

EUBOEA IN THE LATE 340's

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IN *Classical Quarterly* 13 (1963) 210 ff. I DISCUSSED EUBOEAN AFFAIRS in the late 340's, and in the course of a wider treatment of the subject in *Classical Quarterly* 19 (1969) 245 ff., "Euboea in the time of Philip II," Professor Brunt attacked my chronology and concluded that it was "demonstrably false" (259). This has compelled reconsideration of the whole subject and forced me to reconsider and present my own view in a wider context.

Modern historians have been notably reticent about the Euboean League,¹ but perhaps not surprisingly. An inscription found at Eretria (IG 12.9.207), dated surely enough to the later years of Demetrius the Besieger, i.e., ca 290 B.C., showed clearly that the League existed at that date, under the patronage of Demetrius, issuing instructions to the magistrates of the four main Euboean cities; it appeals to "the laws passed for the Euboeans" (line 69 and cf. 20) and to "the decisions of the Euboeans" (73). But it remains very uncertain whether the League existed during the wars of the Successors. In the course of the last decade of the fourth century, Chalcis and Eretria were members of the Boeotian League,² and the reconstituted Euboean League of the inscription just referred to was in at least one respect, viz. the inclusion of Carystus, different from what Aeschines' remarks on the formation of the League (3.85 ff.) would lead one to expect. So whenever the League was founded, it had its ups and downs and one has to be very careful in what one asserts of the period after Chaeronea.

One point, however, seems clear enough. The Macedonian domination of Greece did not necessarily lead to the suppression of leagues. The most notable instance of a league's survival is, of course, the Boeotian. Despite the harsh treatment of Thebes in 338, there were Boeotarchs, and Theban Boeotarchs at that, in 335.³ The Achaean and Arcadian leagues also survived (Hyper. *In Dem* col. 18), of which the one had fought for the Greeks at Chaeronea and the other had not (Paus. 7.6.5 and 15.6, etc.).

I wish to thank Mr David Thomas for reading and criticizing a first draft of this paper, and Professor Andrewes and the editorial staff of this journal for their comments on the second draft.

¹Cf. F. Geyer, *RE* Supp. 4 col. 439 ff., who gives evidence. W. P. Wallace, *The Euboian League and its coinage* (New York 1956) Chapter 1, surveys the history. Busolt-Swoboda, *GS*, and Beloch, *GG*, give no help.

²Cf. Beloch, *GG*³ 4.2.428, and M. Holleaux, *Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecque* 1.41 ff. (esp. 56 ff.).

³Cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.11 and Busolt-Swoboda, *GS* 1431 n. 2.

So there is no general ground for supposing that the Euboean League was broken up by Philip, and when in his *Funeral Oration* Hyperides listed the opponents of Athens in the Lamian War (11), he was probably using technical language when he spoke of "Boeotians and Macedonians and *Euboeans*." Callias and Taurosthenes of Chalcis who had been to the fore in promoting the League were forced out and found refuge at Athens, receiving Athenian citizenship⁴ at no great interval before Aeschines wrote 3.85, but the League went on, loyal now to Macedon just as it would be at the date of *IG* 12.9.207 (which is why Aristotle withdrew to Chalcis in 323 and why Dinarchus [1.44] could speak of Callias "having betrayed the whole of Euboea to Philip").

There is therefore ample time for the fourth-century coins of the Euboean League to be issued, and there would be no difficulty in this respect if the League, surviving into the Macedonian period, began in 340 rather than in 342. On the contrary, one might momentarily wonder whether the League was, formally speaking, founded at all before 338. There is no absolutely certain evidence that the movement of the later 340's came to fulfilment. The various allusions to the Euboeans having fought in the final war against Philip are not necessarily couched in technical language.⁵ It is notable that Athenian ships were lent "to the Chalcidians" (*IG* 2² 1629.516 ff.) and that, when Philip in his declaration of war in autumn 340 alluded to Callias' depredations in the Gulf of Pagasae, he described him as a general from Athens (*Dem.* 12.5). So there is no unequivocal evidence that the League existed in 338. On the other hand, if Philip did not necessarily destroy political unions, there is no reason to suppose that he fostered their creation,⁶ and if the Euboean League had not been in existence by 338 it is unlikely that it would have been founded after the battle.⁷

So the position is that there very probably was by 338 a League similar to, though not the same as, that existing at the date of *IG* 12.9.207, but the precise circumstances of its creation are to seek.⁸

The first version of a Euboean League was perhaps in 411, when Euboean resentment against Athens, of which Thucydides had made Pagondas speak at Delium (4.92.4), flared up in an appeal to Sparta to liberate the island. The League coins of fifth century style are presumed to belong here⁹ and since too the Euboeans could only have made appeal to

⁴*Din.* 1.44, *Hyper. In Dem.* col. 20.

⁵*Dem.* 18.237 (cf. 234), *Plut. Dem.* 17 and *Mor.* 851b, *Ael. V.H.* 6.1.

⁶*Pace τὰ ἀεὶ ὑμνούμενα* about *GHI* 177, which I mean to discuss elsewhere.

⁷I retract *CQ* 13 (1963) 213 n. 4.

⁸No sure inferences about the existence of a League in the 330's can be drawn from the epigraphic evidence at Delphi, and I have therefore left it out of account.

⁹Wallace (above, note 1) 10 and 72.

Sparta after deliberating in common, there may have been some sort of synod. This league, born of hostility to Athens, seems to have survived the end of the Athenian Empire. Xenophon spoke of "no less than 3,000 hoplites from all Euboea" at the battle of Nemea and listed among the forces confronting Agesilaus at Coronea "Euboeans" (*Hell.* 4.2.17 and 3.15), while Diodorus (14.82.3) spoke of "all Euboea" joining the four-cornered alliance of the Corinthian War. In 394/3 however Eretria allied with Athens in a straight-forward alliance, with no mention of Athens' other main allies (*GHI* 103). So if the League entered the Grand alliance of 395,¹⁰ something seems to have gone awry by 394/3. Perhaps the League had been too much the instrument of Laconophile politicians, and, when the Allied cause had suffered the set-backs of Nemea and Coronea and the synod began to repent of its choice of alliance, the Eretrians broke free and joined Athens. Nothing is known of Chalcis from 394/3 until the early days of the Second Athenian Confederacy, and there is no means of knowing what happened to the League. One would guess that it did not survive the secession of Eretria.¹¹ In any case, it could not have survived the King's Peace, for the other leagues which had opposed Sparta, viz. the Boeotians and the Chalcidians of Thrace (cf. Diod. 14.82.3, Isaeus 5.46, and Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12), were dissolved and there was no reason for an Euboean League to be spared. Sparta divided and ruled, as can be seen in the Spartan intervention in Histiaea shortly before 378 (Diod. 15.30.3), and when the Second Athenian Confederacy started, the Euboean cities severally joined (*GHI* 123.80 ff., and 124), the Histiaeans only after they had been subjected to sustained Athenian ravaging (Diod. 15.30.5 and *GHI* 123.114).¹²

A new phase began with the defeat of Sparta at Leuctra. The Second Athenian Confederacy had lost its real *raison d'être*. The Athenians turned their minds to the recovery of lost imperial assets, and in winter 370/69 refused to answer the Arcadians' summons to join in a general Peloponnesian attack on Sparta (Dem. 16.9, Diod. 15.62.3). The Thebans answered otherwise and so for the while became the champions of the cause of liberation from Sparta, for which cause many Greeks had joined the Second Athenian Confederacy. When the Thebans then marched into the Peloponnese, they were accompanied by "Euboeans from all the

¹⁰For the date of the battle of Nemea (prior to the Eretrian alliance), Ael. Arist. 2 p. 370 Dindorf, and cf. Beloch, *GG*² 3.2.217.

¹¹Chalcis' part in the Corinthian War is not mentioned in Diodorus, nor in Xen. *Hell.* after 4.2.17. The hostile acts of Mnesarchus, father of Callias and Taurosthenes (Aesch. 3.85), may well fall in this period. The pact between Eretria and Oreus (*IG* 12.9.188), if rightly ascribed to the 390's, argues dissidence from Chalcis.

