarchies survived into the 390's. But the ephors' pronouncement in favour of *πάτριον πολιτεῖαι* means the adoption of a general principle which should also be applicable outside Asia; and outside the sphere assigned to Persia in the treaty of 411 Byzantium had lost its harmost before 402. For such a general shift away from the policy of Lysander the appropriate time is the latter part of 403 or early in 402, when Lysander's arrangements for the control of Athens were abandoned, and the subsequent acquittal of Pausanias showed that a policy of conciliation was for the time being more acceptable at Sparta. That gives us a solid reason why Kyros should dissociate himself from the decarchies, which we may suppose were not in any case popular with the cities he was engaged in winning over; and in such a situation the new policy of Sparta could prove valid for Asia as well as Europe. Much detail remains unknown or unclear, but we can see enough to conclude that there is no necessity for the decarchies to have continued in being till 397.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup>The early date is the more likely: cf. Beloch, 1<sup>2</sup>.2.185-6, 3<sup>2</sup>.1.19 n. 1. Xenophon's account of the middle year of the war between Sparta and Elis (*Hell.* 3.2.25 ff., esp. 30) excludes the possibility that the campaign was interrupted by an Olympic festival, so the war either ended before the festival of 400 or began after it: 402-400 or 399-397. The latter fits the synchronism in *Hell.* 3.2.21, but Xenophon's record does not encourage one to put much weight on his *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον*; and spring 397 is very late for Agesilaos' accession. Diodoros (14.17.4-12, 34.1) spreads the war over 402/1 and 401/0, and there are grounds (as I hope to argue elsewhere) for supposing that this dating had some authority.

<sup>19</sup>I do not think that Plutarch's evidence helps much here. At *Lys.* 21.2 the action of the kings against Lysander appears to belong even before Thrasybulos' seizure of Phyle, but for reasons stated above I doubt if this passage is usable for chronology. At *Ages.* 6.2 the imperfects *ἐξέπιπτον* and *ἀπέθνησκον*, used of the fate of Lysander's friends in Asia at the moment when he was fostering Agesilaos' expedition of 396, have been used as evidence that the process of dissolving the decarchies was still going on at that time; but this is simply a touched-up version of Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2 with no probative force of its own. Nor does Nepos, *Lys.* 3.1, provide a date. It is unfortunate that the lacuna at the end of 2.3 prevents us from deciding the antecedent of the *ἡ* who abolished the decarchies—whether the ephors as in Xenophon or the kings as in Plutarch—but 3 itself simply repeats the story of Lysander's constitutional plans and dealings with the oracles, which carries no note of time.

2. *Central and Northern Greece*

The question of Lysander's voyage to Thrace, passed over above, leads to a more interesting area of speculation. Its date should be determinable from the opening sentence of Plut. *Lys.* 16, ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος ἀπὸ τούτων γενόμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ Θράκης ἐξέπλευσε—if we could be sure of the reference of ἀπὸ τούτων. *Lys.* 15 ended with Lysander rebuking Kallibios the commander of the garrison at Athens, but Lysander ought not to be present when this garrison arrived (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.13–14), and disquiet is increased when we note that Plutarch writes (15.6) as if the garrison and the Thirty themselves were installed at one time by Lysander in person, and other telescoping and inversion in *Lys.* 15 makes it still less safe to rely on this connective. In 16.1 itself the voyage is linked with the despatch of Gylippos back to Sparta with the surplus money (αὐτὸς μὲν . . . ἐξέπλευσε, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὰ περιόντα κτλ.); and, whatever we may think of the story of Gylippos' theft, its place is unquestionably before Lysander's own return to Sparta; indeed Diodoros (13.106.8–9) puts it before the surrender of Athens. This seems a much more secure indication, and indeed if my previous argument was sound there was not much opportunity for Lysander to visit Thrace after the autumn of 404.

