

GOSSIP AND THE POLITICS OF REPUTATION IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

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CLASSICISTS HAVE DEVOTED but scant attention to the phenomenon of gossip.¹ This is a pity, for gossip has much to tell about the society that produced it. Or this is the view of anthropologists of small communities who have made gossip a serious study. There is one proposition especially that dominates their discussions: gossip is not a gratuitous form of expression but one with its own rules, both socially and culturally determined (Gluckman 308-314; du Boulay 205). As a "cultural form" (Spacks 15), gossip is expressive of the norms, values, and ideology of a given community and of

The following works are cited by the author's name alone or in an abbreviated form: G. Adeleye, "The Purpose of the *Dokimasia*," *GRBS* 24 (1983) 295-306; F. G. Bailey, "Gifts and Poison," in F. G. Bailey (ed.), *Gifts and Poison: The Politics of Reputation* (New York 1971) 1-25; J. du Boulay, *Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village* (Oxford 1974); J. K. Campbell, *Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community* (Oxford 1964); C. A. Cox, "Incest, Inheritance and the Political Forum in Fifth-Century Athens," *CJ* 85 (1989) 34-46; J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C.* (Oxford 1971) (= Davies, *APF*); J. K. Davies, *Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens* (New York 1981) (= Davies, *Wealth and Power*); K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) (= Dover, *Popular Morality*); K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Cambridge, Mass. 1978) (= Dover, *Homosexuality*); K. J. Dover, "Anecdotes, Gossip and Scandal," in *The Greeks and their Legacy: Collected Papers* 2: *Prose Literature, History, Society, Transmission, Influence* (Oxford 1988) 45-52 (= Dover, "Anecdotes"); M. Gluckman, "Gossip and Scandal," *Current Anthropology* 4 (1963) 307-316; M. Golden, "'Donatus' and Athenian Phratries," *CQ* NS 35 (1985) 9-13; J. Gould, "Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women in Classical Athens," *JHS* 100 (1980) 38-59; A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, 2 vols (Oxford 1968 and 1971); S. C. Humphreys, "Social Relations on Stage: Witnesses in Classical Athens," *History and Anthropology* 1 (1985) 313-369; D. M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca 1978); J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton 1989); R. Osborne, *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attika* (Cambridge 1985); J. G. Peristiany (ed.), *Mediterranean Family Structures* (Cambridge 1976); P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972) (= Rhodes, *Boule*); P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) (= Rhodes, *Athenaion Politeia*); R. Sealey, "On Lawful Concubinage in Athens," *Classical Antiquity* 3 (1984) 111-133; P. M. Spacks, *Gossip* (New York 1985); D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica 508/7-ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study* (Princeton 1986); J. J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (New York and London 1990); W. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus* (Cambridge 1904).

¹Exceptions are Dover, *Popular Morality* 30-33 and "Anecdotes" 45-52, Ober 148-151, Cox, and Winkler.

the larger society of which that community is a part. I stress community because gossip as a mode of oral communication flourishes where contact is close and experience shared and where private, even intimate, matters are transmitted through a common grapevine, of neighbours, for example (du Boulay 207–208).² Paradoxically, community is also important in a second sense: private as its subject may appear, gossip requires a public setting to be effective. For gossip is about reputation. While asserting the common values of the group, it holds up to criticism, ridicule, or abuse those who flout society's or the community's accepted rules. Thus gossip functions as a means of social control, ensuring, through its sanctions, conformity with those rules (Campbell 312–315).³ But even as it destroys reputations, gossip can play a positive role

in keeping alive the sense of community and of preserving its highest values; for although gossip springs from the competition and hostility which exist between the different groups in the village, it relies for its expression on the common values and the shared history of the total community. (du Boulay 210–211; cf. Gluckman 308; Campbell 314)

How then are we to define gossip? One definition is that gossip involves statements "making moral judgments."⁴ This is apt but all too vague. For such statements may range from idle chatter, mere talk without malice, what the French call *bavarder*, to their opposite, *mauvaise langue*, "distilled malice," or deliberate abuse meant to hurt (Bailey 1; Spacks 4–6).⁵ In this study gossip implies talk of others—implicit moral judgments—meant to criticize, to scandalize, or to abuse. Hence it is closer to "distilled malice," which Spacks (4) describes thus:

It plays with reputations, circulating truths and half-truths and falsehoods about the activities, sometimes about the motives and feelings, of others. Often it serves serious (possibly unconscious) purposes for the gossipers, whose manipulations of reputation can further political or social ambitions by damaging competitors or enemies, gratify envy and rage by diminishing another, generate an immediately satisfying sense of power, although the talkers acknowledge no such intent.⁶

²Cf. N. Elias, "Towards a Theory of Communities," in C. Bell and H. Newby (eds.), *The Sociology of Community: A Selection of Readings* (London 1974) xxviii.

³Cf. J. du Boulay, "Lies, Mockery and Family Integrity," in Peristiany 394–396.

⁴R. Paine, "What is Gossip About? An Alternative Hypothesis," *Man* NS 2 (1967) 278–285, at 281.

⁵Cf. L. Blaxter, "*Rendre service* and *Jalousie*," in Bailey 122–124. The following works were also consulted on gossip: M. A. Heppenstall, "Reputation, Criticism and Information in an Austrian Village," in Bailey 139–166; S. Harding, "Women and Words in a Spanish Village," in R. R. Reiter (ed.), *Toward an Anthropology of Women* (New York and London 1975) 283–308; M. E. Kenna, "The Idiom of Family," in Peristiany 347–362; T. Tentori, "Social Classes and Family in a Southern Italian Town: Matera," in Peristiany 273–285.

⁶I am ignoring Spacks' second mode of gossip, which "exists only as a function of intimacy. It takes place in private, at leisure, in a context of trust, usually among no

TRANSMISSION OF GOSSIP

M. I. Finley offers a clue as to how gossip was transmitted in classical Athens:

With such small numbers, concentrated in small residential groupings and living the typically Mediterranean out-of-doors life, ancient Athens was the model of a face-to-face society, familiar to us in a university community perhaps but now unknown on a municipal scale, let alone a national scale.⁷

Finley's use of the phrase "face-to-face" to describe life in small communities has been criticized by Robin Osborne (64-65; cf. Ober 31-33). Osborne calls the notion "absurd" as applied to Athenian society as a whole, while conceding that it does have some value "in considering the nature of smaller groups" (89). He draws a distinction between the total network of all Athenians and partial networks, the most important of which was the deme. Osborne's choice of the deme as a face-to-face unit of society is, in my view, a good one. For the deme was self-governing and small in size, with, according to Osborne himself (44), an average population of 120 adult males. Here, in these small, autonomous units, both villages and urban districts, is the analogue of the anthropologist's community. In them as well, community spirit was often strong, since "demesmen felt there was a special tie between them" (Osborne 42; cf. Whitehead 230-234). David Whitehead has examined this tie and concluded that "most of the members of even the largest demes must have known each other by sight or by name or both" (226). In addition, he cites evidence from both the lawsuits and the comedies of Aristophanes to support his argument that demesmen and neighbours were considered synonymous (231)—hence the prevalence in the lawsuits of both groups as witnesses. Humphreys' recent study of witnesses documents the incidence of demesmen and neighbours testifying in court (340-345). Such testimonies reveal that neighbours knew the obvious, for example, that property had been removed from a house (Dem. 47.60-61) or that an individual had left Athens in time of war (Lycurgus 1.19-20; cf. Dem. 43.70, 55.21; Lys. 17.8). In addition they were acquainted with matters of a more private nature and so able to testify that a woman had behaved like a *hetaira* (Isaeus 3.13-15). Similarly, demesmen knew enough to verify marital status (Isaeus 6.10-11) and to confirm or deny the legitimacy of women (Isaeus 3.80, 8.18-20). In discussing these testimonies, Humphreys points out, "It is taken for granted that neighbours know all

more than two or three people" (5). Such gossip would be impossible to document in classical Athens, for the gossip found in our sources is embodied in public utterances. In this study, the word "scandal" is synonymous with malicious gossip, or talk meant to discredit, while "slander" refers to defamation or calumny, some of it false, deliberately circulated to destroy reputation.

