

PRESBEIS AUTOKRATORES: ANDOCIDES' DE PACE

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ANDOCIDES' *DE PACE* MARKS an interlude of diplomacy towards the end of the first decade of the fourth century, interrupting briefly the course of the Corinthian War. Didymus cites Philochorus for the condemnation of Andocides and the other ambassadors in the archonship of Philocles, that is, the Attic year 392/1 (*FGrHist* 328 F 149a).¹ In the *De pace*, Andocides urges the Athenian assembly to accept the terms proposed at a peace conference at Sparta, at which he himself had been present as a member of the Athenian embassy.² We learn from Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F 149a), De-

The following works will be cited by author's name alone: Enrico Auccello, "La Genesi della Pace di Antalcida," *Helikon* 5 (1965) 340-380; Richard A. Baumann, *Political Trials in Ancient Greece* (London and New York 1990); I. A. F. Bruce, "Athenian Embassies in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," *Historia* 15 (1967) 272-281; G. L. Cawkwell, "The Imperialism of Thrasybulus," *CQ* NS 26 (1976) 270-277; Charles D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1979); Anna Missiou[-Ladi], *The Subversive Oratory of Andokides* (Cambridge 1992); Derek J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (Wiesbaden 1973, *Historia Einzelschriften* 22); Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, *Accountability in Athenian Government* (Madison, Wis. 1982); T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (London 1965); Robin Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 B.C.," *JHS* 87 (1967) 95-115; Christopher J. Tuplin, "Lysias xix, the Cypriot War and Thrasyboulos' Navy Expedition," *Philologus* 127 (1983) 170-186.

¹Didymus cites Philochorus as follows (*FGrHist* 328 F 149a): ... ὡς Φιλόχορος ἀφηγ[εῖται] αὐτοῖς ὄνόμασι, πρ[ο]β[ε]ίς ἄρχοντα Φιλοκ[λέα] Ἀναφλύστιον· "καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν ἐπ' Ἀντιμακίδου κατέπεμψεν ὁ βασιλεὺς, ἦν Ἀθηναῖοι οἴ[ου]ν ἐδέξαντο, / διότι ἐγγράμμο ἐν αὐτῇ τοῖς τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκοῦν/τας) Ἕλληνας ἐν Βασιλέως οἴ[κ]ῳ πᾶντας εἶναι / συννεμεμένους· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πρέσβεις τοὺς / ἐν Λακεδαίμονι συγχωρήσαντας) ἐφυγάδευ/σαν, Καλλιστράτου γράψαντος, κ[αὶ] αὐτὸν ὑπομείναντας τὴν κρίσιν, Ἐπικράτην Κηφισία, Ἀνδοκίδην Κυδαθηναία, Κρατῖνον Σφήττιον, Εὐβουλίδην Ἐλευσίνιον. The new reading offered by Lionel Pearson and Susan Stephens (eds.), *Didymi in Demosthenem Commentarium* (Stuttgart 1983) does not differ in any significant way.

²The approximate date of the *De pace* can be determined by internal evidence. Andocides states (3.20) that the Boeotians have already been at war for four years. Since the Corinthian War began in summer 395, a year before the eclipse of the sun of summer 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10), four campaign years would bring us down to summer 392. Andocides may have spoken somewhat earlier, because his point requires an overstatement of the period of war rather than an understatement. Scholars have tried to pinpoint the date of the *De pace* more exactly, but this is an impossible endeavour because Xenophon has chosen not to include the negotiations at Sparta in his *Hellenica*, with the result that no extant source has given a dating of the negotiations at Sparta relative to the other events of the period, in particular from the revolution at Corinth to the destruction of the Spartan *mora* by Iphicrates (see Ryder 165-169). Were the Isthmian Games mentioned by Xenophon (4.5.1) in close association with the news of the destruction of the *mora* by Iphicrates (4.5.7) those of 392 or 390? 392 involves compression of the events