¹²The position of Histiaea on the left side of the Decree of Aristotle shows that it did not join with the other Euboean cities, listed below Thebes on the front face, in 378/7 (*GHI* 124).

cities" (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23), and likewise at the battle of Mantinea the Euboeans were in Epaminondas' army (*ibid.* 7.5.4). This does not however necessarily mean that the League of the late fifth-century had been restored. The so-called "tyrant" of Eretria, Themison, played a leading part in 366 in the seizure of Oropus (Diod. 15.76), but it was evidently the Eretrians and not the Euboeans who were involved (Aesch. 2.164).¹³ The position seems therefore to have been that the cities of Euboea left the Second Athenian Confederacy in 370/69 and entered into alliance with the Boeotian Confederacy. But Boeotian hegemony proved no more palatable, and in 357 there was a crisis of allegiance in Euboea. Some inclined to the Boeotians, who had been the Euboeans' succour in 411 (Diod. 13.47.3), some preferred a return to Athens (Diod. 16.7.2). The Boeotian sympathisers called for Boeotian help which was accorded. The Atticizers represented this as invasion (Dem. 8.74, Aesch. 3.85), and with celebrated speed an Athenian expedition under Timotheus expelled the Boeotians (Dem. 8.74 f.). The cities of Euboea were then formally re-admitted to the Second Athenian Confederacy. The fragmentary remains of a decree concerned with alliance with Carystus in 357/6 (*GHI* 153) shows that separate treaties were made with Eretria, Chalcis, and Histiaea too. There is no sign of any sort of Euboean League.¹⁴ Thus by the mid-350's dissidence from Athens had not meant a return to the political union of the late fifth century.

The Sacred War made the difference. The Thebans were no longer free to help, and those Euboeans who chafed at Athenian power in the island began to seek security in a restoration of the League. Athens' firmest ally was Eretria. In 352 the "dynast," as Demosthenes termed him (23.124), Menestratus, was plainly well-disposed to Athens. His successor, Plutarch, was similarly minded, closely connected with Midias (Dem. 21.110, 200). But in 348, faced with the opposition of an exile, Clitarchus, who was supported by Phocian mercenaries, Plutarch felt himself and his policy sufficiently threatened for him to call on Athens for military support (Dem. 5.5 and Schol., Aesch. 3.86 and Schol.), and an Athenian force under Phocion crossed to the island (Plut. *Phoc.* 12). Attacked, it saved itself by victory in the battle of Tamynae, in the course of which Plutarch and his mercenaries discredited themselves with the Athenians. So

¹³Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1 speaks only of "the exiles." Dem. 18.99 and Schol. support Diodorus and Aeschines. Thuc. 8.60 explains Eretrian interest in Oropus in strategic terms, but the appeal of Menedemus of Eretria to Demetrius (Diog. Laert. 2.141) suggests that there may have been more to this matter.

¹⁴Cf. *GHI* 154 (τῶν κοινῶν in line 16 is a probable supplement). There is no good reason for assigning *IG* 2² 149 to the 350's rather than later (cf. *CQ* 13 [1969] 211 n. 7), but I now connect it not with the events of 342, but with the proper establishment of the League in 341/0 (see below).

Phocion expelled him from Eretria and restored power to the Eretrian people (Plut. *Phoc.* 14, Dem. 9.57). One would expect therefore that Eretria, which had endured civil war but seems not to have formally cut herself off from Athens, remained after the expulsion of Plutarch a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, and this is precisely what she seems to have been at the moment whenever it was, whether as I would have it in 342, or as Professor Brunt in 340, that Callias was so active. For the decree which Demosthenes is said by Aeschines to have proposed (3.100) ordered "the election of ambassadors who would go to Eretria and ask the Eretrians *no longer to give to you the syntaxis*, the five talents, but to give it to Callias." Of course it may be argued that this was a merely theoretical renunciation; *de facto* Eretria had ceased to be a member of the Athenian Confederacy; for Athens to assert such a claim meant no more here than when, for instance, Conon after 394 was lauded for "liberating the allies of the Athenians" (Dem. 20.69). But this will not do. The same decree of Demosthenes (Aesch. 3.100) clearly distinguished Eretria and Oreus: ambassadors were to go to the latter to discuss some sort of alliance, even though that state had been a member of the Athenian Confederacy (*GHI* 123.114, cf. 153.16). So we may take it that, reflecting Phocion's successful intervention in Eretria, its status as a member state of the Athenian Confederacy was unchanged.

The conflict, however, had brought together all those in Euboea who opposed Athens, under the leadership of Callias of Chalcis and his brother Taurosthenes, who between them assembled an army "from all Euboea" supported by Phocian mercenaries sent by Phalaecus (Aesch. 3.87). The trouble was not ended with the restoration of peace in Eretria. Phocion thought that it was over when he returned to Athens, but his successor, Molossus, succeeded in getting himself taken prisoner (Plut. *Phoc.* 14). So military operations went on. To judge by Demosthenes' reference to Eretrian politics after the expulsion of Plutarch (9.57), the renewed hostilities did not involve Eretria, but Chalcis at least must have been involved. The war was "inglorious" (Dem. 5.5). "The Euboeans," in Aeschines' phrase (2.12), were in a position to send ambassadors to discuss peace with the Athenians. If Eretria continued as a member of the Athenian Confederacy, it is almost certain that Chalcis did not. Indeed the decree of Demosthenes of the late 340's (Aesch. 3.92) spoke as if Athens and Chalcis were making a quite new alliance. Evidently Callias remained in power. What then was the situation in Euboea and with "the Euboeans"?

Professor Brunt is persuaded (250 f.) that already in 348 Euboea "was within Philip's sphere of influence and had been lost to Athens."¹⁵ The

¹⁵Cf. Brunt 249 n. 3 ("it is clear that in 348 Euboea passed out of Athens' League into Philip's sphere of influence").

development of Macedonian influence within Euboea is indeed to be considered. Whatever happened before the conclusion of the Euboean War in 348, by the time of the negotiations Callias and his faction had clearly established sufficiently close relations with Philip for the latter to use the Euboeans in a diplomatic approach to Athens (Aesch. 2.12). So there is something to be said for Professor Brunt's view. There is however something of importance to be said against it.

In 346 Euboea was by no means on Philip's side, or indeed thought of as being so. Throughout the decisive months the Athenian general Proxenus was stationed with a small naval force at Oreus (Aesch. 2.133 f., Dem. 19.52, 155, etc.), and there is no hint that he was there against the wishes of the Oreans; the presumption is always that he could operate from Oreus as a base without fear of losing it. So clearly Oreus was not yet "within Philip's sphere of influence." The position of Chalcis was probably somewhat similar. One tends to forget that from 411 onwards there was a bridge over the Euripus controlled by Chalcis (Diod. 13.47). A passage sufficient for a single trireme was bridged by removable planks, and so it continued until the time of Justinian who seems to have built a permanent structure (Procopius *De aedif.* 4.3.19), the real ancestor of the present iron bridge. Orators did not mention it, but it was an abiding strategic fact, as Philip was no doubt well aware when after Chaeronea he installed a garrison in Chalcis.¹⁶ In 346, however, it would seem that the Athenians did not for a moment doubt that they could use this passage, difficult enough of navigation anyhow with the compliance of the Chalcidians (cf. Diod. *loc. cit.*), surely unforceable without. Of the many allusions to the proposal to send to Thermopylae an Athenian force on fifty ships, not one hints that Chalcis would not allow it (cf. Aesch. 2.133, 37, Dem. 19.322). Of course in theory, it might be argued, a naval force could have gone round the eastern coast. But that would have taken much more time and was known to be most hazardous (cf. Hdt. 8.13 f., Eurip. *Troades* 84).¹⁷ Besides, Demosthenes seems to have thought that "sailing round" (i.e., round Sunium) would have been in 346 what it had been in 352 (18.32). So it seems very probable that the Athenians were counting

¹⁶For the bridge over the Euripus, cf. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* 2.256 ff., and F. Geyer, *Topographie und Geschichte der Insel Euboia* 1 (1903) 12. In addition to the passages referred to in the text, the main evidence is Strabo 400, 403, and 447, Livy 28.6 and 45.27. That Pausanias neglected to mention it does not necessarily argue that it was not in use in his day, but, if Procopius is right about the use of a single beam (before Justinian's presumed rebuilding), much transport to the mainland must have been by ferry.

One may note that Diod. 15.71.4 suggests that in the early 360's the passage of the Euripus was denied to Athens.

¹⁷For the difficulties of navigating the eastern coast of Euboea, cf. H. J. Mason and M. B. Wallace, *Hesperia* 41 (1972) 136 ff.

on being able to use the Euripus without check, and if that is so it means that Chalcis was not yet "within Philip's sphere of influence." Aeschines indeed, in a passage on which perhaps one should not lean but which one should not neglect (3.89), remarked that at the conclusion of the Euboean War Callias was forgiven by the Athenians (*τυχῶν παρ' ὑμῶν συγγνώμης*), which suggests that he had not unforgivably taken his city into "Philip's sphere of influence." The war had not produced the result Callias wanted. He was to show that the union of Euboea was his goal. The war had seemed to offer it, but some years would pass before Callias attained it. Eretria and Oreus remained aloof and suspicious. Callias would seek and fail to get Macedonian support for his union; Eretria and Oreus would not shrink from it in their opposition to Callias, as will be discussed in due course.