⁷M. I. Finley, *Democracy Ancient and Modern* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1973) 17. Cf. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1983) 28, n. 9 and 82-83.

about each other's affairs" (340). The deme, in other words, was no different from other small communities in being abuzz with gossip, which began with one's immediate neighbours, from whom nothing could be kept secret (Lys. 17.8).⁸

Idle conversation took place not only in local neighbourhoods. People also congregated to exchange information and to gossip in central public areas, for example, in the agora, in workshops, and in small retail establishments (Dem. 24.15; Hyp. 4.21; Isoc. 18.9; Lys. 24.20). While some of these "hang-outs" might have been locally based, most, it appears, were in or near the agora (Dem. 21.104, 25.82; Lys. 24.20; Ar. *Clouds* 1003; Menander *Kith.* 64–65). Favourite spots were the barber's and the perfumer's shop (Dem. 25.52; Lys. 23.3, 24.20; cf. Ar. *Knights* 1375–76, *Birds* 1441, *Plutus* 338; Menander *Samia* 510; cf. Ober 148–149). Also mentioned are the shoemaker's shop (Lys. 24.20), the wreath-market (Ar. *Eccl.* 302), and the stoa(s) (Menander *Samia* 511). Through these meetings, where men chatted, a network of information and gossip extended throughout the *polis*. The way this grapevine operated is graphically illustrated in Lysias 23, *Against Panceleon*. In his quest for the defendant, who had claimed to be a member of the deme of Decelea, the speaker headed for a barber's shop near the Herms where the Deceleans gathered. There he made his enquiries, to no avail. Since Panceleon was allegedly a Plataean as well, the speaker also paid a visit to the fresh-cheese market, where the Plataeans congregated once a month. But the Plataeans too disavowed any knowledge of Panceleon, although one of them did mention an escaped slave who matched his description. For some, this kind of grapevine meant city-wide notoriety. Timarchus numbered among them, for there was widespread "talk" about him in the city (φήμη: Aeschines 1.48 and 130). The same notoriety attached to Demosthenes (Aeschines 1.131). In discussing the reputation of these two men, Aeschines describes the operation of φήμη: "Attaching itself to men's life and conduct, talk travels unerringly and spontaneously throughout the city, like a messenger proclaiming to the public at large details of men's private behaviour" (127); cf. Antiphon 1.130; Dem. 21.80, 49.14; Lys. 10.23; Ar. *Plutus* 377–378; Menander *Samia* 510–513. Given the efficiency of this city-wide gossip circuit, speakers in the lawsuits often assume in their listeners an acquaintance with local characters of some notoriety like Timarchus and his associates.⁹

⁸ Cf. K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968, Sather Classical Lectures 39) 168–170.

⁹ E.g., Aeschines 1.44–45, 53, 55–56, 69, 116, 130, 158; cf. Dem. 19.199–200, 226, 21.149, 54.34, 59.30; Din. 2.8; Isaeus 3.40, 6.19. Cf. Ober 149. It is virtually impossible to recreate the atmosphere of these male haunts or to reconstruct their conversations. Suggestive, however, is M. Herzfeld's description of an analogous male preserve, the Cretan coffee-house, in *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan*

The public areas described above were the haunts of men, places where men gossiped. What about women? In virtually all contemporary anthropological accounts, women are the major transmitters of gossip. This is not to deny that men also gossip, but to suggest that private and personal concerns dominate the lives of women (Elias [above, n. 2] xxvii). For example, in Ambeli, the village described by du Boulay in *Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village* (204–205), most gossip takes place in the privacy of the home. Sometimes it is taken up by men in the *kafenio* in what amounts to a general discussion providing a kind of community judgment on the issue. But men are considered to have a range of interests that go beyond gossip to business, economics, politics, etc. “Men gossip, but women are thought to do nothing but gossip” (205). Hence, the popular belief that men engage in “sociable,” “good-natured,” and “altruistic” conversation, *bavarder*, while women devote themselves to *mauvaise langue*, malicious talk and “character assassination” (Bailey 1).¹⁰ The circumstances of the lives of women in ancient Athens approximate those in Ambeli, where women generally associated only with kin and immediate neighbours. But were Athenian women transmitters of gossip in the demes? Whatever we might expect based on comparative evidence, our sources rarely accuse women of either *bavardage* or *mauvaise langue*.¹¹ On the other hand, there are some hints that women were perceived as inveterate talkers (e.g., Eur. *Hipp.* 384; cf. Ar. *Eccl.* 120, *Thesm.* 393, and Menander’s misogynist fragment 581.15).¹² All we can

Mountain Village (Princeton 1985) 52 and 152–157. Cf. M. Gilseman, “Lying, Honor, and Contradiction,” in B. Kapferer (ed.), *Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behavior* (Philadelphia 1976) 191–219. Gilseman discusses modes of male display and performance in a village in North Lebanon: these include idle talk, bragging, joking, showing off, and lying, all of which are underlain by a keen awareness of status and the demands of honour.

¹⁰Cf. Blaxter (above, n. 5) 123 and Spacks 38–46. The latter considers some women’s gossip a form of female resistance, by subversion, to male power (44–45). Cf. Harding (above, n. 5) 303. Given the nature of our sources, it would be impossible to document this kind of gossip. On the other hand, a study of women in drama from this perspective might provide some indication of what was thought to engage them in intimate moments or in congregation.

¹¹One exception is the rumour that women were accused of spreading throughout Athens about the “evil spirit” in Hipponicus’ house, indicating his son Callias (Andoc. 1.130). Note too that it was an old slave woman who brought the news of his wife’s seduction to Euphiletus (Lys. 1.15–17) at the behest of Eratosthenes’ previous mistress. Surely gossip played some role here. Cf. Dem. 25.57. Ober 149 believes that prostitutes and entertainers, who were usually present at drinking parties, “may have been conduits of gossip between classes.”

¹²The verb *λαλεῖν*, used of both men’s and women’s talk or chatter, approximates the French *bavarder*. Aristophanes provides a number of examples: Ach. 21; *Knights* 348; *Wasps* 1135; *Frogs* 751 (cf. 752, *καταλαλεῖν*); *Eccl.* 120, 302, and 1058; cf. Dem. 21.118; Menander *Samia* 512 and *Pk.* 320. *λάλος*, babbling or loquacious, is also found at Ar. *Pax* 653, *Thesm.* 393, and Menander fr. 581.15 and *λαλιά* at Aeschines 2.49.

say then is that Athenian women had the same emotional need for self-expression and communication as the women of Ambeli. They also had the same opportunity as neighbours to exchange information and opinions about individuals and families and the same capacity to affect reputations. For women did have a network of acquaintances, mostly neighbours. If this were not so, Aristophanes' three great comedies, *Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazousae*, and *Ecclesiazusae*, would make no sense. One of these plays, moreover, indicates clearly that women visited their friends (*Eccl.* 348–349 and 526–530). In addition, Demosthenes 55.24–25 documents the kind of family problems rural demeswomen and neighbours shared with one another.¹³ Women also congregated in large numbers beyond their immediate neighbourhood at annual festivals like the Thesmophoria and the Skirophoria,¹⁴ while funerals and weddings were times of congregation for mourning and ritual.¹⁵

Another group in a position to transmit gossip were household slaves. Aristophanes evokes laughter in the *Frogs* by the quips of a nosey slave, who liked to listen in on his master's conversations and spread them outside the household (750–753). The figure of the servile busy-body is not unique to Aristophanes but appears in Menander as well (*Epit.* 424–427 and 473, *Dys.* 406–419, *Pk.* 320). It is possible that this type may tell us more about the fears of masters as a class than about real life. On the other hand, masters might well fear, since slaves knew everything that went on in the household. At the same time, they moved about in public, shopping, doing errands, and exchanging grievances and gossip with other slaves. It is impossible to believe that information did not find its way from one household to another in this manner or to suppose that the playwrights

¹³Cf. Tentori (above n. 5) 282, an account of family life in contemporary Matera, Italy. Although women "went out of their houses as little as possible and only when necessary," yet within their neighbourhoods of eight to ten families, they "went out freely, gossiping with each other about all the people known to their little world." Again the model fits life in Athens. D. Cohen, "Seclusion, Separation, and the Status of Women in Classical Athens," *G&R* NS 36 (1989) 3–15, documents a "wide range of activities typical of traditional Mediterranean societies" that regularly took women out of their houses. His list is impressive. (Cf. Gould 46–51.) Cohen is correct to distinguish between cultural ideals and social practices (7). For the world of the women depicted by Aristophanes stands in contrast to that of the wealthy whose lives are on display in the lawsuits. Cf. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "Some Observations on the Property Rights of Women," *CR* NS 20 (1970) 278 and R. Just, *Women in Athenian Law and Life* (London and New York 1989) 105–125.

¹⁴H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977) 82–88, 156–162 and W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, tr. J. Raffan (Cambridge, Mass. 1985) 230, 242–246. Cf. Winkler 188–209.

¹⁵M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge 1974) 4–23; R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (Ithaca 1985) 23–34; Cohen (above, n. 13) 8; Just (above, n. 13) 110–111.

were far off the mark in their depictions. In one instance, their depiction is verified by an example from real life. In Demosthenes 50 some slaves passed on information concealed by their master to an outsider, a sailor on a ship which their master boarded (48). Unfortunately, these are but tantalizing hints, nothing more.¹⁶

In a sense, we have reached a *cul-de-sac* in pursuit of the means whereby gossip was transmitted in classical Athens. Where gossip took place, we can state with a fair degree of confidence, but precisely how the gossip circuit worked remains a matter of speculation. Unlike the anthropologist we cannot play the role of participant observer and listen in on what amounts to talk, pure and simple. Fortunately, there is a literary medium where gossip has been preserved in writing. I am referring to the Attic lawsuits, a genre that provides an extraordinary insight into the nature of Athenian gossip. For the forensic orations are riddled with scandal and abuse, material composed for the court-room and meant to destroy reputations publicly. The kind of gossip found here is the end-product of the process of transmission, stories "filtered through multiple consciousnesses" (Spacks 9). In turn, whatever its provenience, gossip found an efficient vehicle in the orations themselves. Here private matters were bared to the public at large, both jurors and bystanders, who then passed on all that was exciting, controversial, or important to their families (Aeschines 1.186-187; Dem. 59.110-111) and no doubt to their friends and acquaintances as well. Thus the court-room became a route to the whole city.

