

treated in isolation, the former referring to the time before the engagement was broken off and the latter not necessarily referring to Neoboule at all.¹⁶

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A NOTE ON PERICLES' LAST SPEECH

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IN HIS LAST SPEECH, Pericles urges the Athenians

λέναι... τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὁμόσε μὴ φρονήματι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρονήματι. αὖχημα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐτυχούς καὶ δειλῶ τινὶ ἐγγίγνεται, καταφρόνησις δὲ ὅς ἂν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεῖται τῶν ἐναντίων προύχειν, ὃ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας τύχης ἢ ξύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἥσσαν πιστεύει, ἥς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἡ ἰσχὺς, γνώμῃ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἥς βεβαιότερα ἢ πρόνοια.¹

"It is all very elaborate," says Gomme, "but not so obscure as Dionysios, *Thuc. iud.* 928, thinks and as some modern editors have made it."² Nevertheless, though Gomme explicates clearly and in detail the sense of the passage, I think he joins other commentators in failing to discern Thucydides' unorthodox and original technique of persuasive definition.³ A closer look at the passage will, I think, show Gomme's uneasiness about the treatment of *καταφρόνησις* here to be unwarranted.⁴

After the exhortation to face the enemy *μὴ φρονήματι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ*

¹⁶Several reviewers of Lasserre's *Les épodes d'Archiloque* rejected his combination of the two fragments: cf. A. Colonna, *Doxa* 4 (1951) 78, A. Lesky, *AAHG* 7 (1954) 10, Q. Cataudella, *Paideia* 11 (1956) 63. A similar objection was already made by O. Crusius in *RE* 2 (1896) 494. West (above, note 7) 131, however, feels that frs. 118-120 could be combined, with the *ὥς* of 120.1 answering the *ὥς* of 118.

¹Thuc. 2.62.3-5. I follow the Oxford Text of Jones and Powell.

²A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (Oxford 1970) 172; hereafter Gomme.

³On "persuasive definition" cf. A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960) 38-40 and C. L. Stevenson "Persuasive Definitions," *Mind* (1938) 331 ff. It should be particularly noted, however, that according to Stevenson a persuasive definition gives a word a new meaning "without substantially changing its emotive meaning" (331). When Thucydides redefines *καταφρόνησις*, as we shall see, the most important change is the one that takes place in the emotive force.

⁴In commenting on another passage he remarks, "It would be juster to complain of ii, 62, 3-4 as a meaningless play on the word *καταφρόνησις*" (1.417).

καταφρόνηματι, Pericles immediately goes on to define the essential difference between αὔχημα and καταφρόνησις, making it turn on the presence or absence of γνώμη. Commentators have been bothered by the substitution of αὔχημα and καταφρόνησις where we should have expected definitions of φρόνημα and καταφρόνημα.⁵ How do the two pairs relate to each other (if they do), and what is the point of the substitution?

The first observation we can make with confidence is that καταφρόνημα is simply a *variatio* for καταφρόνησις, used probably for the assonance in φρονήματι . . . καταφρονήματι.⁶ καταφρόνημα does not occur elsewhere in Classical Greek, while the form with termination in -σις is used twice more by Thucydides (5.8.3; 5.9.3) and occasionally by other Classical writers (e.g., Pl. *Resp.* 558b; Arist. *Rh.* 1378b14).⁷

The substitution of αὔχημα for φρόνημα was taken also as *variatio* by the scholiast,⁸ an interpretation rightly rejected by both Marchant and Gomme, though for different reasons. I do not see how a solution is possible in the suggestion that αὔχημα is substituted for καταφρόνημα, in view of the previous observation. The problem largely disappears, however, when we realize first of all that there is no contrast intended between φρόνημα and καταφρόνημα. The Athenians should have "not φρόνημα alone, but also καταφρόνημα," i.e., both of them. φρόνημα is here equivalent to γνώμη, the reasoned calculation of power on both sides which justifies the kind of καταφρόνησις that Pericles is defining.⁹

The real point of the argument is this new definition of καταφρόνησις, for which the distinction between the two concepts, itself and αὔχημα, is a necessary vehicle. Gomme points in the right direction when he paraphrases, "there is no boasting in καταφρόνησις in the sense in which I am using the latter word." Pericles is arguing for a new (or at least another) meaning of the word, different from "that proud and haughty spirit