What has misled Professor Brunt is his interpretation of what Aeschines was alleged to have said in the assembly on 16th Scirophorion 346. Demosthenes claimed that Aeschines implied that, in return for Athens' surrender of Amphipolis, Philip would "hand over" Euboea (19.22, cf. 326). Whether or not Aeschines did say this is not here to the point: Aeschines himself, in denying the charge, used the same phrase (2.120). So what was understood to be involved in "handing over Euboea"? Professor Brunt takes it to mean that Euboea was Philip's to hand over, i.e., that Euboea was within his sphere of influence. But on 16th Scirophorion the fear was that having passed through the Gates Philip would enter the Peloponnese, Euboea, and Attica itself, against which the Sacred War had protected Athens (Dem. 19.83). Only when that had happened would Philip have been in a position to "hand over Euboea." One may note that Aeschines was also alleged to have hinted that Athens would receive Oropus (Dem. 19.22), and Demosthenes twice spoke of Euboea and Oropus as if they were in similar conditions (19.220—*Εὐβοίαν, Ὀρωπὸν ἀποδώσειν* and 6.30). Is one to infer from this that Oropus too was "within Philip's sphere of influence"? The truth was quite the opposite. Philip could only be represented as minded to "hand over" Euboea because it was not within his sphere of influence; if he took it, he would "hand it over." Hence the fears of Cleochares the Chalcidian (Aesch. 2.120), and all the talk of what Aeschines was said to have said when for the moment it appeared that Philip would take Euboea.

What Cleochares and his fellow Chalcidians had to fear was that they would be returned to membership of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Eretria, as I have argued, remained a member after 348. Oreus too may have, to guess from Proxenus' use of the city as a base, though her condition may have been that of Chalcis; certainly by the date of Demosthenes' decree described by Aeschines (3.100) Oreus was to be sought as an ally, not merely to be asked to pay the syntaxis elsewhere than to

Athens; i.e., she was not then a member of the Confederacy. But Chalcis (and certain Chalcidians who had been consistently hostile to Athenian influence) had reason to fear in 346; the efforts of 348, only partially successful, might be made wholly vain.

By 343 relations between Athens and the Euboeans had deteriorated. Now they were "these accursed Euboeans" (Dem. 19.75). As a result of Aeschines' conduct in 346, Demosthenes alleged (19.334), Euboea had become "estranged" (*ἀλλοτρία*). There was peace between Athens and Philip, peace between Athens and Euboea. What was afoot?

We must in due course turn to Aeschines' account of relations between Athens and Euboea in this period (3.89–105), which one does with reluctance. No one can handle the passage with confidence. Professor Brunt found that Aeschines had deceived me (257). Perhaps that was so. The more one reads the passage the less confidence one feels. One thing, however, is clear. There is no corresponding treatment of the matter by Demosthenes, to mislead or enlighten. Why so? Aeschines in his prosecution of Ctesiphon dealt with the career of Demosthenes in the four "periods" (*καίροι*) with which he professed (3.54 ff.) to have been told Demosthenes himself would deal. The second and third "periods" covered Athens' relations with Euboea and with Thebes. The latter topic evoked one of Demosthenes' proudest displays, the former not a word. Aeschines ended his speech with an appeal to the jury to decide on the basis of both what was said and what was left out (*τὰ παραλειπόμενα* 3.260): he knew well enough that Demosthenes was an orator at once too great and too fly to deal with the "periods" in a straightforward way; there would be matters left out. One such was, as I have remarked elsewhere,¹⁸ the period after Chaeronea. Another is the subject of this paper, Euboea in the late 340's. In passing, he claimed to have made the Euboeans allies of Athens (18.237), to have made of Euboea a bulwark for Attica against attack by sea (18.301 f.). There are indeed many references to Euboea and the Euboeans.¹⁹ But of the matters discussed in detail by Aeschines, there is not a word, though at one point (18.95) he promised that he would show up the falsity of Aeschines' "slanders against the Euboeans and the Byzantians." There is nothing in Aeschines' speech attacking the Byzantians; if there was in the speech delivered, it must have been excised from the version published. Likewise, although in 18.87–94 Demosthenes had a certain amount to say about his part in saving Byzantium, he did not redeem his promise in 18.95 to deal with Aeschines' slanders against the Byzantians. So it may be the case that Demosthenes excised from his published version all that he had promised

¹⁸CQ 19 (1969) 173 ff.

¹⁹18.71, 79, 81 f., 87, 95 ff., 230, 234, 237 f., 240, 301 f.

the court in 18.95, and that is why we lack a refutation of Aeschines' charges about Euboea. It is also possible that Demosthenes knew that the best way to deal with Aeschines' slanders against the Euboeans was to ignore them. But whether Demosthenes ignored or excised, it is most surprising. He boasted of making the Euboeans allies (18.237). If the climax of the acts of Demosthenes attacked by Aeschines was the Euboean alliance, Demosthenes let slip a great opportunity to score off his opponent. One wonders why. Of course, if it were the case that Aeschines was discussing unsatisfactory and inconclusive negotiations in 342, there is no need to wonder at Demosthenes' avoidance of the topic. There was nothing to boast about from 342.

As already remarked, by the date of the trial of Aeschines in 343, something had gone wrong in Athens' relations with Euboea. There is no evidence about what exactly had happened elsewhere than in Aeschines (3.89). What he says may be tentatively put forward by way of explanation. A short while after the settlement of the Euboean War Callias "reverting to type, began assembling (*συνάγων*) in Chalcis what was alleged to be an Euboean Council (*συνέδριον*) though in fact he was making Euboea strong against you, Athenians, and securing for himself a choice tyranny." "At this point," Aeschines went on, "he went off to Macedonia hoping to gain the support of Philip for his cause (*ἐλπίζων συναγωνιστὴν Φίλιππον λήψεσθαι*), and he went around with Philip and counted as one of the Companions." On the strength of this passage it may be suggested that after the Peace of Philocrates Callias again set about the work of organising a political union of Euboea and appealed to Philip for support, as indeed was inevitable. Eretria was essential for any such union, but, if I am right, it was a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, and Philip's good offices would be needed if Athens was to be persuaded to let it go. Hence Demosthenes' sour references in 343 (19.75, 334).

According to Aeschines (3.90), Callias fell out with Philip. Whatever one makes of Aeschines' reason for this, Philip must have refused support for the cause of Euboean union.

The moment has come when the evidence for Philip's relations with the Euboean cities after 346 must be reviewed and considered.²⁰ I have

²⁰There are two comments to make on what I wrote in *CQ* 12 (1962) 129 ff. concerning the relations of Philip and Euboea before 348. First, the letters of Philip to the Euboeans (Dem. 4.37) have perhaps been misunderstood. The Scholiast comments: *ὁ σκοπὸς τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἐστὶν οὗτος· ὁ Φίλιππος ἐπέστειλεν Εὐβοεῦσι συμβουλευόντων μὴ δεῖν ἐλπίζειν εἰς τὴν Ἀθηναίων συμμαχίαν, οἱ οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς δύνανται σώζειν*. If the Scholiast may be trusted, the letters sound threatening. (Perhaps they belong to the period when first Philip thought of intervening in Central Greece, perhaps in 353/2, although the perfect *ἐλήλυθεν* in Dem. 4.37 makes one think of some occasion more recent.) The threat to Euboea would be comparable to that supposed in Dem. 19.83; if Philip came into Phocis, where else might he not? Secondly, *pace* Professor Brunt (250), I adhere to the view that

already argued the case for denying that Euboea was in 346 "within Philip's sphere of influence" and there may seem therefore little to discuss for the following period. Does not Demosthenes himself in *The Third Philippic* (58) inform us that by then Philip had sent to Eretria a thousand mercenaries under Hipponicus, that the walls of Porthmus were destroyed, that three tyrants were set up, that two attempts to liberate the city had been checked? Unfortunately the final words of the section, which give as commanders of the two groups of mercenaries that prevented the liberation two eminent Macedonian names, Parmenio and Eurylochus, familiar from the events of 346,²¹ are missing in two manuscripts, as are a number of other passages in the speech. This fact has been variously explained. Perhaps the variants are glosses. Perhaps they point to two editions of the speech.²² But the uncertainty about Parmenio and Eurylochus does not seriously diminish the claim that Philip with military force had secured control of Eretria for his supporters in the city (cf. 9.33). Similarly, though less precisely, in the case of Oreus (9.59–62, and cf. 12, 33). "The enemy equipped themselves and went up to the walls. Some turned to defence, some to treachery. So the city was captured. . . ." So by the date of this speech, roughly May of 341, Philip had got his quislings into power in Eretria and Oreus. What is there to argue about?