It is a curious fact of Athenian public life that the rules of the court permitted speakers to indulge in vilification. Name-calling, for example, was common. The following is a list of some of the abusive words used by Dinarchus to describe Demosthenes in his first oration, composed to prosecute the famous rhetorician: beast (10); Scythian (15); hireling (28); thief (41); criminal (77); juggler (92).¹⁷ Clearly, what constituted slander under Athenian law was so defined as to ignore most of what we might regard as slander and abuse in the courts.¹⁸ Another aspect of this kind of material brought in to destroy an opponent's reputation is that it often seems to be irrelevant to the main issue in dispute. Speakers dug into an opponent's past and present to find unacceptable conduct with which

¹⁶In a work I am preparing on social control, I have considered evidence documenting the intimacy of household slaves with the affairs of their masters.

¹⁷See, e.g., Aeschines 1 and 2; Dem. 18, 19, 21, where abusive words are omnipresent. Cf. Dem. 37.15, 58.49; Lys. 30.21.

¹⁸MacDowell 126-130 is the best account of slander. There are no examples extant of individuals indicted for abuse uttered in the law-courts. (Cf. Dover, "Anecdotes" 49.) On the other hand, abuse of a person to his face was illegal. Demosthenes won a suit for slander against Meidias, the charge being that Meidias had spoken in an abusive manner to both Demosthenes himself and his mother and sister (Dem. 21.79-81).

to distract the jury. But is this material really irrelevant? Part of every oration concerns the character of the speaker himself and/or his opponent, a convention that finds a theoretical justification in manuals of rhetoric. Aristotle, for instance, encouraged forensic orators to add to their narrative anything that revealed their own good qualities and their opponent's bad (*Rh.* 3.1417a). Moreover, in listing the three kinds of proofs that can be used in argument, he asserted that the moral character of a speaker (*ἥθος*), as displayed in his oration, "has more weight than almost anything else" (1.1356a). In other words, the life and character of both defendant and prosecutor are viewed not only as relevant but as essential to the argument. Hence, Aeschines 1.153 can make the suggestion to the jury that the way to judge a man is not by the testimony of witnesses but by his everyday life, including his habits and his associates. This suggestion is not unique (cf. Dem. 52.1, 54.38; Hyp. 1.14, 4.23; Ober 126–127). As a result, speakers often felt called upon to provide abundant detail about an opponent's style of life, contrasting it with their own positive accomplishments. In most cases what they say about an opponent amounts to statements "making moral judgments" or what we have defined as gossip.

If material about life and character finds its justification in rhetorical theory, it also has less savoury purposes. Speakers routinely resorted to both gossip and abuse as a court-room strategy. Hence the forensic orations are rich in words denoting gossip, slander, and abuse of varying degrees of intensity. They include *κακολογεῖν* (or *κακῶς λέγειν*), to defame or malign, *βλασφημεῖν* (or *βλασφημίας λέγειν*), to slander or calumniate, and *λογιοποιεῖν*, to fabricate stories.¹⁹ In addition to name-calling, it was perfectly acceptable to accuse one's opponent of either perjury or sycophancy or both.²⁰ All

¹⁹Examples of *βλασφημία* and its cognates are found at Aeschines 1.122 and 167; Dem. 22.21; 25.26, 45, 52, 85, 91, 94; 36.61; 38.26; 40.49; 41.20; 57.1, 11, 33, 42; 58.58; Din. 1.5 and 12; Isaeus 2.43; Isoc. 16.23. As for its synonyms, *κακολογεῖν* appears at Dem. 25.94, 36.61, and Lys. 8.5, *κακῶς λέγειν* at Dem. 20.104, 38.26, and Lys. 8.16, and *λογιοποιεῖν* at Andoc. 1.54 and Lys. 16.11, 22.14. Cf. the use of *λογιοποιός*, "rumour-monger," at Dem. 24.15. *κακῶς ἄκουειν*, to be ill-spoken of, is also found at Antiphon 5.75, Dem. 37.37, and Lys. 10.11. An individual might also be *περιβόητος*, "notorious" (Lys. 3.30), or an affair "scandalous" (Dem. 40.11). Another very common word for verbal abuse is *λοιδορία* (*λοιδορεῖν*), found, for example, at Dem. 25.36, 26.19, 40.49, 54.18, 57.17; Din. 1.99; Hyp. 1.9; Isoc. 16.22; Lys. 8.5, 9.9. While *λοιδορία* and its cognates can refer to slander or calumny, it often describes the use of abusive language to another's face. In the above, I have made no attempt to provide an exhaustive list of these words.

²⁰For accusations of lies or perjury, see Dem. 21.119 and 139; 36.42; 37.21; 39.18; 42.29; 49.66–67; 52.1; Hyp. 1.11; Isaeus 9.19 and 24; 11.20, 23, 36, 47; Isoc. 18.4 and 57. Charges of sycophancy appear in Aeschines 1, *passim*; Dem. 21.103 and 116; 36, *passim*; 37, *passim*; 38.3, 16, 20; 39.2, 26, 34; 55, *passim*; 57, *passim*; 58, *passim*; Isaeus 11.13 and 31; Isoc. 18, *passim*; Lycurgus 1.31; Lys. 13.67. Again these lists are not exhaustive. On bribery, also a common accusation, see F. D. Harvey, "*Dona ferentes*: Some Aspects

these techniques may be summed up under a single term, διαβολή, slander or misrepresentation. Conversely, it was common to accuse one's opponent of διαβολή.²¹ Hyperides 1.8–10 describes the advantages of speaking first, forcing the defendant to address charges that are extraneous and distracting the jury (cf. Hyp. 4.10, Lycurgus 1.11–13, Lys. 19.5–6). It is this strategy that has left the forensic orations full of gossip.

Since the words "perjury" and "lies" are often bandied about in the lawsuits, the question might well arise as to how we know that we are dealing with the truth. We do not. Nor can we ever know the truth when we are dealing with a fluid and oral form of communication like gossip. For all gossip "embodies the fictional" (Spacks 4). Changing slightly from one person to another, its content is shaped according to "familiar patterns" to fit "established structures" (Spacks 14). In a word, it is story. Hence, even when witnesses testify to the truth of gossip, and often they do so testify, their testimony remains nonetheless part fiction. I see no problem here, for we are not attempting to discover the "real" truth but to gain insight into the nature of gossip itself as a reflection of societal and cultural norms (cf. Dover, "Anecdotes" 46).

Out of all this material, I have chosen to ignore abuse without substance, such as name-calling or accusations of perjury or sycophancy. Nor, for the most part, have I concentrated on those details of the accusation itself, or the defence, that are embodied in a narrative.²² Rather I have selected material that seems, at least on the surface, to be "irrelevant," or better subsidiary, to the main issue, accusations aimed at an opponent that have to do with his private life, his character, his background, and/or his associates, material brought in for no other purpose than to blacken his reputation in the eyes of the jury.

GOSSIP IN THE ATTIC LAWSUITS

Here I propose to consider a few concrete instances of Athenian gossip. The first is taken from Demosthenes 36, a speech given on behalf of Phormio in the form of a special plea attempting to bar a suit for 20 talents brought against himself by his step-son Apollodorus. The target of the gossip is Apollodorus, whose liturgical record the speaker attacks, alleging that he

of Bribery in Greek Politics," in P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), *Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix* (London 1985) 76–117.

²¹ Some examples are Antiphon 5.79, 6.7; Dem. 48.55; 57.30, 36, 52; Din. 1.54; Hyp. 1.14; Lycurgus 1.11 and 149; Lys. 9.1, 3, 18–19. The technique of διαβολή was also widely used by rhetoricians in the assembly. See Thuc. 3.42.2–3.

²² An exception is lawsuits composed for the δοκιμασία that scrutinized a man's whole life and career. I have, in other words, not attempted to judge the facts as narrated. In this choice, I have been conservative. Thus, others may well discern in the lawsuits more gossip than I have.

had spent on public service but a small fraction of an enormous fortune inherited from his father Pasio (36–41). In fact, we know that this attack is intentionally misleading, for Apollodorus had an outstanding liturgical record, including multiple trierarchies (Dem. 50, *passim*; 53.4–5; *IG II*² 1609, 83 and 89; *IG II*² 1612, 110; Davies, *APF* 440–442). Nonetheless, it allows the speaker to contrast Apollodorus' greed in indulging his own whims with his lack of public generosity. There follows an attack on Apollodorus' style of life, alleging that he wore effeminate clothes, had two mistresses, and went around town with three slave attendants (44–45). The character that emerges from this gossip is that of a wastrel, who, if he manages to get hold of the hard-earned money of Phormio, will not spend it to benefit the city but rather will squander it on himself.

A second example is taken from Isaeus 3.37, a suit against Nicodemus for perjury. Its aim is to prove that Nicodemus gave false testimony when he swore that he betrothed his sister to Pyrrhus. One of the ways the speaker attempts to undermine Nicodemus is by questioning whether his uncle would have married the sister of a man who had been accused, in a formal legal action (a *γραφὴ ξενίας*) by a member of his own phratry, of usurping the rights of a citizen. For though Nicodemus won his case and was acknowledged to be an Athenian citizen, he won by only four votes. The speaker thus uses a challenge to Nicodemus' status to argue for the improbability of his relationship with Pyrrhus and with it his overall veracity.