It is likely that he did in fact at some stage visit the Thraceward region. Plutarch has no perceptible motive for inventing such a thing, even if that were his nature; the voyage was apparently no use for any of his themes, and he leaves Lysander after this half-sentence while he turns his attention to Gylippos and the introduction of gold and silver coin into Sparta. Two other Lysander stories presuppose the voyage, neither of them obviously or grossly false: the dream in which Ammon bade him give up the siege of Aphytis, in Plutarch (20.7) and Pausanias (3.18.3); and his treatment of the pro-Athenian party in Thasos, in Polyaeus (1.45.4) and in a mutilated version in Nepos (*Lys.* 2.2).<sup>20</sup> There is room for these activities before his return to Sparta, for there is a whole year available, from autumn 405 to autumn 404, in which we know only of his visits to Athens and his presence for part of the time at Samos. Immediately after Aigospotamoi he sent Eteonikos to the Thraceward area with ten ships (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.5), so he did not then go there himself; but he could have gone later in that year, or in spring 404, or indeed during the summer, for though he went to Samos after the

<sup>20</sup>Nepos' reference to the *praecipua fides* of Thasos towards Athens is at first sight surprising in view of Thuc. 8.64.3–5, but it is no doubt right for the period after Thrasyboulos' recovery of the city (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.9), as Samos' loyalty was assured after, if not before, the revolution described in Thuc. 8.21. Meyer (11, n. 1) and Lotze (29) argue plausibly that in Plut. *Lys.* 19.3 Miletos is named in error for Thasos.

surrender of Athens (*Hell.* 2.3.3) and was there when the Athenian oligarchs called him in to settle the constitution (Diod. 14.3.4), he need not have spent the whole summer there continuously.

If it is right to assign Lysander's Thracian cruise to this period, we have also to ask if his presence in this area has any connection with the situation of Larisa and of Archelaos of Macedon, as described and implied in the speech entitled 'Ἡρώδου περὶ πολιτείας'.<sup>21</sup> It is now generally accepted<sup>21a</sup> that this is a genuine document from the late fifth century, a plea to the Larisians to accept an invitation from Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to join them and to take united action against Archelaos. J. S. Morrison in *CQ* 36 (1942) 65–76 and H. T. Wade-Gery in *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 271–292 (= *CQ* 39 [1945] 19–33) have notably illuminated this document. Their argument about its date is entirely convincing,<sup>22</sup> that it falls between the surrender of Athens in April 404<sup>23</sup> and the victory of Lykophron of Pherai over the Larisians and others on the day of the eclipse of the third of September 404. Between these dates Sparta proposed to Larisa an alliance directed against Archelaos (19, etc.); and at some date prior to this Archelaos had himself offered to become the ally of Sparta, and even to pay for the privilege, but had been rebuffed (24). This offer by Archelaos need not itself fall after the surrender of Athens, but it must come at a time when Sparta's victory was seen to be certain, probably after Aigospotamoi.

We do not have to believe all that the "Herodes" speaker says. He claims (19) that Archelaos' only crime in the eyes of the Peloponnesians was neutrality in their war with Athens, but we know that in fact he had collaborated with Athens (*SEG* 10.138 = *ML* 91; cf. And. 2.11, Diod. 13.49.1) and that Sparta had more solid grounds for treating him as an enemy. Again, as Meyer pointed out, it is illogical to argue both that the Peloponnesians were in no position to harm Larisa (32) and that Larisa would be in danger from them if she refused their invitation (20). There are probably other distortions, but we cannot doubt the main proposition, the offer of alliance and of joint war against Archelaos, and

<sup>21</sup>For the collections in which the text is printed, see Wade-Gery 271; he does not print it entire, but discusses many doubtful passages. Drerup's separate publication (1908) is the most complete; Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika* (Halle 1909) 201–283, prints a text with a reduced apparatus, and the most substantial historical commentary before Morrison and Wade-Gery.

<sup>21a</sup>But see the separate edition of U. Albin (Florence 1968).

<sup>22</sup>I will not repeat their arguments, but would draw special attention to Wade-Gery's demolition (276–278) of the inferences drawn by Meyer from the mention of Elis (28).

<sup>23</sup>If Diodoros (13.108.1) is right in placing Dareios' death μικρόν . . . τῆς εἰρήνης ὕστερον, the surrender of Athens came well before the tenth of April (above, 214). This should have been noted in my addition to Gomme's note on Thuc. 5.26.3.

we have no reason to reject the statement that the latter had tried to conciliate Sparta and been repulsed. If Lysander's officer Eteonikos was off the coast of Thrace at the material time, or still more Lysander himself, we can assume that Archelaos' offer was made in the first instance to him and not to the distant authorities at Sparta. It might also be Lysander who conceived the plan of treating the Macedonian king as an irreclaimable barbarian and using his Thessalian neighbours against him.