In CQ 13 (1963) I argued that, until the negotiations about the amendment of the Peace of Philocrates had broken down at the time that Hegesippus delivered his so-called *On Halonnesus*, Philip did not intervene in the affairs of Greek cities. The reason for this view was that in that speech Hegesippus, who was plainly of the war-party, could find nothing worse to reprove Philip for than the occupation of three Greek cities within the Molossian kingdom and the installation of a garrison in Pherae which had been within Philip's competence as *archon* of Thessaly since 352 (Dem. 7.32). It seemed to me, though, it must be stated, not to Professor Brunt (265), inconceivable that, if there had been anything in Demosthenes' allegations in 343 about Megara and Euboea, Hegesippus would not have mentioned them. These places were on Athens' doorstep, the places Hegesippus mentions so far away as to occasion Athenians practically no fear at all. I maintain this view. The speech of Hegesippus

emendation of *Φιλίππου* at Aesch. 3.87 is necessary. It was not "simply good sense" for Callias to apply to Philip for help in 348, if he was applying to Phalaecus. Philip had proclaimed his attitude to Phocis and the Phocians at the battle of the Crocus Field in 352 (Justin 8.2) and it would not have been good sense to try to get Phocian mercenaries and Macedonian troops of any sort as comrades in arms.

²¹Dem. 19.163, 69 with 2nd Hypothesis, 5; Theop. F 165.

²²Cf. P. Treves, *REA* 42 (1940) 354 ff., who argues that the fuller version was the first edition.

is a watershed. Before it there was nothing to complain about. After it things did happen. But what exactly? In 1963 I accepted Demosthenes' statements in *The Third Philippic* without question. I no longer do so.

The Third Philippic was delivered before Scirophorion 342/1, in which month Philistides, in control of Oreus at the time of the speech, was killed (Philoch. F 159 and Schol. Aesch. 3.85). On the other hand it is clearly sometime after the speech *On the Chersonese* which was so much concerned with the reinforcement of Diopithes, who gets only a passing mention in *The Third Philippic* (15); there is too a change of attitude to Byzantium, which in the earlier speech was said to be sticking to a policy of madness (8.14) and in the later is supposed to be ready to receive help (9.19). The date of the speech *On the Chersonese* is less neatly fixed, but two references to the dangers of the period of the Etesian winds (14, 18) suggest that the speech is not long before they began to blow in mid-year. So if we put the speech *On the Chersonese* in March or April and *The Third Philippic* in May 341, we cannot be far out.

In that interval of a few weeks, if we take Demosthenes at his face value, there is a remarkable development. In the speech *On the Chersonese* there is not a single word about Eretria, save that at one moment (36) he speaks of Philip having set up two tyrants in Euboea. In *The Third Philippic* there is quite a lot. Philip had by then sent one thousand mercenaries under Hipponicus, destroyed the walls of Porthmus and set up "three tyrants" and subsequently on two occasions expelled those attempting to liberate themselves (58). In this speech Eretria is in like case with Olynthus and Oreus (63). Earlier, Olynthus, Oreus, and Pherae came to mind, not Eretria (8.59). So quite a lot would appear to have happened either in Euboea or in Demosthenes' mind.

But could so much have happened in the short interval between the two speeches? It seems too much, and, if such events had literally happened, one would expect rather more of a conclusion to the speech than an appeal for embassies all round (9.71 ff.). Athens was shortly to expel Clitarchus (Philoch. F 160) with no more than the aid of Chalcis, which is mentioned in *The Third Philippic* as if willing to act (74). One therefore wonders whether the facts were quite as Demosthenes in May 341 represented them. But perhaps the developments at Eretria were not all that recent? Why then, did Eretria not come into the speech *On the Chersonese*? The aim of that speech was to secure the rejection of Philip's protest about Diopithes. Surely, if Philip had sent mercenaries to help Clitarchus, they should have been mentioned to help expose Philip's demand that Athens keep the peace. The suspicion arises that the events in Eretria have been interpreted by Demosthenes as originating with Philip when the truth was far less dramatic. Hipponicus (Dem. 9.58) is not met with amongst the Macedonian names listed in Berve's *Das*

Alexanderreich, although there is a Macedonian Hipponicus of the early third century mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (2.138) in his life of Menedemus of Eretria. Yet it is a natural enough name for a Greek and we meet a man from Styra so-called in an Eretrian document of the late fourth century (IG 12.9.b191).²³ Hipponicus could have been an Euboean mercenary captain with no connection in fact with Philip, only in Demosthenes' mind or in his speech.

But is such scepticism justified? Diodorus said, at the moment that he recorded the Athenian attack on Clitarchus, that he had been "set up by Philip" (16.74). But this is hardly independent evidence. For the later parts of the Hellenica in Book 16 (as opposed to the Persica, the Macedonica, and the Sacred War) seem to have come from a historian much influenced by the speeches of Demosthenes.²⁴ Again the contrast between Demosthenes' *On the Embassy* and Hegesippus' *On Halonnesus* is instructive. Demosthenes asserted then that "troops are in Euboea," by implication Philip's (204), that "Philip is establishing bases in Euboea and continues to plot against Geraestus and Megara" (326 and cf. 87 and 219). Hegesippus had no such thing to say, and again it seems that if Demosthenes' assertions had anything in them Hegesippus would not have been scraping the bucket for Philip's villainous interventions (32). Of course, there were likely enough troops in Euboea in 343. In this age of mercenaries, mercenaries were everywhere. But who hired them and who paid them was a matter open to speculation and misrepresentation.

The uncertainty about the text of *The Third Philippic* section 58 is particularly tiresome. If it were sure that the mention of mercenary forces under Eurylochus and Parmenio belonged to the first edition, i.e., to the edition nearest to what Demosthenes actually said, it would be hard to explain the later suppression other than by supposing that the passage had been ill-received and shown up as plainly contrary to the facts. But we cannot be sure of any such thing. Nor is the statement of the second-century historian Carystius reported in Athenaeus (508e) of much help. It alleges that, when Parmenion caught Euphraeus in Oreus, he put him to death, but by no means proves that Parmenion was in command of troops in Euboea. If Euphraeus had been murdered by a Macedonian or on Macedonian orders, Demosthenes knew nothing of it, for he declared that Euphraeus committed suicide (9.62). Carystius may simply have known nothing about it, but made Parmenio pay off an old score after Chaeronea. If, however, the passage is to be seized upon as proof that Parmenion did command troops in Euboea, passing perhaps from the capture of Oreus shortly before the speech *On the Chersonese*

²³It is perhaps his son in IG 12.9.245A 83 and 151 (of the early third century).

²⁴Cf. 16.54, 55.3 f, 84. I assume, though I cannot prove, that Diodorus' notice of the expulsion of Clitarchus is not from the chronographic source.

(cf. 18) to operations in Eretrian territory, an awkward consequence ensues. For Parmenio is represented as operating after Eurylochus, or so it would seem. So either all three alleged Macedonian interventions in Eretria must have preceded the speech *On the Chersonese* or Parmenio and his forces were actually in Euboea at the very moment that the speech was delivered. How then could Demosthenes have neglected to high-light such a thing? How could he have omitted all reference to the mercenaries both of Hipponicus and of Eurylochus? The fact is that Eretria had made very little impact on Demosthenes by April 341. His detailed account of May (9.57 f.) is therefore to be treated with considerable scepticism.

But is not the case of Oreus plain enough? In *The Third Philippic* we are told that Philip had sent troops, declaring that he did so as an ally to a city sick with civil strife (12), that they were sent to set up Philistides as tyrant (33), that "those who now hold the city in their power," Philistides and four others, had had to silence the opposition of Euphraeus by getting him put in gaol and there was no one else bold enough to stand up to them before "the enemy came up to the walls," that "after the city had been basely and wickedly captured, the faction of Philistides rules tyrannically" (59-62). In the speech *On the Chersonese* the situation is delineated with less detail, but not inconsistently. Oreus was "lately" attacked (18), and Philip had made no hostile profession although "the troops were in the city's territory" (59). So is it not plain that Philip had "set up Philistides" as tyrant by armed intervention shortly before April 341? Perhaps that is right. But again there are some grounds for scepticism. The earlier speech does not have anything of the message of justification for sending the troops but speaks of Philip's refusal to admit he is at war, in a manner suggesting that he made no statement at all with regard to Oreus (59); if he did send the misleading message that Demosthenes spoke of in May, why did he not make use of it in April when it would have so much helped his argument? This doubt may be unjustified, but it is there. Again, he speaks in *The Third Philippic* of Philip setting up Philistides as tyrant (33),²⁵ but it is evident from his own narrative (59 f.) that Philistides was in effective control a good year before the city was captured. Again, if it was certain that troops sent or financed by Philip had captured Oreus shortly before the speech *On the Chersonese*, why did not Demosthenes make more of this shocking intervention in Greek affairs? He should have pressed it far more fully and effectively and indeed demanded action, if what he said was common knowledge.