Isaeus 7 provides a third example, this time derived from a family's private history. Thrasyllus is arguing for the legality of the procedures making him the adoptive son of Apollodorus. Having been forced to defend himself against the claims of one of Apollodorus' female cousins, he attempts to undermine his rival by suggesting that, on the basis of her past record, she will be unlikely to fulfil her responsibilities to Apollodorus. For she and her sister had already inherited a brother's estate, in return for which neither had given up a son for posthumous adoption into his house. At this point, the speaker utters the word "shameful," picturing a house left without an heir, and, even worse, a house that was capable of supporting the trierarchy extinguished (31–32; cf. 44–45). He moves, in other words, from an attack on his opponent for failing to fulfil family responsibilities to her potential failure to fulfil a responsibility to the city itself.

Lysias 3, a defence against a charge of wounding, offers yet another kind of gossip, here seen from the perspective of its target. The speaker tells of his unhappy affair with a young male prostitute, unhappy because he had a rival for the boy's affections in the person of a man named Simon. Between the two there was trouble, even violence, for which, he alleges, Simon was

responsible. All this he endured because he was ashamed: he did not want people to know that a man of his age was having an affair with a boy (3–4). Shame too made him avoid the judgment of his fellow citizens, who might think him an utter fool to put up with Simon's provocations. For he knew that there were in the city those of the envious sort who would laugh at him, given his reputation as a good citizen (9). In short, he had not prosecuted Simon, as he might have, because he did not want notoriety (30).

The above are some random uses of gossip. But gossip could also be put to good effect in an extended attack on an individual's whole life and character. The example I have chosen to discuss is Aeschines 1, a lengthy attack on Timarchus and a masterpiece of abuse and vilification. The case is based on a law attributed to Solon forbidding men who had lived a shameful life to speak in public (27–28). The law demanded that *rhetores*, public speakers or "politicians," undergo a *δοκιμασία* if they belonged to one of the following groups: a) those who maltreated their parents, b) those who failed to perform military service or threw away their shield, c) those who prostituted themselves,²³ or d) those who squandered their patrimony or inheritance (28–31; Harrison 2.171–172; Dover, *Homosexuality* 20–23). If one of the above spoke in the assembly, anyone might challenge him there, calling upon him to undergo a scrutiny. If convicted by a jury, the accused was disfranchised (2, 32, 64, 81; Dem. 19.257 and 284; Harrison 2.204–205). Timarchus, the speaker charges, had lived a shameful life contrary to all the laws. This life he proposes to examine, and with it the character of the accused (3 and 8). He insinuates, moreover, that it is more important to judge a man by the facts that are known about him—his habits and associates, his style of life, the way in which he manages his household—than to make one's decision on the basis of what witnesses might say about him (90 and 153). Reputation counts, in other words, and reputation, not to say public notoriety, the defendant did not lack: all Athens talked about him and his associates (20, 44, 48, 53, 55, 130).

Against Timarchus resounds with cries of shame (e.g., 3, 26, 33, 40–42, 54–55). It is also enlivened by a wealth of vivid detail which is not without its own logic but can be broken down into a number of categories. While Timarchus' vices include a gourmand's taste for expensive meals, the company of flute-girls and prostitutes, and the gambling-den (42), his extravagance comes in for special notice, for it drove him to devour his own patrimony (95–96). Left a liturgical fortune, he squandered everything. In addition to being a wastrel, Timarchus associated with the scum of Athens, mostly sexual degenerates like himself (41–42, 52–57, 67, 111, 131, 171, 194). But these vices are only a prelude to the main charge, that

²³Cf. Dem. 22.21, 29–30, 73, and 77 for further references to the law on prostitution.

Timarchus prostituted himself in the house of one man after another. Add to this Timarchus' maltreatment of his own kin. His mother he refused a plot of land for which she pleaded as a burial-place. His uncle, Arignotus of Sphettus, a man the family had supported for years, he refused to maintain, leaving him destitute. Finally, Aeschines accuses Timarchus of bribery, sycophancy, the buying of office, embezzlement, and perjury (107 and 110–115). For some of these charges the speaker is able to call witnesses (e.g., 50, 99–100, 104, 115), but not all. And here the quality of his argument is worth considering, for he calls no witnesses to Timarchus' prostitution. What he substitutes is circumstantial evidence and arguments from probability, leaving his major charge based on hearsay and gossip. In cases like this, it appears, proof was not always necessary, and was certainly not always forthcoming. Instead, the prosecutor depended on gossip (cf. Dover, *Homosexuality* 22 and 39–40).

The above is not an innocent exercise: Aeschines has his own motives, of a political nature, for wanting Timarchus disfranchised.²⁴ Thus he has taken a welter of stories and anecdotes reaching back into Timarchus' youth and made them fit three of the four rules set forth in the law on the scrutiny of *rhetoires*. If Timarchus was the talk of Athens, this lawsuit had the effect of consolidating such talk and gossip and giving it a deadly thrust. The stakes were high, no longer the mockery of one's neighbours or community, or even ridicule among those lounging in and around the agora, but Timarchus' rights as a citizen and with them, his political career. For in losing his civic rights, Timarchus was also the loser in a political struggle with Aeschines. The gossip that dispatched him we might call political slander.

The orations discussed above encompass most of the significant themes of gossip and slander found throughout the lawsuits, whether they are embodied in extended attacks or in isolated complaints. In Athens gossip found a target in the following aspects of an individual's life: the level of his public expenditures such as liturgies and εἰσφοραί, the quality of his military service, his treatment of kin, especially parents, the way in which he stewarded his patrimony, the nature of his associates, his private life and conduct, especially his sexual mores, his character, his status as a citizen, and his "criminal" record.²⁵ Some of these issues ranged into very sensitive areas. After all, those who displayed cowardice in battle, maltreated their parents, or acted in the manner of a spendthrift could face prosecution and, if found guilty, loss of civic rights (ἀτιμία). In addition, any of these matters

²⁴On the background to this case, see Dover, *Homosexuality* 19–20. Winkler 56–61 has discussed Aeschines 1 as an example of the "hoplite vs. *kinaidos* ideology." He believes that such an image was applied only to the "conspicuous representatives" of the citizen body "who managed public affairs" (59).

²⁵See the Appendix for examples of gossip in the lawsuits.

might come to the attention of a political rival and be put to use as political slander.²⁶

GOSSIP AND THE CITIZEN

The prosecution of Timarchus has raised the question of the δοκιμασία, an institution worth considering further as an instance of the kind of "collective scrutiny" (Whitehead 33) that characterized Athenian life.²⁷ While the examination of public speakers was merely encouraged, it was mandatory for magistrates, ephebes, and new citizens. Only the first category will concern us here. The major source for the scrutiny of magistrates is Aristotle's *Constitution* (*Ath. Pol.* 45.3 and 55.2–4), which sets out the procedures used in the examination of archons and *bouleutai*. Unlike the majority of magistrates, who were examined by a jury-court, incoming members of the *boule* were scrutinized by their predecessors and faced a jury, on appeal, only if rejected. Archons too underwent scrutiny in the *boule*, but in their case the rules were more stringent: whether rejected by the *boule* or not, they faced a second δοκιμασία in a jury-court (cf. *Dem.* 20.90).²⁸ In addition to Aristotle, we are fortunate in having four orations of Lysias (16, 25, 26, and 31) composed for delivery before a jury-court sitting in scrutiny of potential magistrates. One of the four concerns the archonship, the other three membership in the *boule*.

The purpose of the δοκιμασία was to ensure that magistrates had the legal qualifications for office (Harrison 2.201). They must, for example, be Athenian citizens in good standing (not ἄτιμοι) and have reached the appropriate age.²⁹ In their defence, however, candidates often revealed much more about themselves, at times displaying their "whole career" (Rhodes, *Athenaion Politeia* 472) in an effort to demonstrate that they were "good and patriotic" citizens (MacDowell 168; cf. Adeleye 296). As to the procedures at the δοκιμασία, Aristotle is quite precise. The candidate was asked a series of questions about his background and qualifications, in response

²⁶Cox discusses outstanding examples of political slander in both the fifth and the fourth century. Among its victims were Cimon and his sons, Pericles, and Alcibiades.

²⁷Works consulted on the δοκιμασία include Harrison 2.200–207, Rhodes, *Boule* 171–178 and *Athenaion Politeia* 542–543, 612, 614–619, MacDowell 167–169, and Adeleye. Whitehead 116 believes that a δοκιμασία was also required before one assumed office in a deme. The evidence, however, is scanty, deriving from Halimous alone (*Dem.* 57.25, 46, 67).

²⁸I follow Rhodes, *Athenaion Politeia* 542–543 in the view that an appeal to the jury-courts applied only when the *boule* rejected a candidate. (Cf. Rhodes, *Boule* 178 and MacDowell 168.) By contrast, see Harrison 2.202–203.