To get this into focus we must briefly review the recent relations between Sparta and Thessaly. To go no further back,<sup>24</sup> the Thessalian *koinon* became Athens' ally when she broke with Sparta in 462 (Thuc. 1.102.4), but the strength of the pro-Spartan faction is shown by the change of sides of the Thessalian cavalry at Tanagra (107.7); while the exile of an Aleuad of Larisa, Orestes described as son of the Thessalian "king" Echekratidas, and the help he got from Athens in 454 (111.1), both suggest that the Aleuadai had retained the headship of the *koinon* down to this point and show that they were the friends of Athens.<sup>25</sup> What happened next is obscure, but the next *tagos* we hear of is of another family, Daochos of Pharsalos, whose peaceful twenty-seven years (*SIG* 274 no. 6) probably began around 440; and the alliance with Athens had been restored by 431 (Thuc. 2.22.3), though to no great effect.

The major fact of this time is the Spartan foundation of Herakleia Trachinia in 426, a strikingly ambitious project out of all proportion to the two purposes which Thucydides stresses (3.92.4), protection of the Trachinians and Dorians, and attack on Athens through Euboeia; a third motive, more lightly stressed, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Θράκης παρόδου χρησίμους ἔξειν, is interesting as foreshadowing Brasidas' enterprise of 424 but equally fails to explain the scale of Herakleia. It seems inescapable that Sparta, or a party in Sparta, favoured expansion in this direction for its own sake.<sup>26</sup> Thucydides notes at the outset (93.2) that Thessalian

<sup>24</sup>See Pind. *Pyth.* 10.1–3, with C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 104–105 and Hdt. 6.74.1; Hdt. 6.72.1; Plut. 859d. Whatever Sparta's exact relation with the Aleuadai in the 490's, their medism evidently ended it, and Paus. 3.7.9 is no doubt right in saying that Leotychidas' post-war expedition was directed against the Aleuadai; it failed, and they probably retained power till the 450's (see next note).

<sup>25</sup>For Echekratidas as an Aleuad name, see Morrison 60–63. There was clearly a large upheaval, and the Aleuadai never recovered the same power, but we need not follow M. Sordi, *La lega tessala* (Rome 1958) 106 ff., 344–347, in the deductions about "the revolution of 457" which she draws from the puzzling Thessalian dedication at Delphi published by G. Daux, *BCH* 82 (1958) 329–334 (the text is also printed by L. H. Jeffery, *Local Scripts* [Oxford 1961] 375). As Daux rightly says, there is much that we do not know about Thessalian politics in this time.

<sup>26</sup>It is not easy to follow the development of Sparta's policy. Gomme, on 3.92.4, remarked of the foundation "clearly we can see the mind of Brasidas behind this," which may be right; but among the *oikistai* of Herakleia we find not Brasidas but the

hostility was both continuous and effective, and we should expect that hostility to be strongest in the nearest of the great cities of Thessaly, Pharsalos; but when Brasidas came two years later he was helped by friends in Pharsalos (Thucydides names five of them, 4.78.1), so there was also a pro-Spartan faction there, ready to co-operate with the Spartan force near by. "Some Thessalians" joined in the defeat of Herakleia by its neighbours in winter 420/19 (5.51); more general disquiet is indicated when Agis from Dekeleia in winter 413/12 took hostages from the Achaioi Phthiotai and other subjects of the Thessalians in the area, and tried to enrol them in the Spartan alliance, *μεμφομένων καὶ ἀκόντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν* (8.3.1).<sup>27</sup> It should be noted that the Thessalian city with the nearest interest in Achaia Phthiotis is, again, Pharsalos. The fragility of Agis' encroachment on southern Thessaly was shown in winter 409/8, when according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.2.18) the Herakleots suffered another defeat, this time from the Oitaioi, in which the Achaians betrayed the colonists. This is the last we hear from this area before the end of the war and the occasion of the "Herodes" speech. Xenophon says nothing of any measure taken by Agis or anyone else to repair the defeat, but his record is so scrappy that we must not assume that nothing was done; and Herakleia was under Spartan control in 399 (below).