For these reasons I am sceptical also about what really happened in Oreus, and it may well have been the case that Philistides and Clitarchus

²⁵I suspect that Reiske was right to emend *τυραννίδα* in section 17.

had not by early 341 gone as far as Demosthenes said. What does seem to be behind all that Demosthenes says is, I suggest, that, just as in Callias' struggle with Athens in 348 Callias had made diplomatic contact with Philip (Aesch. 2.12), so Philistides and Clitarchus, in their struggle with Callias and his plans for Euboean union dominated by Chalcis, sought the friendship of Philip. The military forces, so confidently asserted by Demosthenes as coming from Philip, may well have been hired, just as mercenaries were constantly hired, by the so-called tyrants themselves. Philip did not perhaps send forces, which would explain why he made no direct move to save Oreus and Eretria. Not, of course, that Philip was deaf to appeals. With *The Third Philippic* the writing was on the wall for Clitarchus and Philistides; Callias and Demosthenes would not rest until they had sought by arms to dislodge them. Clitarchus and Philistides may then have appealed directly and openly to Philip for help, and precipitated the military actions they feared. No Macedonian troops came to help,²⁶ but perhaps Philip handed over some of his latest weaponry (which would surprise no observer of our own age). The torsion catapult appears to have been an invention made under Macedonian patronage and first employed at the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium in 340. An inscription (*IG* 2² 1627 B 328–341) of 330/329 records the presence in Athens of what Marsden²⁷ has argued are torsion catapults, "the catapults from Eretria." It seems probable that these were captured during the Athenian assault of 341/0. If this is right, Philip's response to the appeal of Clitarchus threatened by Chalcis and Athens was perhaps to send some of his newest equipment. As in some more recent cases, such military aid did not succeed in saving its beneficiaries.

To sum up this part of my argument, I propose tentatively that it may not have been until 341, and perhaps very shortly before the combined attack of Athens and Chalcis on Oreus and Eretria, that Philistides and Clitarchus clearly and unequivocally turned to Philip, that until then therefore Euboean politics were being played in much less black and white colours than Demosthenes would have us believe.

It is time to return to Aeschines' account of Euboean affairs, which has deceived either me or Professor Brunt, possibly both. I have already suggested that the explanation of Demosthenes' sourness towards the Euboeans in 343 is to be found in Aeschines' claim that Callias returned to his true self, i.e., started again on plans for Euboean union, and appealed to Philip (3.89). Aeschines then claimed that Callias, rebuffed by Philip, tried the Thebans, again with no success, and having provoked the hostility of both Philip and Thebes was faced with the prospect of a

²⁶Plut. *Dem.* 17 says that the Athenians "drove out the Macedonians," but it is doubtful whether he had evidence to justify this. Demosthenes speaks of "mercenaries."

²⁷*Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford 1969) 58 ff.

campaign by both of them. Παραγγελλομένης ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἤδη στρατείας, Callias saw his only hope in the support of Athens, to whom he therefore appealed (90 f.). What is to be made of this and of all that follows in Aeschines?

Aeschines' account of the relations between Demosthenes and Callias is in two parts. First (91 ff.), an embassy of three men came from him to Athens, persuaded Demosthenes to further their cause, and, with him as proposer of the decree, secured from Athens a plain alliance between Athens and Chalcis with customary mutual guarantees of military aid, but clearly not involving renewed membership of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Aeschines professed to quote a clause and supported his discussion by having the decree read out. As far then as we can see, it was *sine fuco ac fallaciis* alliance between the Athenians and "the Chalcidians." The second part (94 ff.) was complex. Callias appeared in person before the Athenian assembly and declared that he had got together a military force financed by the Achaeans, Megarians and all the cities of Euboea with prospects of many others joining in. He went on to hint at secret negotiations to which "certain Athenians" were privy, finally naming Demosthenes and asking him to confirm. Demosthenes did so, claiming to be in the know, and declared he wished to make report to the assembly on his embassy to the Peloponnese and to Acarnania. Then he reported that a general Hellenic alliance against Philip was in the making consisting of all the Peloponnesians and all the Acarnanians, a very large land and naval force, that arrangements would be completed not at a long interval (οὐκ ἐς μακράν) but on the 16th of Anthesterion "for it had been stated by himself in the cities and the message had been given that all should come to Athens to join in a Congress at the full moon (εἰς τὴν πανσέληνον)." Aeschines declared that Demosthenes was well aware that "none of this would ever come about" but he proposed a long decree "full of hopes that would never be realised and military forces that would never be assembled." This decree included clauses (cf. συστρέψας) concerning Eretria and Oreus, which appear to have renounced Athens' claims on them, real or theoretical, as members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, and to have sought through embassies to persuade them to join Callias' Euboean union. These clauses were then read out. Aeschines proceeded (103 f.) to offer evidence from a later period that Demosthenes had received payments for proposing these clauses from Callias, Clitarchus, and the Oreans.

How are these two "parts" to be dated? There is nothing in the text to suggest at what interval the second followed the first. The answer of Professor Brunt (255 ff.) is as follows.²⁸ The first part, the Chalcidian alliance, is none other than the event recorded by Philochorus (F 159)

²⁸Followed by J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 173.

under 342/1 and dated to Scirophorion. "And the Athenians made alliance with the Chalcidians, and with the Chalcidians freed the Oreans in the month of Scirophorion. . . ." (Although some of the readings of letters on the papyrus are not certain, there seems no reason to disbelieve that this is an accurate statement of what Philochorus said. It is not necessarily the case that the alliance as well as the expedition is to be dated to Scirophorion, but it seems to be implied and there is some sort of confirmation in *The Third Philippic*, where (74) Demosthenes envisages the possibility of Chalcis facing Philip without Athens.) So Professor Brunt proceeds to place the second part after Scirophorion 342/1, which involves him in some uncertainty. Aeschines, in his proof that Demosthenes received bribes (103 f.), a proof which Professor Brunt rightly describes as "ludicrous," spoke as if Clitarchus was still in power when Demosthenes' second decree was passed. If that is correct, the decree must be set before the liberation of Eretria in 341/0. Now the notice of Philochorus (F 160) is one of those which begin *ἐπὶ τοῦτου* and which therefore, on the view of Jacoby, record the first event of the archon year noticed by Philochorus. Since 341/0 was a busy year, the liberation would have on this view to be set in August or not much later, and this would make a curiously tight programme and also an improbable one; for it overstrains credulity to suppose that Athens could be appealing to Clitarchus to join a movement hostile to Philip shortly after the denunciation of *The Third Philippic* and shortly before the joint attack of Athens and Chalcis on Eretria. Professor Brunt's solution, on the hypothesis that Clitarchus was still in power at the moment of Demosthenes' second decree, would be to reject Jacoby's theory and place the liberation of Eretria at some considerable interval after the liberation of Oreus. He himself would prefer a date in the autumn of 341, since he finds it hard to credit that Clitarchus as depicted in *The Third Philippic* could have been long left in a position to damage Athens. But his argument does not oblige him necessarily to reject the date for the overthrow of Clitarchus proffered by Beloch, viz. early summer 340. Indeed his own dating of autumn 341 will not do. When Demosthenes reported that it would be at no great interval of time but that it would be "at the full moon," that would seem to indicate that Demosthenes was talking at no greater interval than a month, possibly even in early Anthesterion. So if Clitarchus was in power when he spoke, Professor Brunt's dating would have to be modified; he would have to put the embassy of Demosthenes in about February 340. However, if my scepticism about *The Third Philippic's* account of Clitarchus is not wildly astray, Clitarchus might well have been slower to commit himself to Philip than Philistides, and a long interval between the liberation of Oreus and that of Eretria might well be perfectly credible.

However, Professor Brunt (256) also thinks it possible that Clitarchus

had been overthrown and Eretria liberated before Demosthenes' second decree. Our only evidence that that was not the case is in Aeschines' "ludicrous" proof that Demosthenes took a bribe from Clitarchus. Perhaps not only the bribe is a fiction, but also the name of the donor. This possibility stated, Professor Brunt would not be bound to reject Jacoby's dating of the liberation of Eretria.

That is not all. Professor Brunt states (257), and prefers, yet another possibility, which I fear I may not fully comprehend, but which seems to be this, viz. that the decree concerning the Euboean cities was quite distinct from a decree about the making of a Hellenic alliance, that the former was made in summer 341 shortly after the liberation of Oreus and the latter in winter 341/0 not long before Anthesterion, that Aeschines has cunningly confused them (and me) and apparently, to cap it all, pretended that successful negotiations of early 340 which led to the creation of the Hellenic alliance of Chaeronea were the unsuccessful negotiations of Demosthenes' embassy of 343/2.