mosthenes (19.276–280), ps.-Plutarch (*Moralia* 835a), and Photius (261b) that Andocides and his fellow ambassadors not only failed to persuade the Athenian assembly to accept the terms of the peace, but were severely penalized.³ The reason is not easy to determine. Demosthenes (19.278) alleges that the penalty was for having disobeyed their instructions (*ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὰ γράμματα ... ἐπρέσβευσαν ἐκείνοι*). Yet, as Andocides makes very clear (3.33–34 and 40–41), the ambassadors, though *αὐτοκράτορες*, still referred the final decision back to the Athenian assembly. This discrepancy between the seemingly conscientious behavior of Andocides and his colleagues and their subsequent conviction has been noted by I. A. F. Bruce who, on the basis of the scholia to a passage in Aristides' *Panathenaicus* (293 Behr),⁴ has proposed to redate their conviction to 387/6.⁵ While I agree with Bruce that the most logical hypothesis to explain the convic-

of 4.4.1–19; 390 leaves at least a year unaccounted for. Diodorus places the revolution at Corinth (14.86.1), the capture of Lechaeum (14.86.4), and Agesilaus' expedition to Corinth at the time of the Isthmian Games (14.86.5) under the archon year 394/3. Since he dates the events of the campaigning season of 394 (14.83–14.84.3) in the archon year 395/4, it is possible that he is dating the events of the campaigning season of 393 (and, according to his frequent custom, events of the campaigning season of 392 which were directly connected with those of 393) as 394/3. I would incline more to the 393–392 framework for this period than to the 393–390 framework. This would give 392 as a *terminus post quem* for the capture of Lechaeum, the last military event referred to by Andocides (3.18). Since Andocides addressed the Athenian assembly before he went into exile, the date of 392/1 under which Didymus quotes Philochorus for the condemnation of the ambassadors is not unreasonable.

³Philochorus, ps.-Plutarch, and Photius state that they went into exile. Demosthenes refers to Epicrates' exile (19.280), but also gives Epicrates as an example of a victim of a sentence of capital punishment resulting from an embassy (19.276–277). Philochorus names Epicrates as a fellow ambassador of Andocides, and so Demosthenes must be referring to the same ill-fated embassy. Because Philochorus says explicitly that the ambassadors did not await judgement, we may infer that they were condemned to death *in absentia* (as suggested by Felix Staehelin, "Die griechischen Historikerfragmente bei Didymos," *Klio* 5 [1905] 55–71, at 62).

⁴Aristides and his scholia associate the conviction of Epicrates and the other ambassadors with the King's Peace of 387/6, a natural conclusion from the notoriety of the latter, and Plato (*Menex.* 245bc), Diodorus (14.110.2–4), and Plutarch (*Ages.* 23) appear to preserve a similar tradition. Neither Philochorus nor Didymus would be likely to have complicated the issue by inventing a conference at Sparta in 392/1 when the famous peace of 387/6 would have presented a more logical scenario. The logical explanation for the existence of two traditions for the date of the conviction is that Philochorus followed a different source with better information and did not make the mistake of telescoping the events of 392/1 with those of 387/6.

⁵Bruce 272–281. Most scholars have not been persuaded by Bruce's arguments for the redating of the conviction of Andocides and the other ambassadors, with the exceptions of Sylvain Payrau ("*Eirenika*: Considérations sur l'échec de quelques tentatives panhelléniques au IV^e siècle avant Jésus-Christ," *REA* 73 [1971] 24–79, at 39, n. 3) and Hamilton (237–239 and 317–321). A recent rebuttal of Bruce's theory is that of Baumann (88).

tion of the ambassadors is that they recommended the acceptance of the peace terms in defiance of the instructions they had received before leaving Athens,⁶ I propose that this explanation is even more likely in 392/1 than in 387/6.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the reasons for the conviction of the ambassadors in the context of the events of 392/1, it is necessary to establish that the Philochorus fragment does in fact refer to the same peace negotiations as the *De pace*. An apparently major discrepancy between the *De Pace* and the Philochorus fragment concerns the role of Persia in these peace negotiations.⁷ Contrary to Philochorus, Andocides does not explicitly mention the involvement of the Persian king in the negotiations or the surrender of the Greeks of Asia Minor to Persia as a condition of the peace. Despite Andocides' studied omission of any involvement of the Persian king in the peace negotiations,⁸ he is forced to admit (3.17) that this peace attempt is a "common peace for all Hellenes." In 392/1, however, the "Hellenes" of Asia Minor were *de facto*, if not *de iure*, included in the territory of the Great King, an unpleasant fact which the Greeks were forced to recognize in the King's Peace.⁹ Thus, there is no real discrepancy between Andocides' account of the negotiations and the Philochorus fragment; there is only Andocides' desire to underplay an unpalatable condition.¹⁰