In all this there was much to alarm the Thessalians, especially the foundation of Herakleia and Agis' expedition of 413/12; and their reaction might take either of the standard forms, increased resistance or a scramble for appeasement. The effects on Pharsalos have been discussed above. At Pherai Lykophron is called "tyrant" by Diodoros (14.82.5, for what that may be worth), and is credited by Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.3.4, which could be the interpolator) with the ambition to rule all Thessaly; probably he hoped, like Jason later (*Hell.* 6.1.8 ff.), to

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apparently incompetent Alkidas, who had overruled him at Kerkyra not long before (3.79.3), whereas Brasidas is next heard of in the subordinate post of trierarch at Pylos in 425 (4.11.4). Brasidas' march to the north, and the opposition to him which Thucydides later notes (4.108.7), may preoccupy us too much; independent of the war with Athens, there was often a current of opinion which favoured expansion by land to the north, as the evidence considered in this paper shows.

<sup>27</sup>Thucydides says nothing of Herakleia in this passage, and the omission is extremely odd, for Herakleia must be relevant, and the last we heard of it was at 5.52.1, in 419 when the Boiotians took it over, to the resentment of Sparta. Spartan relations with Boiotia were once more cordial by the opening of Thuc. 8, and clearly the position had altered in the interval. The omission is perhaps parallel to the omission in 8.5.5 of all reference to Athens' support of Amorges (*Historia* 10 [1961] 6, 13): that is, the re-establishment of Spartan control over Herakleia came earlier than winter 413/12 but had not been noted in its proper place, and Thucydides intended to repair the omission when he revised Books 6-7.

become *tagos*, the official head of the *koinon*.<sup>28</sup> Xenophon has Jason refer to Lykophron's friendship with Sparta (*Hell.* 6.4.24), but we cannot date that; the build-up of his power must begin before his victory of September 404 (*Hell.* 2.3.4), and Sparta clearly had an interest in Thessalian politics by this time, but that is all we can say. In Larisa, the "Herodes" speaker tells us that for a brief time a hoplite oligarchy had been established (30); Morrison (65 f.), supported by Wade-Gery (280–281), makes the attractive suggestion that Kritias, acting in the Spartan interest, had a hand in setting up this régime, and that Theramenes refers to this in *Xen. Hell.* 2.3.36. In the civil war which preceded the "Herodes" speech, Archelaos had helped the *δῆλοι* to victory (9–10) and had taken hostages from them (33). It remains conjecture that Sparta had assisted the first overthrow of the nobility, but it is certain that the latter regained power with Archelaos' help and were dependent on him. It is thus no surprise that they should use the strong term *δουλεύειν ἐτέροις* (26) to describe what would happen to them if Larisa accepted the Peloponnesian offer and joined a war against their protector.

Uncertain as some of the details must remain, it is clear that this was a situation which could be exploited, if Sparta planned and acted boldly. There is no proof that Lysander was the planner, but he was in the relevant area at the relevant time, and we know of no plausible alternative. If he was responsible for Sparta's dealings with Larisa and Archelaos, we must note that he did not confine his attention to capturing for Sparta the maritime empire of Athens but was also alive to the possibilities of expansion by land to the north, like the founders of Herakleia. Our sources do not report this aspect, but it would not in itself be surprising, and the sequel does not discourage belief in it.

For Larisa, we have first a single phrase from Thrasy machos' speech *ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων*: 'Ἀρχελάῳ δουλεύσομεν Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάρῳ; (Diels-Kranz *Vorsokr.* B2). As Wade-Gery argued (273–275), a speech with this title should be a plea on behalf of Larisa to some other party, probably Sparta: that is, someone, not necessarily representing the group then dominant in Larisa, was asking support to liberate the city from dependence on Archelaos. That might be, as Wade-Gery reconstructs it, an unsuccessful attempt later than the "Herodes" speech, at a time when

<sup>28</sup>The epigram on his grandson's monument at Delphi (*SIG* 274 no. 6 [above, 219]) emphasises the peace and prosperity of Daochos' twenty seven years of rule, and this and other considerations suggest that it came to an end well before 404; but we do not know what happened next. Very possibly there was a period without a *tagos*; the intermittent character of the office is clear from *Xen. Hell.* 6.1.8–9, 12. According to Thucydides (4.78.2–5) the *koinon* was not very effective in 424, and he does not even mention Daochos.