It is not easy to meet such Protean hypothesising. One has to make the best of what Aeschines wrote, and only if it leads to hopeless contradictions does such adaptation of the evidence become necessary.

The first point to reaffirm is that the liberation of Eretria did indeed occur early in the archon year 341/0. Jacoby's principle is better grounded than Professor Brunt (256) seems to realise. There are five fragments of Philochorus introduced by ἐπὶ τούτου. Of these three can be shown probably enough to record events very early in the Attic year.²⁹ Professor Brunt supposes that Philochorus after a number of entries for a year

²⁹Since Philip spent some time besieging Perinthus before turning against Byzantium in time to capture the corn-fleet (F 162), F 54 must record an event very early in the Attic year. Olynthus fell "within a year" and before the Macedonian Olympia (Dem. 19.266 and 192), which argues for a date early in 349/8, and in any case Philip presumably attacked during the Etesian winds. So F 49 is likely enough to be the first event noticed for 349/8. The demand in *The Third Olynthiac* for the appointment of *nomothetai* to repeal laws is, in view of the discussion of *nomothesia* by D. M. MacDowell, *JHS* 95 (1975) 62 ff., not a sure pointer. He shows that there was a variety of procedures and the evidence for appointing *nomothetai* in the first prytany (Dem. 24.20 ff.) applies only to the reviewing of the laws; in the law about repeal of laws (*ibid.* 33) there is no clause quoted about timing. Nonetheless there is some reason for supposing that it too occurred in the first prytany. F 56a, an ἐπὶ τούτου notice, records the suspension of public works and the devotion of "the surpluses" to the funding of the war. The war had begun in September 340 (cf. Jacoby *ad* F 162), and the delay of nine months seems best explained by supposing that only early in 339/8 was the repeal of the Theoric Law possible. (Of course, the law may have been repealed the previous year, and only when Philip was known to be about to march south was work stopped on the docks and the *Skeuotheke*, but in view of the danger to Byzantium and the corn-supply one would have expected such work to have been stopped the previous autumn.) So perhaps both F 49 and F 56a were first entries for the years in question.

"might for variation have referred back to the name of the archon, prefacing a new entry either by *ἐπὶ τοῦ δέινα* or by *ἐπὶ τούτου*." But if ever Philochorus had been tempted to such variation, he would surely have written *ἐπὶ δὲ τούτου*. The connecting *δὲ* or *καὶ* is never omitted by Didymus in his citations from Philochorus. So Professor Brunt's supposition is weak. In any case the principle of Jacoby is what one would expect. The form of Atthidographic entry is shown in F 44 of Androtion, viz. the archon's name, followed by an *ἐπὶ τούτου* notice and then by a notice with a conjunction, and, since three of the five cases in Philochorus are likely to be first entries, I still maintain that the expulsion of Clitarchus and the liberation of Eretria happened early in the Attic year 341/0, and that we must face the consequences. There seems no more to be said, and I must simply submit the matter to the judgement of my fellow historians.

Now if the decree of Demosthenes concerning embassies to Eretria and Oreus was in 341/0 and did indeed, as Aeschines would have us believe, concern also the formation of a Hellenic alliance in a Congress at Athens on 16th Anthesterion, it would appear that seven or eight months had passed since the Philippizers in the two cities had been expelled. What was Callias doing in the interval? One would have expected prompt action aimed at establishing the Euboean union after the liberation of Eretria. As already remarked, the reported reference of Demosthenes to "the full moon" shows that he was not moving his decree in September. If the decree belongs to 341/0 at all, it was proposed in February 340. What was the state of the Euboean cities up to that moment? Demosthenes and Callias had joined forces and had their way. Euboea would have been ripe for union. Why was there this delay?

This is, however, a minor point. What Professor Brunt has neglected to provide is a satisfactory account of what was afoot in early 340. He presumes that Demosthenes and Callias had been out on a joint embassy from which resulted the Hellenic alliance for Chaeronea. In so far as we may trust Aeschines' account, this simply will not do. If Callias and Demosthenes had been on a joint embassy, the report would have been given by them jointly, but Callias to support his assertions hinted that certain Athenians were in the know and finally named Demosthenes, a wholly absurd scene if they were known to have been on a joint embassy. When Demosthenes was called on to speak in support of Callias, he then began to report on his embassy to the Peloponnese, as if this was an affair quite separate. Why then had Demosthenes and Callias been acting separately? Chalcis was from mid 341 an ally of Athens and dependent on Athens. One would expect in 340 joint action, not separate initiatives, whereby Callias was composing a *σύνταγμα* (18.95) of the Achaeans, the Megarians, and all the cities of Euboea, while Demosthenes was trying to unite all the Peloponnesians in action military and financial.

The Megarians are indeed a curious detail on the 341/0 hypothesis. They had joined with Chalcis and Athens in the attack on Oreus in June 341 (*FGrHist* 103 F 19): although it is not clear whether they did so as allies of Athens or of Chalcis,³⁰ they were committed to support of Athens in the coming war. Why were they somehow separate, ready to act with Chalcis instead of throwing their weight behind the grand alliance being fashioned by Demosthenes? All this is explicable, to my mind, on my dating of 343/2. On Professor Brunt's hypothesis of 341/0 there is some explaining to be done.

It is quietly assumed by Professor Brunt that his supposed appeal of 341/0 was successful, that the Hellenic alliance was fashioned then. There is no reason to think so. Demosthenes is said to have promised that all the Acarnanians would be joined in the array against Philip (18.97), and Professor Brunt points (257 n. 4) to *the* Acarnanians fighting at Chaeronea (*GHI* 178). But the inscription shows that only *some* Acarnanians fought (and were exiled for doing so). There is no reason to think the state ever joined the Hellenic alliance. One must remember that in winter 341/0 Philip was fighting the Thracians, the attack on Perinthus of 340/39 had not begun, Athens was not yet formally at war (Philoch. FF 54 and 55). When the letter of Philip declaring war finally came in September 340, Demosthenes then declared that Athens must summon the Hellenes to alliance (11.23). That is the time for the creation of the Hellenic alliance, not winter 341/0. If Professor Brunt is to make credible his theory of 341/0, he must explain what Callias and Demosthenes were separately about, why they were so received. On the hypothesis of 343/2 all this can, as I shall argue, be explained.

As to the version that Professor Brunt prefers but cannot prove, viz. that Aeschines sought to deceive his audience into confusing the comparative failure of the embassy of 343/2 with the successes of winter 341/0 (257), I repeat that there is no reason to think that there were successful negotiations in winter 341/0. Indeed there is a strong indication that, whenever the events discussed by Aeschines in 3.94 ff. are to be dated, Aeschines was right in saying that they came to nothing. Demosthenes made no reply to these charges. Of course, his failure to do so might be variously explained, but he did claim to have made allies of the Euboeans, the Achaeans, and the Megarians (18.237). If Professor Brunt were right about 341/0, Demosthenes had the chance to tear Aeschines to tatters. Why did he not? He did not, because Aeschines was right. That, at any rate, is an answer, to my mind very probable.

I do not say of Professor Brunt's dating what he said of mine, that it

³⁰If the Megarians were allies of Athens, they would appear to have become so after *The Third Philippic* (cf. 74). Perhaps their mention in the same context as the Chalcidians argues that they fought at Oreus as allies of the latter.

"is demonstrably false." There is one major awkward point for my dating of 343/2, which I will come to. When one is handling orators' putty, cast-iron proofs are not possible. But I do say that his dating is demonstrably not strong.

It is time to turn to the case for 343/2 and to see if it can be more adequately presented than I presented it in 1963. But first something must be said of 342/1. Can the Anthesterion in question be February 341? In 1963 (*CQ* 13 [1963] 211) I ruled it out on the grounds that the Philippizing of Philistides and Clitarchus was shown by Demosthenes' speeches of early 341 to have gone too far to make conceivable that Athens could be appealing to them to join a league which would oppose Philip. If my new scepticism about those speeches is justified, that argument is no longer valid. It is not clear that Oreus had not already turned to Philip, but it is not clear that she had. Nonetheless if the events "described" by Aeschines had taken place a few weeks before the speech *On the Chersonese*, they would surely have made some mark on it and on *The Third Philippic*. In the latter speech (71 f.) Demosthenes called for a new set of embassies to unite the Greeks and referred to the embassies of 343/2. If there had been an appeal in winter 342/1 which at first looked like succeeding and then for some reason came to nothing, Demosthenes would not have spoken in quite those terms. In the speech *On the Chersonese* (34 ff.) he did allude to embassies to the Greeks, but not in a way to suggest that they had recently agreed to come to Athens to a Congress possibly to form an alliance of all the Peloponnesians and all the Acarnanians and then not come. Besides, in winter 342/1 Philip was in Thrace. Why should there be this sudden stirring of interest in a Hellenic alliance to oppose him?