²⁹Adeleye 296–297 lists other requirements that specific public officials had to satisfy.

to which he was allowed to call witnesses. Once he had presented his testimony, the hearing was thrown open to objections. At that point, anyone was permitted to submit evidence in respect of the candidate's life and career that might militate against his being accepted for office. The candidate was then allowed to reply to his accuser. When all the procedures were complete, the question was put to a vote, a show of hands in the *boule* and a ballot in the court (Rhodes, *Athenaion Politeia* 619).

It is not surprising that candidates defending themselves at a scrutiny thought they were justified in giving an account of their whole life (Lys. 16.9). For the kind of questions that it was traditional for the presiding magistrate to ask probed into aspects of an individual's life that went deeper than formal, legal qualifications. Again Aristotle has recorded these questions (*Ath. Pol.* 55.3–4; cf. Dem. 57.66–70; Din. 2.17–18; Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.13). Most were meant to ensure that the candidate was an Athenian on both sides and to elicit whether he belonged to a phratry (Rhodes, *Athenaion Politeia* 511 and 618). He was also asked whether he treated his parents well, whether he met his financial obligations to the city, and whether he performed his military service.³⁰ No matter how impeccable an individual's legal qualifications, the very posing of these last three questions encouraged an objector to unearth negative personal details about a candidate's life. He would not have to pry very deeply to discover all he needed about an individual's relations with his parents, his financial contributions to the city, or his fulfilment of military service. For such issues were foremost among those that inspired gossip. Lysias' orations, composed both for the defence (16 and 25) and for the prosecution (26 and 31), give us some idea of the kinds of arguments that might have been adduced at a δοκιμασία, although the four are extraordinary in being centred on the career and conduct of their protagonists during the reign of the Thirty.³¹ Hence they concentrate for the most part on public activity. Nonetheless, the details of private life that do emerge are interesting. For example, the young Mantisheus, accused of serving in the cavalry under the Thirty, defends himself not just by answering this charge alone but by testifying to the fact that he dowered two sisters, was generous in sharing his patrimony with his brother, and

³⁰While all candidates for public office faced a scrutiny (*Ath. Pol.* 55.2; Aeschines 3.14–15), Aristotle records these questions in conjunction with the scrutiny of archons alone. Scholars generally assume that similar questions were posed to other officials as well. See, for instance, Harrison 2.202–203; MacDowell 168; and Adeleye 296, n. 4.

³¹Adeleye 301–305 discusses these four speeches in relation to the amnesty of 403/2, arguing that there was no indiscriminate disqualification at the δοκιμασία: "only candidates of proven participation in the atrocities of the Thirty were liable to disqualification" (302). On the amnesty itself, see Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 39, *Andoc.* 1.90, and Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.38–43. Cf. Rhodes, *Athenaion Politeia* 462–472, P. Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens* (Ithaca 1982) 102–108, and B. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy 403–386 B.C.* (Ithaca 1986) 89–94.

was not a trouble-maker, never having had anything to do heretofore with the court system (Lys. 16.10–12). Nor was he to be associated with Athens' smart, young set.³² These personal details he follows by his military record and his expenditures on behalf of the city. Taken together, the defence he makes touches his entire life (16.9) and is not merely a response to the questions that the presiding magistrate routinely asked (cf. Lys. 26.3). Lysias 31, a case for the prosecution, charges that Philon betrayed the city during the reign of the Thirty by becoming a metic in Oropus, in effect, deserting in time of war. The speaker also alleges that Philon's mother refused to commit herself to her son's care after her death, instead entrusting money to a man who was not even her relative in the hopes of ensuring a proper burial (20–22). Philon, the speaker insinuates, maltreated his mother, forcing upon her the realization that he would even try to profit by her death. These are allegations based on gossip, though backed by evidence, for the man who received the money appears as a witness. This kind of charge was elicited by the very questions posed at the scrutiny, which encouraged objectors to seek out abnormalities in a candidate's relationship with his parents.

It is my contention that many of the issues that attracted gossip and slander fit neatly under those categories that inspired questions at the δοκιμασία. Hence, the δοκιμασία functioned as a repository of innuendo, rumour, hearsay, and gossip, producing a close articulation of gossip itself and institutional structures (cf. Winkler 54–61). If there was talk circulating about an individual who hoped to stand for office, let him beware, for there was a very good chance that such talk would emerge at his scrutiny. In this way, the δοκιμασία also constituted a means of transmitting gossip. One's peers in the *boule* or court-room, as well as those present as spectators—in the *boule*, as listeners (Rhodes, *Boule* 33)—were offered details of an individual's personal life. Even if those details were positive, such as the ones Mantitheus presented, they allowed others an entry into the private side of his life, e.g., into the intimacy of his household. But what if the charges alleged were entirely negative? Aeschines' portrait of Timarchus, derived from a wealth of titillating gossip that had been in circulation since his youth, would surely be on everyone's lips, adding discomfort and ridicule to the disabilities he already experienced in losing his case. On the other hand, what if an individual like Philon won his case and entered the *boule*? It would be difficult to lay to rest the allegations about himself and his

³²Evidently there was gossip circulating about Mantitheus, for he speaks of rumours spread by the youth from whom he disassociates himself (11). See too his apologies at 18–20. For the plea that one was ἀπάργμων, see D. Lateiner, "‘The Man Who Does Not Meddle in Politics’: A *Topos* in Lysias," *CW* 76 (1982–83) 1–12, who cites Orations 7, 9, 12, 17, 20, and 21. Cf. L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford 1986) 103–111, for "rich quietists" in the orations. Carter adds Lysias 26 to Lateiner's list.

mother. Gossip or not, the information brought to light at a δοκιμασία could haunt a man. The speaker of Dinarchus 2, for example, submitted evidence drawn from a scrutiny proving that his opponent Aristogeiton not only maltreated his father but had led the life of a thorough scoundrel. He offered no witnesses, merely noting that the facts had been established by a δοκιμασία (2.10). In other words, "collective scrutiny" of this kind not only encouraged and justified delving into an individual's private life, but it also left behind a repository of such charges, only some of which were supported by witnesses. Once in circulation, any of this material might prove dangerous to its target in future lawsuits.

While the δοκιμασία is a special case, it does not veer far in its conventions from the standard forensic oration. For most speakers went to great lengths to portray an opponent as having all the traits a jury might condemn. Such traits had little affinity with those of the "good and patriotic citizen" (MacDowell 168), a characterization routinely applied to themselves by either side. What, in any case, did it mean in the context of an Athenian jury-court to be a good and patriotic citizen? Dinarchus offers a hint in his sketch of those qualities that might justify a jury in sparing a man (2.8). He should be moderate in character and of good ancestry, and one who had performed many fine services in both a private and a public capacity (cf. Lys. 30.1). Others offer a fuller picture, among them, Lysias 19, an encomium written on behalf of a father, rejecting the charge that the latter had withheld property confiscated from his son-in-law. The speaker portrays his father as a model of probity and public spirit. During a life-span of 50 years, he had lavished nine talents and 2,000 drachmas on his fellow citizens, equipping choruses, outfitting triremes, and making other contributions (εἰσφοραί) to the public purse (57-58; cf. 9). This public generosity he matched by private benefactions, helping his friends with dowries for their daughters and sisters, with ransoms, and with funds for burial (59). He also brought honour to the city by the victories his horses won in international competitions (63). Such a plea is not unique. The speaker of Lysias 18 argues in the same vein, basing his appeal for pity on the splendour and generosity of his more distant ancestors (1, 7, 21, 23), while Lysias 20 adds to these themes a distinguished military career (23-25). (Cf. Lys. 16, Lys. 21, Isoc. 16.)

Scholarly interest in the character, achievements, and expectations of the good and patriotic citizen has not been matched by an equal interest in his opposite. And yet Lysias 14 articulates how it was possible to connect the two in the minds of the jury. Concerned that his opponent might be acquitted, since he has shown himself a distinguished and useful citizen, the speaker suggests that the jury would be justified in condemning him to death on the basis of the rest of his activities. He advises them:

You permit those speaking in defence to describe their own superior qualities and to recount the public service of their ancestors. Surely then it is reasonable that you listen to the prosecution when they expose the many wrongdoings that defendants have committed against you and the many evils for which their ancestors have been responsible. (14.24; cf. Lys. 30.1)

Speakers followed this credo, producing a stereotype of their opponent that was very often the precise opposite of the good and patriotic citizen. In what follows, I have chosen one such depiction as an illustration of the negative traits that one might attribute to an opponent. It matters not whether these attributes are true or false or whether they are introduced as sheer irrelevancies meant to distract the jury. Taken as whole, they reach far into the mentality of the Athenians on questions of private conduct, public morality, and civic expectations.