Larisa had been weakened by defeat at the hands of Lykophron; alternatively, it might be earlier, a successful attempt to gain Spartan support for that hoplite oligarchy which the "Herodes" speaker regretted, against a nobility dependent on Macedonian support. Certainly later than 404 comes the activity of Aristippos, an Aleuad (Pl. *Meno* 70b) who, *πιεζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν οἴκοι ἀντιστασιωτῶν*, obtained from Kyros 4,000 mercenaries and six months pay, twice what he asked for (Xen. *An.* 1.1.10). As Morrison points out (66–67, esp. 66, n. 3), he failed to send back more than a fraction of this force when Kyros summoned them (*An.* 1.2.6), so it is clear that he had not freed himself from his domestic troubles by spring 401, but we do not know what eventually became of him. After the murder of Archelaos in 399 Macedon was for the time less formidable and the pressures on Larisa were that much altered. By 395 Medeios<sup>29</sup> was established as their leader, described by Diodoros (14.82.5) as *δυναστεύων*; though there is no conclusive evidence, he is often supposed to be an Aleuad (see, e.g., Morrison 67).

Of Pherai we can only say that Lykophron was still tyrant in 395 and still at war with Larisa (Diod., *ibid.*); he had not attained his ambition to be recognised as *tagos*. At Pharsalos Sparta had a garrison in 395, a striking sign of renewed activity in the north: this comes out in Diodoros' account of the aftermath of Haliartos (14.82.5–6), when Medeios obtained 2,000 men from the anti-Spartan coalition, took Pharsalos *ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρουμένην*, and sold the inhabitants. Aristotle (*Hist. An.* 618 b 15) adds an odder touch, the dearth of crows in Attica and Peloponnese when Medeios' mercenaries were destroyed in Pharsalos, suggesting that crows have some means of communicating with one another. Morrison (67–68) arranges these events more plausibly than Meyer (*Theopomps Hellenika* [Halle 1909] 254): Medeios' mercenaries were there first, possibly the troops that Aristippos failed to return to Kyros; then the Pharsalians admitted the Spartans, who slaughtered the mercenaries; and this is why Medeios treated the city so harshly.

Lastly, Herakleia helps us to date this resumption of Spartan intervention. Diodoros (14.38.4–5) places under 399/8 the mission of Herippidas<sup>30</sup> to deal with *stasis* there, and his execution of five hundred culprits; and a war against τῶν . . . περὶ τὴν Οἴτην κατοικούντων, which ended in their withdrawal to Thessaly, whence the Boiotians restored

<sup>29</sup>He is uniformly *Μῆδιος* in Diodoros, as is the friend of Alexander, M. son of Oxythemis (H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* [Munich 1926] no. 521; *FGH Hist* 129) in literary sources; but *Μῆδεῖος* in some mss. of Arist. *Hist. An.* 618 b 15. *Μῆδεῖος* is certain for the 2nd/1st cent. Athenians of this name (*PA* 10094–10100), and this spelling is guaranteed for Larisa by the *ναοποῖος* *Μῆδεῖος* 'Ἀριστοφυλῖδα Λαρισαῖος (*SIG* 237 l. 16, etc.) in the years around 330. This was not a direct descendant in the male line, since his grandfather's name was Aristophylos (*SIG* 254A), but no doubt a relative.

<sup>30</sup>For this man's career see Parke, *CQ* 21 (1927) 159–165.

them after five years. This item is a little jumbled. Polyaeus (2.21) helps by identifying Herippidas' victims as Trachinians; and Diodoros later (14.82.7) makes it Trachinians whom the Boiotians brought back—no doubt Herippidas did also conduct a war against the Oitaioi, who had led the attack on Herakleia in winter 409/8 (above), and at 38.5 (but not at 82.7) Diodoros confused two sets of people with whom Herippidas dealt. The restoration is, again, part of the sequel of Haliartos, late in summer 395, and this confirms that Diodoros' date for the action of Herippidas is roughly right, though 400 would fit better than 399.