It is noteworthy also that the Persian king, Antalcidas, and the Greeks of Asia Minor are all mentioned in the first half of the fragment (καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ... συννεμεμένους), whereas Sparta and the names of the Athenian ambassadors are made explicit only in the second half (ἀλλὰ καὶ ... Εὐβουλίδην Ἐλευσίνιον). Furthermore, the quotation (or, more probably, paraphrase) of Philochorus contained in the anonymous *Hypothesis* to the *De pace* (*FGrHist* 328 F 149b) appears nowhere in Didymus' citation of Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F 149a).¹¹ F 149b can, however, be fitted into F 149a between συννεμεμένους and ἀλλὰ καί.¹² Because something is ap-

⁶Bruce 279–281.

⁷Bruce 278–279.

⁸The only exception is 3.15, where Andocides concedes the necessity of keeping on the good side of the king.

⁹There is documentary proof from the King's Peace onwards, beginning with the treaty between Athens and Chios of 384/3 (*Staatsverträge*, no. 248), of the care which the Greeks took not to interfere in the domain of the Persian king (see the discussion of Phillip Harding, "Athenian Defensive Strategy in the Fourth Century," *Phoenix* 42 [1988] 61–71, at 67 and n. 19).

¹⁰See Jacoby's commentary on the Philochorus fragment (*FGrHist* 3b, Supplement 1.518 and n. 7).

¹¹The anonymous *Hypothesis* to the *De pace* quotes Philochorus as follows (*FGrHist* 328 F 149b): ... Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ἔλθειν τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ Λακεδαιμονίας καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου.

¹²Jacoby (*FGrHist* 3b, Supplement 1.518) remarks: "Didymos may have omitted that sentence as being unessential for his purpose."

parently already missing from F 149a, it seems to me that there may be a larger lacuna in F 149a than the information contained in F 149b, which would explain the greater emphasis placed on the roles of Antalcidas and the Persian king in the Philochorus fragment than in the *De pace*.

One does not have to look far in order to fill this lacuna. Xenophon (4.8.12–15)¹³ describes a peace conference held at Sardis, in which, just as in 387/6, Antalcidas is involved and the Greek cities of Asia Minor are made part of the peace proposals (4.8.14). The only substantive divergence between Xenophon's account of this conference at Sardis and the first half of the Philochorus fragment is the difference in the motives given for Athens' rejection of the peace terms. According to Xenophon (4.8.15), neither the Athenians nor any of the other Greeks show any concern for the cities of Asia Minor at this point. The peace conference is unsuccessful, but this is due to the desire of the Athenians, Argives, and Boeotians not to give up any of their own territory. Philochorus, on the other hand, probably reflects the later (and more self-righteous) Athenian version when he states that the Athenians refused to hand over the Greeks of Asia Minor as the price for entering into a treaty with Persia.¹⁴ Since the only difference between Philochorus and Xenophon can be explained by the Athenians' desire to whitewash their behavior, it is a reasonable inference that both are referring to the same event. Therefore, the first half of the Philochorus fragment seems to refer to the peace conference at Sardis, whereas the second applies best to the trial and flight of Andocides and the other ambassadors following the peace negotiations held at Sparta.¹⁵ Didymus could easily have decided to include only the essentials from Philochorus, that is, Athens' actions in

¹³All citations of Xenophon are from the *Hellenica*.

¹⁴This alleged Athenian reluctance to abandon the cities of Asia Minor is found also in Plato (*Menex.* 245c), Diodorus (14.110.4), and Aristides (1.293 Behr).

¹⁵The connection between the discussions at Sardis and those at Sparta is difficult to ascertain, mainly because Xenophon, the chief source for the Sardis negotiations, does not mention those at Sparta, while Andocides, the chief source for the Sparta negotiations, is silent about Sardis. It is clear from the information contained in Xenophon and Andocides that the discussions at Sardis and Sparta were separate in space, time, and primary host. It is likely that they were linked in some way, since the interval of time between them seems not to have been long and the concessions yielded to Athens and Thebes at Sparta (Andoc. 3.12–14, 20) appear to be either a reply or a prelude to the stricter terms at Sardis (Xen. 4.8.14–15). What is not clear, however, is whether one was the *direct* continuation of a process which the other had begun (as is argued by, e.g., Hamilton 234–255) or whether each was a *separate* attempt at negotiation (as is argued by, e.g., V. Martin, "Sur une interprétation nouvelle de la 'Paix du Roi'," *MusHelv* 6 [1940] 127–139).