My example is drawn from Isaeus 5, a dispute over the estate of Dicaeogenes II. The case involves both a will and an adopted son, Dicaeogenes III, who has a long history of legal battles with the sisters of his adoptive father and who is the main target of the speaker. The portrait the latter draws of Dicaeogenes parallels almost point by point that of the good citizen, as defended above by his son (Lysias 19). Dicaeogenes is the stereotypical "bad" citizen. For though he was rich, he was also the least generous of men when it came to his city, his kin, and his friends. For ten years he had an income of 80 *minai*, yet his liturgies consisted of only three choruses, for which he won no prizes. Nor had he ever been trierarch or made financial contributions to the city. Worse still, his name was publicly inscribed in the agora on a list of men who had failed to carry out their promise to contribute money for the welfare of the city in war (35–38). Dicaeogenes' private conduct matches his public performance. He cheated or failed to maintain close family members for whom he was legally responsible (39; cf. 9–11). In addition, his mother charged him with acts so shameful that the speaker is incapable of uttering them before a jury. As for his friends, he cheated the lot (40). The list goes on, including the fact that Dicaeogenes never ransomed prisoners of war (44) and never served as a soldier (46). Isaeus 5 has companions in a number of other lawsuits in which the speaker develops an extended attack on his opponent somewhat in the manner, *mutatis mutandis*, of Aeschines' *Against Timarchus* (see, e.g., Aeschines 2; Dem. 18, 19, 21, 25–26, 39; Din. 1; Isaeus 4; Lys. 14). In addition, partial versions of the stereotype of the bad citizen are numerous (e.g., Dem. 36, 45; Isaeus 11; Lys. 6, 21). Total or partial, the negative stereotype that recurs will be seen to be an amalgam of many of the significant themes of gossip and slander.

The competing stereotypes of the good and the bad citizen delineated above are part of an ideology of citizenship. They are constructs that assert what is and what is not appropriate behaviour. Put another way, these stereotypes reflected and sustained the *status quo*. They also sustained prevailing notions of "property-power" (Davies, *APF* xviii; *Wealth and Power* 88–131). For in positing what is good and noble, they assume a liturgical fortune or wealth enough to make consistent and generous contributions to the city and to patronize less fortunate kinsmen and friends. They also assume fine ancestry, with parents and more remote kin honoured and remembered for their benefactions and achievements. These portraits express the world-view of an elite, whether of birth or of wealth, indicating the qualities to which they aspired and the accomplishments they wished to present as their own to a jury, or conversely, the deviation of one of their peers from these accepted norms. Even if it was only a construct, such a world-view, accepted by the majority of Athenians, would influence their notion of what was natural and right. They too would acquiesce in or conform to the reality it espoused, thus echoing the outlook of the elite and sustaining their position and their precedence in leadership. In return, the elite was expected to reveal the extent of their wealth and show grace in making it available to the democracy. Moreover, if they held aristocratic ideals, they must make them conform to the egalitarian ethos of the *polis* (Ober 291). Hence, they attempted to demonstrate that they deserved χάρις (gratitude) and that their opponent did not. In a word, the stereotypes of the good and bad citizen are part of the discourse of an elite competing with one another for the approval of mass juries. Gossip was one of the weapons they used in their competition.³³

GOSSIP AND WOMEN

As we have seen above, relations among kin were frequently a topic of gossip. In particular, the failure to meet one's obligations to kin provoked hostility, being a breach of collective norms.³⁴ The most imperative of

³³ Consulted on ideology were L. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, tr. B. Brewster (London 1971) 121–173; E. Carlton, *Ideology and Social Order* (London 1977); J. Larraín, *The Concept of Ideology* (Athens, Georgia 1979); Finley, *Politics* (above, n. 7) 122–141; N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, tr. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1986); Ober 38–43. For a list of references to χάρις, see Davies, *Wealth and Power* 92–96, especially 93, n. 9. Cf. Ober 226–233, 245–247. On competition among the elite, see W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971); Davies, *APF and Wealth and Power*; D. Whitehead, "Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: Φιλοτιμία in Democratic Athens," *CIMed* 34 (1983) 55–74.

³⁴ See the Appendix for references to the maltreatment of kin. Gossip about kin also concerned family quarrels (Isaeus 6.39–42, 9.17–18), crimes or misdeeds of close relatives (Dem. 25.79–80, 58.27–28; Lys. 13.65–66), and wrongs of ancestors (Lys. 14.39–42).

such obligations was the respect and maintenance owed parents. Hence, the maltreatment of parents stands high on the list of familial indiscretions about which gossip circulated. In turn, the incidence of gossip about parents provides a useful entrée into the question of women and gossip. For there is no individual who inspired more gossip that could be used against a man than his mother.³⁵ Where maltreatment is concerned, charges apply almost equally to both father and mother. But there the similarity ends and gossip diverges. In the case of the father, emphasis is equally on his status as an Athenian and on his past wrongdoings and/or his "criminal" record, while in that of the mother, the issue that exercised speakers most was her status as an Athenian.³⁶ Such gossip took a number of forms, alleging that a woman was either a slave or an ex-slave, a foreigner, or a poor working-woman with questionable ancestry. The most familiar example is that of Demosthenes, who had to contend with the charge that he was a Scythian on his mother's side (Aeschines 2.78, 93, 180; 3.172; Din. 1.15; Dover, *Popular Morality* 32).³⁷ On the other hand, the best documented example is that of Euxitheus, the speaker of Demosthenes 57, who was stripped by his fellow demesmen of his citizenship in the διαγήφσις (deme registration) of 346/5. It was alleged that his mother was an alien or even a slave, the proof being that she worked in the market-place selling ribbons and had also spent many years as a wet-nurse (30–37, 40–45). Another form such slander might take was that a woman had lived as a *hetaira* or as a common-law wife. Her children were thus illegitimate and so did not share in the full rights of Athenian citizens. Phile, the daughter of Pyrrhus, for example, lost her right to her father's estate when her opponents convinced a jury that she was the daughter of a *hetaira* and so a bastard (Isaeus 3).³⁸

Why did speakers choose an opponent's mother? The choice was probably based on the fact that such slander against a woman was difficult to refute. While it remains unclear whether the birth of female children was

³⁵Cf. J. Henderson, "Older Women in Attic Old Comedy," *TAPA* 117 (1987) 112–113. His father inspired as much gossip. There are four examples of gossip about a sister, relating to both maltreatment (Dem. 24.202–203, 25.55; Isaeus 8.40–43) and incest (Lys. 14.28), three that concerned a wife (Aeschines 2.149; Andoc. 1.125; Dem. 21.158), and two that concerned a mother-in-law (Andoc. 1.124–128; Dem. 45.70).

³⁶Maltreatment: of a mother, Aeschines 1.99; Dem. 25.55; Isaeus 5.39; Lys. 31.21–23; of a father, Andoc. 1.19; Dem. 24.201, 25.54; Din. 2.8, 11, 14, 20; Isaeus 4.19; Lys. 13.91.

Status: of a mother, Aeschines 2.78, 93, 180, 3.172; Dem. 18.129–131, 19.281, 21.149–150, 25.65, 57.30–37, 40–45; Din. 1.15; of a father, Dem. 18.129–131 and 258, 19.281, 23.213, 57.18; Lys. 13.64, 30.2 and 30.

Wrongdoings/"criminal" record: of a father, Dem. 22.33–34, 56, 58, 68; 24.125, 127, 168; 25.65 and 77; 58.19–20; Din. 2.8, 11, 14, 20; Lys. 14.30–38; of a mother, Dem. 25.65.

³⁷Cf. Demosthenes' attack on both Aeschines' parents (18.129–131, 258–262; 19.199–200 and 281; cf. Dover, *Popular Morality* 30–32).

³⁸Cf. gossip about Plangon (Dem. 39.3–4 and 26; 40.2, 8–11, 27, 51) and Chrysilla (Andoc. 1.124–128).

recorded in the phratry, certainly their names were not inscribed anywhere on the list of citizens.³⁹ The acknowledgement of their legitimacy as daughters of Athenian citizens depended on rites of passage such as recognition by a father at birth, betrothal, and a marriage feast (γάμηλία), which introduced a woman to her husband's phratry (Dem. 57.40–43; Isaeus 3.30, 8.9, 14–20; Gould 40–42; Golden). All these ceremonies were affirmed by witnesses: there were no written records. Hence when Euxitheus wanted to disprove charges against himself and his mother, he called upon a series of kin on both sides of the family to testify on his behalf. Euxitheus was in an enviable position, for he had numerous supporters from his deme, phratry, and family group (γένος).⁴⁰ This need not always have been the case when such a charge was made. Demosthenes' mother, for example, was raised in a Milesian colony, the daughter of a local woman and a father, Gylon, who had fled Athens rather than stand trial for treason (Aeschines 2.171; Davies, *APF* 121–122).⁴¹ Hence her predecessors would not be familiar figures in Athens, while those on her mother's side would be very difficult to trace indeed. In general, because the public presence of women was minimal, only kin, close acquaintances, and neighbours knew of the life they led or had led. Or these are the kinds of people, together with household slaves, who routinely testified to their legitimacy and activity. All in all then, slander of a man's mother was an effective form of attack, planting seeds of doubt in a jury's mind and forcing an opponent to spend valuable time refuting the charges.

In the above examples of slander against a mother, it is noteworthy that the woman herself was not its direct target: she served merely as an instrument to be used against her son. In fact, this is the character of most gossip about women. For the most part, such gossip related to a man's sexual mores. For example, the charge that a man associated with *hetairai* and/or flute-girls is one that recurs. So does the allegation that he made a habit of seducing women.⁴² In very few instances, however, is a specific woman ever mentioned. Exceptions are Alce (Isaeus 6), Neaera and her

³⁹The speaker of Isaeus 3 states that Pyrrhus might have assured his daughter's legitimacy by introducing her to his phratry, but did not do so (73, 75–76, 79). Gould (41–42) rejects such a possibility as a general procedure, believing that it was appealed to in this instance only because Phile was alleged to be an inheriting daughter (ἐκκληρος). For an opposite view, see Golden, who believes that Athenian women were regularly associated with phratries and customarily introduced to them at birth.