Sketchy as these data are, it is clear that in the early 390's Sparta resumed on a substantial scale the policy of which the foundation of Herakleia was an earlier symptom. The first step, the reorganisation of Herakleia itself, comes at the time when Lysander's renewed influence had just been shown in the accession of Agesilaos to the throne. That might be written off as coincidence, and perhaps we should not yet succumb to the temptation of noticing that Herippidas' brutality is very much in Lysander's style. But it is legitimate to look also at the last act of his life, when Lysander was sent to Phokis to assemble an army of Phokians, Oitaioi, Herakleots, Malians, and Ainianes, and bring it to Haliartos to meet Pausanias and the regular army (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6). These Central Greek alliances are clearly the fruit of Sparta's recent activity in this area—the adherence of the Oitaioi is especially striking in view of their record—and it may be significant that Lysander and not some other commander was sent to collect them. There can be no proof, but it would be a reasonable guess that this was not the first time he had been seen round the head of the Malian Gulf.

All this must have a bearing on the vexed question of the causes of the Corinthian War.<sup>31</sup> It is easy to discount Xenophon's simple view that the root cause was the Persian gold brought to Greece by Timokrates of Rhodes, in order to stir up war in Greece and so stab the heroic Agesilaos in the back (*Hell.* 3.5.1–2). The Oxyrhynchos historian (7[2].2–5) combats this, arguing that in each state Sparta had supported a party of her friends, and so the opposing parties were eager to foment war long before Timokrates' arrival, from simple motives of self-preservation; for Thebes in particular he tells us (17[12].2, 18[13].1) that Ismenias and Androkleidas wanted war because they were afraid of losing to Astias and Leontiadas the predominant position which they had held for some time past. But this is not enough either: it may enlighten

<sup>31</sup>For a recent discussion and bibliography, see S. Perlman, *CQ* n.s. 14 (1964) 64–81. I would agree with Perlman that the Greeks at home were more afraid of what Sparta might do to them in the future than resentful about what she had already done to them, and I applaud his emphasis on the incident at Aulis; but I think he seriously underestimates the importance of what Sparta was currently doing on the borders of Boiotia.

us about the personal motives of individual leaders, but it does not tell us, as a Thucydidean speech would be likely to do, about the arguments or emotional levers they used to get their countrymen to vote for war. The author does not even explain why Ismenias was more in danger from Leontiadas in 395 than he had been at other times.<sup>32</sup>

For this last question we can borrow from the author's own exposition of the reasons for Leontiadas' earlier predominance (17[12].3): it was partly due to the near presence of the Spartan force at Dekeleia, partly to the mere profit of raiding their Attic neighbours. So now, when the Spartans had re-established themselves in Herakleia and had just seized Pharsalos, when Megara was still loyal to Sparta and Athens reluctant to offend her, a cautious or timid Boiotian might well prefer to cultivate the professed friends of Sparta, Leontiadas and the rest. The opposite effect might be equally important. We have enough signs of Theban discontent with Spartan leadership after the fall of Athens, the latest and most striking of which was the disruption of Agesilaos' sacrifice at Aulis by horsemen sent by the Boiotarchs (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4); Xenophon records the fact but did not feel the need to explain, so it is left to us to note that these Boiotarchs were evidently of Ismenias' way of thinking, and that it was possible in the summer of 396 to make an official demonstration, of the most conspicuous kind, of anti-Spartan feeling in Boiotia. But the longer Spartan pressure was allowed to continue, the worse the prospect for Ismenias; in 395 the balance of feeling may have been more even.