So, Anthesterion 342/1 being ruled out, can it be that Aeschines was describing events of Anthesterion 343/2?

If the events of Aeschines 3.94 ff. belong to Anthesterion 343/2, those of 3.89 ff. must precede them. Aeschines claimed that Callias turned to Athens when threatened by a joint expedition of the Thebans and Philip to destroy him. The expedition had been ordered (*παραγγελλομένης ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἤδη στρατείας* 90) and was even under way (*τηλικαῦται δυνάμεις ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐπεστράτευνον* 91), but, Aeschines implies, was stopped by the Athenian alliance—it was plain that Callias would be attacked, unless the Athenians prevented it (90). So we are dealing with an expedition that was rumoured or expected but that never actually happened. Of what circumstances could such things be said by Aeschines? Callias' appeal to Athens must come after Demosthenes' speech *On the Embassy* (cf. 75) of 343/2 (Dion. Hal. *ad Amm.* 10), which was itself delivered before Hegesippus' speech *Concerning Halonnesus* (Dem. 7) in the first half of 342 when Philip was said to be campaigning against Ambracia (32);

neither Ambracia nor a number of other matters touched on in Hegesippus' speech are alluded to in Demosthenes' *On the Embassy*. So the imagined campaign of Philip and the Thebans cannot be set before late 343. If the events of Aeschines 3.94 ff. belong to February 342, is winter 343/2 a credible time for rumours or allegations that Philip and Thebes were about to attack Chalcis?

Before answering this question, it will be useful to inquire whether Anthesterion 343/2, i.e., February 342, provides a suitable setting for the events of Aeschines 3.94 ff. In June 342 Philip began his Thracian campaign (Dem. 8.2, 35). Before that he intervened in the affairs of the Molossian kingdom, in the course of which he seized the cities of Cassiopia and was rumoured to be campaigning against Ambracia, after which anything could be expected (Dem. 7.32). Nothing came of it. It was indeed largely a matter of Greek imagination. If Philip had meant to take Ambracia, which was less than fifteen kilometers from one of the places he did take, nothing that Demosthenes or anyone else could have done would have deterred him. But the cry went up that Philip was coming. Even the Peloponnese could fear (Dem. 9.72). An Athenian force was despatched to Acarnania (Dem. 48.24, 26), though it must have arrived long after the imagined danger was past imagining. There was a great diplomatic flurry, with the leading members of the Athenian war-party touring the Peloponnese (Dem. 9.72). At such a time it would be not inconceivable for Callias, as well as Athens, to fear. If Philip came into Greece, he could come to Euboea and it behooved Callias to whip up what resistance he could, and temporary fear of Philip furnishes an adequate explanation why both Callias and the Athenian envoys were well received and yet why it all came to nothing, "things that would never come about," "hopes that would not be realised and armies that would never be assembled" in the phrases of Aeschines (3.99 f.). So too is explicable the extempore nature of the Congress called at short notice, "for the full moon." To judge by Aeschines' report of what Demosthenes said (98), one would suppose that Demosthenes had got together the Congress off his own initiative; he had perhaps gone out to alert and, in the alarm raised by Philip's presence in north-west Greece, found a readier response and a stronger will to act than either he or the Athenians who had sent him out had expected. It was all short-lived. The alarm was quickly over. Philip was known to have withdrawn, and no one came on 16 Anthesterion.

But can Philip have intervened in the Molossian kingdom in winter 343/2? The speech of Hegesippus *On Halonnesus*, delivered during the campaign, cannot be exactly fixed within 343/2, but there is no obstacle to placing it in mid-winter shortly before Anthesterion. Philip fought through the savage Thracian winters (Dem. 8.35, 44). "Summer and

winter are alike to him and there is no special season when he leaves off" (Dem. 9.50). So the Molossian campaign can indeed provide a suitable setting for the events of Aeschines 3.94 ff.

So too the expectation and rumour of the coming campaign, before its direction was known, can provide an explanation of why Callias sought *rapprochement* for Athens and Chalcis, the events of Aeschines 3.90 f. Παραγγελλομένης - - ἤδη στρατείας (90), rumour and fear prompted Callias to fear that it was against him. Philip still controlled the passage of Thermopylae (Dem. 11.4, Philoch. F 56b). If Thebes were to join him, Chalcis was in great danger. Despite the rumours of 344 of trouble between Thebes and Philip (Dem. 6.14), one searches in vain in the speech *On the Embassy* for a break. Rather, freedom from fear of Thebes has gone now that Philip can come "into the Peloponnese and into Euboea" (83). Hearing of the campaign and not knowing that it was directed at the Molossian kingdom, Callias rightly feared and turned to Athens for help.

The events of Aeschines 3.89-101 fit therefore well enough into 343/2. What then are the obstacles?

First, an inscription with the opening of an alliance between Athens and the Messenians (IG 2² 225) is dated indisputably (cf. 224) to the fourth day of the tenth prytany of 343/2, and since the Messenians are found amongst the allies listed by the Scholiast to Aeschines 3.83 as gained in 343/2,³¹ there is a strong temptation to place the embassy of Demosthenes of that year (Dem. 9.72) in early summer and not mid-winter. But it is to be noted that Demosthenes speaks of "embassies." The abortive summons of Anthesterion may well have been followed by other efforts to organise alliances. It is true that Demosthenes speaks as if all these embassies contributed to checking the advance of Philip. But he may be speaking loosely. The efforts of 343/2 achieved nothing permanent. Of the allies listed by the Scholiast only the Achaeans fought at Chaeronea (Paus. 7.6.5); the Arcadians, the Messenians, and the Argives abstained (Dem. 18.64 etc.). Progress to the alliance of Chaeronea was fitful and disheartening. In *The Fourth Philippic* Demosthenes spoke of wrangles about who would command and where the Synod would meet (6). There was little to boast about in his efforts of 342, and when in *The Third Philippic* he recommended further embassies to the Greeks, he had half to apologise—οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἀχρηστον (72)—and claim for the embassies of 343/2 the success of having stopped Philip, when in fact all they had done over a number of months was to scramble together alli-

³¹It may be asked why if the alliance between Athens and Chalcis of Aesch. 3.92 was made in 343/2 it is not in the list given by the Scholiast at 83, but it is evident that he is only concerned with the results of the Athenian embassies "sent to many places in Greece" at the same time as Aristodemus was sent out.

ances which withered away. So the fact that the Messenians did not become allies until June does not prove that Demosthenes could not have been active in Anthesterion. (As already remarked, the embassy of Callias appears to have been quite separate from the embassy of Demosthenes at Aeschines 3.97. By speaking several times of "the embassy of Demosthenes and Callias," Professor Brunt (257) has persuaded himself that since the names listed by Demosthenes (9.73) do not include Callias, the embassy of Callias cannot belong to 343/2. But there was no call for Demosthenes to mention Callias, who as far as we know was not an Athenian ambassador in 343/2, 341/0, or at any other time.)

Secondly, Professor Brunt (258) finds inexplicable the shifts of Euboean policy implied by my view—"we have to posit that Eretria and Oreus were hostile to Athens in autumn 343, friendly in winter 343/2, and hostile again later in 342. How can such a double diplomatic revolution be explained?" The hostility of Euboea in autumn 343 (Dem. 19.75) was the hostility of Callias and his supporters, who had courted Philip's favour (Aesch. 3.89); Eretria, it appears, continued to belong to the Athenian Confederacy (see above); Oreus perhaps did not, but despite Demosthenes' talk about Philip "establishing tyrants" we do not know that in 343 Oreus was all that "hostile to Athens." So the first shift of policy is of Professor Brunt's imagining. So too is the second. He presumes (255 f.) that the Eretrians and Oreans complied with the Athenian request that they join "the Euboeans" (Aesch. 3.100), but he presumes too much. Aeschines claimed that Demosthenes had been bribed by Callias, Clitarchus, and Oreus into moving his decree (103 f.). We may justly presume therefore that Eretria and Oreus welcomed their release from the Second Athenian Confederacy. But the decree of Demosthenes which secured them that could not force them into the Euboean league,³² and, if indeed they were as grateful for the decree as Aeschines makes them, that is no ground for supposing that they necessarily joined the league and became friendly to Athens as they had not been before. Also, as I have argued, we may be somewhat sceptical about how far Philistides and Clitarchus had philippized by the end of 342. So the difficulties Professor Brunt sees are unreal.