⁴⁰Dem. 57, *passim*; Whitehead 296–301. Cf. S. C. Humphreys, "Kinship Patterns in Athenian Courts," *GRBS* 27 (1986) 60–62.

⁴¹See also L. Gernet, "Notes sur les parents de Démosthène," *REG* 31 (1918) 186–187 and V. Hunter, "Women's Authority in Classical Athens: The Example of Kleoboule and her Son (Dem. 27–29)," *EMC/CV* NS 8 (1989) 39–48.

⁴²E.g., see Aeschines 1.42, 75, 107, 115; Dem. 36.45; 45.79; 48.53–55; 59, *passim*; Hyp. 1.12; Isaeus 3.10–16; 6.19–21, 29, 55; 8.44; Lys. 1.16–17; 13.68; 14.25. Apollodorus'

daughter Phano (Demosthenes 59), Pyrrhus' putative ex-wife (Isaeus 3), and Chrysilla (Andoc. 1.124-128). For the most part, such women were of no real interest in their own right, being either non-citizens or the nameless denizens of Athens' *demi-monde*.

Gossip about women could have devastating effects on the individuals against whom it was directed as well as on their families. Consider Isaeus 3. In the absence of a case for the defence, it is impossible to judge whether the deceased, Pyrrhus, whose estate is at issue, lived with Phile's mother in a legitimate union. The evidence of Pyrrhus' uncles that she did so and that their daughter Phile was duly recognized as a legitimate child gives one pause (29-34). On the negative side, one jury had already been convinced that her case was not valid, convicting Xenocles, her husband and *κύριος* (public representative), of perjury in claiming the estate for his wife. What convinced them? Apart from the argument that neither a legal marriage nor a divorce had ever taken place, the speaker charged that Phile's mother was a *hetaira*, "at the disposal of anyone" (11 and 15). His evidence consisted of gossip, sworn to by neighbours and other acquaintances. They told of quarrels, noisy parties, and wild behaviour whenever Pyrrhus' "wife" appeared on the scene (13-14). Thus arose the belief that the woman was a courtesan. Was she? It is impossible to say. But certainly her non-conforming behaviour had dire results: her daughter was disinherited and publicly acknowledged as illegitimate (*νόθη*) with a portion of 1000 drachmas.⁴³

Isaeus 6 reveals a similar pattern. The difficulties experienced by Euctemon's putative sons in claiming their deceased brother's estate stemmed from a scandalous tale circulated by their opponents about Euctemon himself. The story was based on his close association with an ex-prostitute and slave named Alce, with whom, it was alleged, he had lived at an advanced age. Under her influence, he had introduced one of her two sons into his phratry as his own child (18-21). And yet there is a strong argument for the legitimacy of the two boys, the sons of a second marriage to a woman named Callippe (Wyse 503-504; Davies, *APF* 563). Again gossip had its effect. Grudgingly admitted to the phratry, the son of Euctemon received only a plot of land out of a substantial family fortune (22-23). Here then association with a slave of some independence and notoriety at a crucial juncture in a man's life and the scandal it created in the family threatened the rights and status of his children (cf. Sealey 125-126).

slander of his mother, Archippe (Dem. 45.27, 39, 84; 46.21), directed against both her and Phormio, is an unusual example of gossip about close kin.

⁴³On bastards, see Harrison 1.67; D. M. MacDowell, "Bastards as Athenian Citizens," *CQ* NS 26 (1976) 88-91; P. J. Rhodes, "Bastards as Athenian Citizens," *CQ* NS 28 (1978) 89-92; C. Patterson, "Those Athenian Bastards," *Classical Antiquity* 9 (1990) 40-73. Cf. Sealey 124-125.

In addition to the cases involving status or sexual mores, gossip in circulation about women took a number of more mundane but predictable forms. Plangon's case is illustrative. A striking woman from a wealthy, though ruined, family (Davies, *APF* 365–367), she had, as Mantias' common-law wife, a reputation for expensive tastes, living independently and stylishly with her two sons (Dem. 39.26, 40.9, 27, 51). She was also reputed to be cunning, having tricked Mantias into recognizing the two boys as his sons in the presence of a public arbitrator (Dem. 39.3–4, 40.2, 8–11).⁴⁴ Allegations that women were extravagant or that they were schemers recur (Dem. 21.158; Isaeus 2.1, 19–20, 25, 38, 8.36). In one of these cases (Isaeus 2), the speaker answers the charge that his sister had, as Menecles' ex-wife, persuaded the latter to choose himself as his adopted son. The evidence adduced was circumstantial, based on the discrepancy in age between Menecles and his wife (he was an old man) and their close and amiable relationship both before and after they divorced. Gossip of this kind was not trivial, since it was illegal for a woman to influence a man in his choice of an adopted son, whether it was made by will or *inter vivos* (cf. Dem. 46.14, 48.56; Hyp. 5.17; Harrison 1.85).⁴⁵ Hence, the speaker was in danger of losing his estate and his name as Menecles' son. Other kinds of gossip about women included their failure to carry out obligations to kin (Isaeus 7.31–32, 42, 44–45) and hints of sexual indiscretions (Dem. 45.27, 39, 84, 46.21).

Admittedly, gossip aimed at women directly is found in only two of the above cases (Isaeus 7 and Dem. 45/46). For the rest, a male protagonist is its target, being associated with some indiscretion by or with a female relative or paramour. To scheme, to exert undue influence, to fail in responsibilities to kin, or to be extravagant constituted behaviour on a woman's part that was expected to carry negative weight with a jury. Even a hint of adultery could hold real danger, bringing into question the legitimacy of progeny and suggesting its perpetrators had engaged in illicit acts. On the other hand, the fact that certain speakers dwelt in some detail on these indiscretions (Dem. 39/40, Isaeus 2, 8) serves to bring women in their own right into the foreground, providing evidence for the kinds of issues that aroused talk about them in Athens. They reveal areas in which a woman needed to exercise caution or provoke the antagonism, and the gossip that attended it, of her neighbours and community.

⁴⁴Plangon was Mantias' first wife and the mother of his oldest son, Boeotus. He divorced her to marry the daughter of Polyaratus. When the latter died, however, "he continued to associate with Plangon" (Davies, *APF* 367). It was at this point that a second son was born. Cf. J. Rudhardt, "La reconnaissance de la paternité, sa nature et sa portée dans la société athénienne," *MusHelv* 19 (1962) 39–64; Sealey 123–124; S. C. Humphreys, "Family Quarrels," *JHS* 109 (1989) 182–185.

⁴⁵The influence of a woman was even more troublesome if she was a prostitute or notorious character like Alce (Isaeus 6.21 and 48; cf. Dem. 48.53–55, 59.56).

The majority of examples of gossip about women relate to two issues: sexual mores and status as an Athenian. Such gossip was provoked by a number of questions, including how often and how seriously individual Athenians availed themselves of the company of "entertainers" like flute-girls, courtesans, and prostitutes, most of them slaves or aliens, and all members of a marginal stratum of Athenian society. Also open to question, because it could be obscure, was the purity of a mother. Was she the daughter of Athenian parents on both sides and had she been duly betrothed and married? Lurking behind both issues was a widespread concern about legitimacy, which such gossip tapped. It derived from the fears of a "descent group" that outsiders might insinuate their way into its ranks.⁴⁶ Ever watchful and quick to talk, the community itself—demesmen and neighbours—was the first line of defence against such a possibility. Community gossip was one way of preventing illicit relationships, or at least ensuring that any offspring that resulted would not ultimately present problems. Gossip, Aeschines noted (1.127), drew private details of an individual's life into the public arena. Aeschines was referring to talk of men, particularly men in public life. But his statement applies equally to women. In the case of respectable citizens, gossip represented an entry of public morality into the private world of the *oikos*. It ensured that women, who were not *sui iuris* or public persons in their own right but the responsibility of fathers, husbands, or brothers, would experience the hostility and mockery of the community if they breached its standards. While such talk was surely directed at women *per se*, in our sources it is shown to reach them mostly through the gossip or scandal that attached itself to a close male relative. Women were then responsible for bringing shame on a man in his deme, among his closest associates, or even in the larger urban political arena. To preserve his honour, a man had the duty both to himself and to his kin to ensure seemly behaviour on the part of women in his *κοινία*. The less said about them the better (cf. Thuc. 2.45.2). This may serve as a partial explanation why women were, at least ideally, confined to the home as much as possible.⁴⁷ Thus, both directly and indirectly, gossip served as a potent weapon in ensuring the conformity of Athenian women to community standards.

CONCLUSIONS

In his recent work, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 1989) 148, Josiah Ober notes the importance of rumour and gossip "in a

⁴⁶See J. K. Davies, "Athenian Citizenship: The Descent Group and the Alternatives," *CJ* 73 (1977) 105–121.