The Oxyrhynchos historian knew, of course, that Ismenias must find a plausible pretext for war, that he could not simply stand up in the federal Council and explain that he was in fear for his own political position or that he had been paid to start trouble for Sparta; hence the elaborate manoeuvre with Phokis and Lokris, to which the author characteristically devotes ample space (18[13].2-4). But he gives only half a sentence to the crucial decision of the Boiotians to reject Sparta's proposal of arbitration and to march at once into Phokis. Thucydides, who was in important respects his model, would surely have done this differently; the situation cries out for an adaptation of the famous formula of 1.23.6, that the growth of Spartan power alarmed the Boiotians and compelled them to war. The Oxyrhynchos author knew what was going on in Central Greece—he describes the first Boiotian campaign of 395 in Phokis (18[13].5), and it would be reasonable to suppose that the northern details in Diod. 14.82.5-9 derive ultimately from him—but

<sup>32</sup>Since we are dealing with fragments, it is always possible that the author had dealt more fully with this aspect elsewhere; it remains true that the absence of comment in this passage is surprising.

he gives no sign that he thought that these matters affected the Boiotian decision in 395.

Whoever it was that persuaded the Spartans to take up again this policy of expansion to the north, he or they bear the primary responsibility for driving the Boiotians to the point where they were prepared to risk a war. I have suggested that it might be Lysander, and one might be tempted in this connection to exploit Plutarch, *Lys.* 27.1, where he speaks of Lysander meeting his death before the return of Agesilaos from Asia, *ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τὸν Βοιωτικὸν πόλεμον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἐμβαλὼν τὴν Ἑλλάδα. λέγεται γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως*: some blamed him, some the Thebans, some both. Plutarch goes on to list known grievances—the interruption of the sacrifice at Aulis, the Persian gold, the quarrel over the tithe of the spoils of the Peloponnesian War, Theban support of Thrasyboulos. When he comes to the point in 28.1 he can do no better than to talk of Lysander's old age and bad temper spurring the ephors on to action, and maybe there was nothing more penetrating than this to be found among the historians of the fourth century. If so, we are more than ever compelled to make our own guesses.

The fact of this Spartan expansion is of course more important than the question which Spartan began it. It must be stressed that our knowledge of Central and Northern Greece is throughout fragmentary and uncertain. It is chance that the "Herodes" speech survived at all, and without it we should not have suspected the plans which Sparta entertained in 404. It is our luck that Diodoros felt he had room for an account of the sequel to Haliartos—for 396/5 he had so much to relate of Dionysios that he could spare only 14.81.1–3 for the outbreak of war in mainland Greece—and without him we should not have suspected the Spartan garrison in Pharsalos in 395. Aristotle's interest in the movement of crows is a still less likely bonus. There are large tracts of virtually unknown history here, much of which was recorded in the fourth century but is lost to us because our surviving sources were more interested in the south and the Aegean. It is natural enough that these sources should treat the Peloponnesian War in terms of the Aegean battles in which Athens lost it, and treat the Aegean empire of Athens as the main prize won by Sparta from the war. That is not of course merely wrong, but the bias does obscure the fact that for Sparta conquest by land was the more natural ambition. Thucydides offers some corrective with his account of Herakleia and of Brasidas' adventures, but even Thucydides was very much an Athenian, for whom the maritime empire was the prime consideration. Nevertheless the evidence which chance has placed at our disposal does disclose, to a remarkable degree, the strength of Sparta's interest in the north, at all times when she was in an expansive

mood and free, more or less, from preoccupations further south.<sup>33</sup> The Olynthian War at the end of the 380's was the culmination of many years' effort in a familiar field, not an isolated aberration. The aberration was rather the pursuit of naval hegemony in the Aegean, successful only over short periods when the interests of Sparta and Persia coincided.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>In an interesting and thoughtful article in *Klio* 52 (1970) 255–275 D. Lotze has argued that it is anachronistic to attribute imperialistic ambitions to Sparta immediately after the Persian Wars. That seems right (cf. Gomme's important note to Thuc. 5.105.2); it was Athens, with her very differently organised alliance, that showed the way to empire. In that case Herodotos' phrase about Leotychidas' expedition to Thessaly, *παρεὸν δὲ οἱ πάντα ὑποχείρια ποιήσασθαι* (6.72.1), is also anachronistic, a reflection of what would naturally be thought in the next generation.

<sup>34</sup>This is a revised version of a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society in February 1959. I am grateful for criticisms made on that occasion, and more especially to Mr G. L. Cawkwell for subsequent comments (which do not limit his continuing right to dissent).