There is, however, one real difficulty about the dating to 343/2. I raised it in 1963 (213), but I now see that my solution was somewhat inadequate. The difficulty arises over the Chalcis alliance of 342/1 (Philoch. F 159). The first stage in the *rapprochement* of Athens and

³²Logically speaking, Demosthenes might have so framed his decree as to promise Oreus and Eretria independence from Athens if and only if they joined the Euboean League. But I suppose that in the enthusiasm and fear of early Anthesterion 343/2 he presumed on success for Callias' movement, and was not making conditional offers. After all, Athens' claim on Oreus was purely theoretical, that on Eretria not very strong. Demosthenes was not giving away much.

Callias was, as I have already remarked, alliance between Athens and Chalcis. So on my view Athens would have entered into alliance with Chalcis twice, in two successive archon years.³³ How is this to be explained?

My answer is as follows. When Demosthenes proposed his second decree (Aesch. 3.100 f.), his purpose was in part to help further the foundation of the Euboean League. That is evident from the fact that Eretria was to pay its five talents *syntaxis* no longer to Athens but "to Callias," as Aeschines would have it. Aeschines, typically, is trying to prove that all that Demosthenes had done was to deprive Athens of money. Accordingly, in the case of Oreus which would appear to have been in a different position, only in Athenian legalistic claim a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, Aeschines claims that it was to be made an ally of Athens and then to be asked to pay its five talents *syntaxis* to Callias. One suspects serious misrepresentation here. Alliance could have been made with Oreus which did not entail payment of *syntaxis*. I suspect therefore that the truth behind Aeschines' words is that Athens made alliance with "the Euboeans," thus for the first time formally recognized, that as Euboeans and only as Euboeans the Oreans would be allies of Athens. The title "the Euboeans" is met in *IG* 12.9.207 and, nearer in time, in *IG* 2² 149. As far as we know the Euboean League was not "the Chalcidians and their allies." So at the moment that Athens was making alliance with "the Euboeans" she had necessarily to renounce her recent alliance with "the Chalcidians." Professor Brunt asserts (259) that the Chalcidian alliance "would have remained in force" and come into effect again after Callias' failure to make anything much of "the Euboeans." There is, as far as I am aware, no parallel situation to justify this assertion, and it is not very likely that Chalcis might be obliged by an alliance of her own to do as "Chalcidians" what she might be obliged not to do as "Euboeans." So I suppose that in making alliance with "the Euboeans" Athens renounced her alliance with "the Chalcidians," just as she did renounce her alliance with the Eretrians. When therefore the Euboean movement of 342 failed and the whole structure of *synods*, *syntaxis*, and joint military action became a dead letter, Chalcis accepted failure and returned to plain alliance, the alliance of late 342/1. There would therefore have been two alliances within sixteen months.

Since however it can only be suggested and cannot be proved that there were these two alliances, I cannot claim that the dating to 343/2 is demonstrably true. But weighing up my case and that of Professor Brunt I cannot acknowledge that his is the heavier.

By Anthesterion 343/2, the crisis that could have united the Greeks had passed. Philip was reported to be withdrawing to Macedon, or about

³³This is the criticism of Professor Brunt (258 f.).

to do so, and the expected Congress came to nothing. But shortly before, when Demosthenes moved the second decree that Aeschines described, Philip was still expected to be coming into Greece, and Callias and Demosthenes saw advantage in a union of the Euboeans. Callias felt confident enough to promise that "all the cities in Euboea" would contribute forty talents (Aesch. 3.95), and the moment must have seemed ripe for the realisation of his long-cherished plans for union. To that end Athens at no great sacrifice to herself could consent and add her persuasion. But perhaps what foiled Demosthenes' hopes of a Hellenic Congress foiled Callias' plans for union. When Eretria and Oreus heard that Philip was not to be shortly expected in Euboea, separatism re-asserted itself.

In *The Third Philippic* (66) Demosthenes declared that the Eretrian *demos* "rebuffed your ambassadors and has given itself over to Clitarchus." This could well be the embassy appointed by Demosthenes' decree. In the case of Oreus he asserted that the crisis in Orean politics in which the faction of Philistides ousted Euphraeus from popular favour happened a year before (*ἐνιαυτῷ*) the city was "captured" (9.60). The "capture"³⁴ happened shortly before the speech *On the Chersonese* was delivered (*πρώην*—8.18). *Πρώην* is not necessarily to be taken in a precise way; "the day before yesterday" might well be late in 342. However it is possible, and is therefore worth mention, that the clash between Philistides and Euphraeus came in Anthesterion 343/2, at the moment when Oreus was called on to choose between Callias' Euboean union and independence. (Demosthenes represented the clash in terms of Philip-pizers and champions of liberty, which he could do because the call to join Callias' union came when Greece was believed to be in imminent danger. But the issue for Oreans was not perhaps so black and white, of liberty or treachery to Greece, but rather of separatism or union. An individual like Philistides could well be traitor to liberty, but the *demos* which supported him was not likely to be simply so.) This wrangle at Oreus, then, may well have been brought to a head by Demosthenes' decree, which Aeschines "described" and to which Demosthenes himself perhaps alluded in the speech *On the Crown* (79).³⁵ The plan for Euboean

³⁴"Capture," because clearly Philistides was in the city already.

³⁵In this passage Demosthenes listed his acts of opposition. "First I proposed the embassy to the Peloponnese when Philip began to steal into the Peloponnese"—evidently the embassy of 344, although there is no other evidence that Demosthenes proposed it, and not the embassy of 343/2 which Demosthenes claimed stopped Philip "making an attack on the Peloponnese" (9.72 *ὀρμῆσαι εἰς* . . .) and of which the proposer is not known. "Then (*sc.* I proposed) the embassy to Euboea when he was laying hands on Euboea (*Εὐβοίας ἥπτετο*)"—that is, as I propose, his decree of early Anthesterion 343/2 when Euboea was thought to have been threatened with attack (Aesch. 3.91). "Then I proposed the expedition against Oreus . . . and that against Eretria . . ."—i.e., the ex-

union had run aground. But there were perhaps diplomatic comings and goings. Embassies came from Clitarchus and Philistides (Dem. 18.82). They stayed in Aeschines' house, according to Demosthenes to Aeschines' shame. But perhaps at that time they had not openly or heartily begun to look to Philip.

It is uncertain how far Callias got in 342, but there is no good argument for having Clitarchus submit, even temporarily, to his leadership. Callias was a man of large ideas, as his embassy to the Peloponnese shows, and of determination, as his piratical acts of 341 or 340 suggest (Dem. 12.5). He had the energy to stir up the Euboeans to confront Athens in 348, but not yet the necessary support for political union. For that were needed the threat of Philip and help of Athens. In a sense Dinarchus was right to say that "he enslaved his fellow citizens" (1.44.) In Oreus and Eretria many feared his ambition, and the populace in each case supported the separatists. Demosthenes and the war-party at Athens backed him, and the separatists were driven to look ever more and more to Philip. It was just another instance of the sort of situation described by Polybius (18.14) in his comments on Demosthenes' Black List of guilty men (18.295).³⁶

What happened immediately after *The Third Philippic* we do not know, but by Scirophorion Chalcis and Athens, now reallied, closed in on Oreus and Philistides was killed. A month later, or at any rate very early in the new year 341/0, Clitarchus was dealt with by siege (Philoch. FF 159, 160). Euboea was safe for Callias and so for Athens and Greece. As to how exactly the Euboean League was finally accomplished we do not know. Demosthenes did not care to mention, or at any rate to publish, his account. Presumably after the expulsion of Clitarchus, Callias lost no time.³⁷ Time was short. His ambitions had made of a politician a statesman and a patriot, and turned his political opponents into traitors to the liberty of Greece.

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peditions of 342/1 and 341/0. It cannot be proved that this list is in chronological order, but it certainly reads as if it is—which does not however satisfy Professor Brunt (259).

³⁶Professor Brunt (260) declared that the opponents of Callias "are conspicuously absent from Polybius' list of the local patriots whom Demosthenes malevolently assailed." But Polybius mentions by name only a few of those on Demosthenes' Black List—in fact, from only five of the ten places named by Demosthenes—and adds "with them several others." It seems quite wrong to suggest that Polybius was making exceptions to his general defence of those on the list.

³⁷Perhaps *IG* 2³ 149 relates to 341/0, and I retract my suggestion (*CQ* 13 [1963] 211 n. 7) that it belongs to 343/2, though of course it may. The ships lent by the Athenians "to the Chalcidians" (*IG* 2³ 1629 1.516 ff.) may have been lent for the operations of 341. So the term "the Chalcidians" cannot be used to date exactly the inception of the League.