Moreover, the debate over whether Sardis or Sparta came first is ongoing. For discussion of the various arguments involved, see Ryder 165–169 and Cawkwell 271, n. 13, both of whom support the order Sardis-Sparta. It should be noted, however, that the trial and flight of Andocides and the other ambassadors need not have taken place immediately following the delivery of the *De pace*, and that the conference at Sardis could have taken place in the interval (which is the order given in the Philochorus fragment).

rejecting the peace terms from Sardis and condemning Andocides and the other ambassadors for their acceptance of the peace terms at Sparta, while omitting the preliminary discussions.¹⁶

Therefore, we no longer have any reason to correct Didymus' claim of Philochorus' date of 392/1 for the peace sent by the Persian king, because the circumstances surrounding the conviction of Andocides, Epicrates, and the other Athenian ambassadors in the fragment are compatible with Andocides' account of the peace negotiations discussed in the *De pace*. It is necessary now to determine the reason for their conviction in the context of the events of 392/1. Many scholars attribute the condemnation of Andocides and his colleagues to the imperialism of the large group of Athenians who were unwilling to settle for the *status quo*.¹⁷ One scholar argues against this view, on the grounds that those who were in favour of peace at Athens would have had the most reason to be dissatisfied with Andocides and the other ambassadors, whose caution had resulted in the failure of the peace negotiations.¹⁸ Most recently, Anna Missiou attributes the decision of the Athenian Assembly to continue the war to the hope of the "lower classes" in Athenian society that renewed war would ameliorate their social and economic position. Andocides' *De pace*, with its emphasis on oligarchic ideology, offered no concrete suggestions of how the proposed peace would benefit Athenian society, and thus failed to win over the Assembly.¹⁹

It is not necessary, however, to think solely in terms of elements in Athenian society in searching for the reason behind the harsh sentence meted out to Andocides and his fellow ambassadors. The tone of the *De pace* is uniformly conciliatory and defensive, indicating that Andocides is facing a hostile audience.²⁰ Prior hesitation is evident on the part of Andocides and the other envoys who, in spite of the fact that they were *autokratores*, still refused to commit themselves to the peace at Sparta.

Given the tone of the *De pace*, one wonders how much authority to conduct negotiations these so-called *autokratores* actually had. It is somewhat surprising that the scholarship on the *De pace* and that on *presbeis au-*

¹⁶Roberts (91) notes that Philochorus may have confused the terms discussed at Sparta with those discussed at Sardis, but she does not consider the possibility that Didymus is the source of the confusion. Ryder (31, n. 2) comments that "it is scarcely possible to argue from so brief a notice that Philochorus was not talking about two conferences," but he does not pursue the point any further.

¹⁷E.g., Aucello 370-371, Seager 105-108, Cawkwell 277, Hamilton 258, and James G. DeVoto, "Agesilaus, Antalcidas, and the Failed Peace of 392/91 B.C.," *CP* 81 (1986) 191-202, at 201. Seager gives a thorough analysis of the *De pace* in terms of its response to the imperialistic mood of Athens (105-107).

¹⁸Roberts 89-93.

¹⁹Missiou[-Ladi] sums up her main arguments at 171-172.