⁵The conventional τρόπος of discrimination between pairs of words was generally ascribed to Prodicus by the Greeks (cf. especially Plato, *Protagoras* 337a-c; Aristotle, *Topics* 112b23; Alexander of Aphrodisias [L. Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores* (Vienna 1951) 68]; Hermias [Radermacher 68]). On "Prodician" distinctions in Thucydides, cf. F. Mayer, *Prodicus* (Paderborn 1913) 60-79 and W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 3 (Cambridge 1969) 224. Though Guthrie does not cite it, I would suggest, as Thucydides' closest parallel to the Prodicus of the *Protagoras*, 1.77.4: the distinction between ἀδικεῖσθαι and βιάζεσθαι. Here there is no substitution of terms, and the μὲν . . . δέ clauses in the definitions are exactly parallel.

⁶On *variatio* in Thucydides, cf. J. Ros, *Die Metabole (Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides* (Paderborn 1938).

⁷W. R. Connor has reminded me that there is a great upsurge in the use of -σις words in the late fifth century, probably Hippocratic in origin, but shared by Thucydides.

⁸Cited by Gomme 172.

⁹For the interpretation (mistaken, as I hope to show) as a contrast, cf. most recently F. Solmsen, "Thucydides' Treatment of Words and Concepts," *Hermes* 99 (1971) 389, n. 2.

which precedes and invites a fall"¹⁰ and is earlier equated with folly (*ἀφροσύνη*) by a Corinthian envoy at Sparta (1.122.4).¹¹

The passage is rhetorically very effective, for the speaker arrests his listeners' attention by making what seems at first a foolish, even outrageous, statement, then justifies it through a carefully reasoned argument from definition. Pericles has taken something which is most often a dangerous fault, as the *History* itself bears out, and turned it into a virtue of the highest sort.

And this is not the end. In the next sentence he builds up the argument further, bringing in the the concepts of *τόλμα* and *τὸ ὑπέρφρον*.¹² The latter is a word borrowed from tragedy,¹³ usually signifying an even more extreme arrogance than *καταφρόνησις*. But here, linked with *ξύνεσις*, *γνώμη*, and *πρόνοια*, it too is clearly a virtue.

The phenomenon which Thucydides exploits of a single word with two meanings has obvious affinities with the political metonomasia which he describes in the celebrated passage on Corcyra (3.82). The latter involves a single action which, in different circumstances, is referred to by different words (e.g., a murder might be *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* at one time and *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* at another), rather than a single word for two different actions or ideas. There is a basic similarity in that in both cases external circumstances, political or otherwise, can determine the choice, in the one case of the appropriate word, in the other of the appropriate definition.

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¹⁰C. F. Smith, trans. *Thucydides* 1 (London 1919) 204–205, n. 1. This is clearly the meaning of the word in "normal thought," as Gomme (172) points out. *LSJ* cite only this instance for *καταφρόνησις* "without any bad sense." At 5.8.3 and 5.9.3 the sense of the word wavers somewhat, but is ultimately the normal one. Brasidas fears the justified (i.e., Periclean) *καταφρόνησις* of the Athenians at Amphipolis, but he also exploits it in planning his strategem and turns it into an instrument of the Athenians' defeat. The verb *καταφρονέω* occurs often in Thucydides with negative aspect (e.g., 2.11.4; 6.11.5, where Nicias says that it comes from success *παρὰ γνώμην*, the very antithesis of Pericles' definition; 8.25.3). But there are exceptions: 4.34.1 (of the Athenians at Pylos); 6.34.9, where Hermocrates tells the Syracusans, *τὸ μὲν καταφρονεῖν τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐν τῶν ἔργων τῇ ἀλκῇ δέικνυσθαι*.

¹¹It is interesting that in both passages there is a deliberate play on etymologies involving the *φρήν* root. Cf. next note.

¹²With *ὑπέρφρον* we have the last in a progression from *φρόνημα* to *καταφρόνησις* (or *καταφρόνημα*) to *ὑπέρφρον*. The degree is changed by the addition or substitution of a prefix, but the basic idea, emphasized by the repetition of *γνώμη*, remains, just as the root does, the same.

¹³So Gomme 172; cf. Eur. *Heracl.* 388.