⁴⁷Cf. Tentori (above, n. 5) 282 and J. Dubisch, "Culture Enters through the Kitchen: Women, Food, and Social Boundaries in Rural Greece," in J. Dubisch (ed.), *Gender and Power in Rural Greece* (Princeton 1986) 200.

society that lacked organized news media," emphasizing that one of the functions of gossip is to assist in the flow of information. But gossip also functioned in another important way, censuring individual conduct and thereby ensuring appropriate standards of community behaviour. Here we can be explicit. Since Dodds' seminal work on the irrational, it is widely recognized that Athens was a "shame-culture," a society where deep anxieties existed about "what people will say."⁴⁸ "In such a society, anything which exposes a man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to 'lose face,' is felt as unbearable."⁴⁹ Yet this is the very aim and effect of gossip itself, to submit its target to public mockery. Or as Campbell puts it (315): "Gossip and its outcome, ridicule, are in a certain manner the external sanctions which support the internal sanctions of individual action, self-regard and the sense of shame." In this way, gossip operates as a form of social control, making non-conformity or deviance unacceptable. Embedded deep in the mentality and social practice of a community, gossip oversees people's lives down to the smallest detail. But even as it criticizes and ridicules, gossip is also "a restatement of a value" (Campbell 314). For to criticize others is to imply some ideal standard of behaviour from which they have veered. This observation holds for Athens, where gossip reached deep into individual lives. Values attaching to family and kin were especially prominent among those expressed in gossip. Hence talk dragged details of men's private lives into the public arena for inspection and condemnation. Conversely, gossip penetrated into the privacy of the *oikos* to mark out women who did not conform to community standards. Gossip thus represents a point of articulation of family and community, *oikos* and *polis*. It was one of a number of ways in which the rules of life in the *polis* reached and affected members of the *oikos*.

Gossip had a special power in classical Athens, where the impetus to talk, ridicule, and criticize was heightened by many of the procedures of the

⁴⁸A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford 1960) 48. Although Adkins is discussing Homeric values, he believes that concern for "face" and for "what people will say" was "a fixed feature of the Greek moral landscape, common to all men (and women)" throughout the fifth century (155). The evidence of the orations suggests that the concern persisted through the fourth century.

⁴⁹E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951) 18; cf. A. W. Gouldner, *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory* (New York and London 1965) 81–86 and Dover, *Popular Morality* 236–242. The notion of honour and shame has not been adduced as an explanatory category but rather as a characteristic of a society where "sensitivity to public opinion" is acute and where such opinion "arbitrates reputation": see D. D. Gilmore, "Introduction: The Shame of Dishonor," in D. D. Gilmore (ed.), *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean* (Washington, D.C. 1987) 3. An adequate explanation of both honour and shame and gossip would depend on the peculiarities of the society under study. I hope I have made some of those peculiarities clear for classical Athens. Gilmore's collection is worth consulting for the contemporary debate reassessing the notion of honour and shame.

democratic system. Participation, for example, was a privilege open to all. For most, this meant the periodic holding of one of the many offices of state for a year. But to enjoy this responsibility one must first qualify as a citizen, with behaviour befitting a citizen. Public scrutiny at the δοκιμασία ensured that office-holders were so qualified. The same concern for character and behaviour distinguished appeals to the jury-courts. It appears then that at all levels Athenians were encouraged to pry and to probe, to know what their neighbours were doing and had done. Little effort was required to obtain such information, for most Athenians lived in small, face-to-face communities, where they were on intimate terms with their demesmen. Such information might serve as mere *bavardage* or it could be used with a purpose, ending up as part of the evidence of witnesses in court or as part of an objection at a scrutiny. Both the form and the content of gossip were socially constructed in such a way as to fit institutional structures. Hence, while gossip in Athens was surely no more intense or omniscient than that circulating in other small communities, it was more embedded in institutions and so was more purposive and potentially more destructive.

Anthropologists have noted that gossip can also function to preserve an elite, reinforcing their common values and standards of behaviour (Gluckman). At the same time, it may also ensure the equality of members of an elite by levelling those who seek undue pre-eminence or who fail to conform to its norms. In a general way, this holds true for the Athenian elite, for gossip was one of the weapons they used in competition with one another. Thus, in the lawsuits gossip often reached an ideological level in the demands it placed on the elite to conform publicly to the image of the good citizen deserving of χάρις. Unfortunately, the vast majority of the extant lawsuits were written by and/or for members of this elite (Ober 45). As a result, there is no controlling body of evidence to indicate whether members of the lower classes also riddled their appeals to a jury with gossip about an opponent. Was the resort to gossip in the lawsuits a *topos* encouraged by orators who composed for wealthy clients (Ober 150)? Or was its use more widespread in the courts? It is impossible to say. What we can say with some assurance is that the elite themselves invariably resorted to gossip, forcing their peers to conform to standards of behaviour appropriate to both community and *polis*. Uttered before the mass audiences of court and assembly, gossip allowed the lower classes to judge the correctness or otherwise of individual conduct, thus exerting some control over the elite (Ober *passim*).

But gossip affected more than the elite. Its circulation through a grapevine of neighbours and demesmen to local haunts, to village squares, and to the agora in Athens indicates that no one was immune from its criticism or ridicule. The issues that inspired it, every aspect of private and public conduct, also point in the same direction. To talk of others, whether

idly or maliciously, was a deeply engrained part of community behaviour (cf. Campbell 314). Apart from the elite then, gossip helped to preserve the descent group itself against outsiders by the images it evoked, by the standards it proclaimed, and by the morality it enforced. For in criticizing one another, Athenians declared what it was to be an Athenian. Gossip thus helped to sustain their position as an elite surrounded by slaves and aliens.⁵⁰

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APPENDIX

The following are the most common subjects of gossip found in the law-suits:

Public service: Dem. 21.151–157, 160–162; 25.78; 36.41–42; 38.25; 42.22–23; 45.66; 54.44; Din. 1.69–70; Isaeus 4.29; 5.36–38, 44–45; 11.47; Lys. 6.48–49; 21.20.

Military service: Aeschines 2.79; Dem. 21.148, 163–174; 39.16–17; Isaeus 4.29; 5.46; Isoc. 18.48; Lycurgus 1.19; Lys. 3.45; 6.46–47; 13.77–79; 31.9, 27–29.

Treatment of kin: Aeschines 1.102–104; Dem. 21.130; 24.127, 202–203; 25.55; 45.70; Isaeus 5.9–11 and 39; 7.31, 42, 44–45; 8.37, 40–43; 9.16–18; 11.37–38.

Treatment of parents: Aeschines 1.99; Andoc. 1.19; Dem. 24.201; 25.54–55; Din. 2.8, 11, 14, 20; Isaeus 2.43; 4.19; 5.39; Lys. 13.91; 31.21–23.

Care of patrimony: Aeschines 1.97–105; Dem. 21.158–159; 36.42–45; 38.25–28; 40.51 and 58; 42.24; 48.55; Din. 1.36; Isaeus 5.43; 10.25; Lys. 14.27.

Associates: Aeschines 1, *passim*; Dem. 21.139, 195; 37.48; 38.27; 39.2, 13; 40.9, 57; 54.34, 39; 59, *passim*; Isaeus 5.7–8; 6.19–21, 29; Isoc. 17.33–34.

Private life and conduct: Aeschines 1, *passim*; 2.153–154; Dem. 21.133–134, 158; 22.62–63; 36.45; 38.27; 59, *passim*; Din. 1.30, 36, 47; Isaeus 6.18–21, 39–42, 49–50; 8.36–37; Lys. 14.25–29.

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Sexual mores: Aeschines 1, *passim*; Aeschines 2.127, 166; Andoc. 1.124–129; Dem. 22.29, 73, 77; 36.45; 39.26; 40.8–9; 45.27, 39, 79, 84; 48.53–55; 59, *passim*; Hyp. 1.3 and 12; Isaeus 3.10–14; 10.25; Lys. 1.16; 3.3–4, 30; 13.68; 14.25–28.

Character: Aeschines 1, *passim*; 2.22, 54, 88, 143; Dem. 36.8, 41–42, 44; 37.52; 45.63–65; 48.56; 58.27–28; 59.50, 64; Lys. 3.45; 14, *passim*.

Status: Aeschines 2.22–23, 78–79, 93, 127, 180, 183; 3.172; Andoc. 1.139; fr. 3.2; Dem. 18.129–131; 19.281; 21.149–150; 23.213; 25.65, 78; 57, *passim*; 59, *passim*; Din. 1.15; Isaeus 3.37; Lys. 13.64; 30.2, 5–6, 27–30.

Criminal record: Aeschines 2.93, 148, 165–166; Dem. 24.127; 25.60–63, 67–71; 40.22; Din. 2.9–13; Isaeus 4.28; 8.43–44; Lys. 6.21–32; 13.67–68; 31.18 and 20.

Other topics that recur, though less frequently, are the maltreatment of friends (e.g., Aeschines 2.22, 55; Dem. 25.56–58; Isaeus 5.40; Lys. 6.23), resort to false oaths (e.g., Aeschines 1.115; Dem. 49.66–67; 54.39; Din. 1.46), and dishonesty or other unacceptable conduct in public office (e.g., Aeschines 1.107–115; Dem. 21.173–174; 24, *passim*; 57.59–60; Isoc. 17.33–34; Lys. 30.2). There are naturally many other random uses of gossip, the subjects of which do not recur. These I have not documented.