²⁰Missiou[-Ladi] (88) suggests that the two rhetorical questions of Andocides 3.21 indicate that "the orator is reacting to a strongly negative response from his audience."

tokratores have never been brought into explicit relation, because an examination of the precise import of the term promises to shed light upon the reasons for the conviction of the ambassadors. The term is usually translated as "plenipotentiary" or "with full powers" but, as D. J. Mosley has shown,²¹ these "full powers" were in point of fact quite limited and such ambassadors had little discretion in negotiation. Missiou-Ladi suggests that *presbeis autokratores* were sometimes appointed to capitulate when the conditions of war put the enemy in a position to dictate terms.²² In this situation, of course, the reason for appointing *presbeis autokratores* would be to bring to a speedy conclusion negotiations in which there was little room for movement. A survey of the known examples of *presbeis autokratores* in Greece in the classical period makes it clear that *presbeis autokratores* were sent specifically when there was little need or opportunity for negotiation.²³ Mosley's discussion of these examples also makes it clear that *presbeis autokratores* were not usually sent to ratify terms of which there had been no previous discussion.²⁴ When the proposals had been discussed beforehand and needed little more than ratification, *presbeis autokratores* could be employed with the authority to execute on the spot the decision already reached by the state which had sent them. In this way, there would be no unnecessary delay in making the agreement binding.²⁵ This being the case, however, the ambassadors' authority would naturally fall within certain limits, defined before their departure from home.

²¹Mosley 30-38.

²²Anna Missiou-Ladi, "Coercive Diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations," *CQ* NS 37 (1987) 336-345. She cites the desperate straits of Athens in 405/4, when Theramenes was sent *autokrator* (Xen. 2.2.11-23; Lys. 13.9-11), and of Olynthus in 379 (Xen. 5.3.26). Her study, although useful, examines only these cases in which the state that sent *presbeis autokratores* was threatened with total destruction.

²³In addition to the examples cited in the previous note, the *TLG* gives the following instances of *presbeis autokratores* in Greece in the classical period: the Athenian embassy to Persia in 449 (Diod. Sic. 12.4.5), the Athenian embassy to Sparta in 446/5 (Andoc. 3.6), the Spartan embassy to Athens in 420 (Thuc. 5.45; Plut. *Alc.* 14.6-9; *Nic.* 10.4-6), the Athenian embassy to Sparta of the *De pace* (Andoc. 3.33), the corresponding Spartan embassy to Athens (Andoc. 3.39), the Spartan embassy to Athens in 369 (Xen. 7.1.1), and the proposed Macedonian embassy to Athens in 346 (Aeschin. 3.63).

²⁴Mosley 35.

²⁵Even Aristophanes' two surviving references to *presbeis autokratores* illustrate this point. In the *Birds*, the ambassadors have clearly been given instructions upon which they are to negotiate. Poseidon states the terms on which he and the other envoys have been sent to make peace and concludes by saying, τούτων περί πάντων αὐτοκράτορες ἤκομεν (1595). In the *Lysistrata* (1009-12), there is an indication that *presbeis autokratores* were sent when there was a desire not to waste time over prolonged negotiations: ἄλλ' ὥς τάχιστα φράζε περί διαλλαγῶν/ αὐτοκράτορας πρέσβεις ἀποπέμπειν ἐνθαδί./ ἐγὼ δ' ἐτέρους ἐνθένδε τῇ βουλῇ φράσω/ πρέσβεις ἐλίσσθαι, τὸ πέος ἐπιδείξας τοδί.

Similarly, generals could be appointed *autokratores* to conduct a military campaign upon a certain mandate. Examples of *strategoi autokratores* are too numerous to cite individually, but the most famous example is worth a mention. Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus were appointed *strategoi autokratores* for the Sicilian expedition in 415 upon a specific mandate (Thuc. 6.8.2; 6.26.1; Plut. *Alc.* 18.2; *Nic.* 12.4; Diod. Sic. 13.2.1). Naturally, the leeway within the mandate of the *strategoi autokratores* would be greater than that of *presbeis autokratores*, since the course of war is much more difficult to predict than the course of negotiations. Nevertheless, it is clear that in both categories of *autokratores* powers are full only within certain predefined limits.²⁶

It is a logical corollary that *presbeis autokratores*, with their limited powers of negotiation, would have been given instructions by the state which sent them.²⁷ In the case of Andocides and his fellow ambassadors of 392, Andocides himself indicates clearly in the *De pace* (3.35) that he and his colleagues had been given specific instructions (γράμματα τὰ γεγραμμένα). Since the ambassadors felt compelled to refer back to the assembly, these instructions evidently did not give them the authority to make peace with Sparta on the terms proposed. Mosley shows that ordinary envoys (i.e., those who were not *autokratores*) were occasionally confronted with unanticipated proposals while on their mission. In these cases of changes in circumstances, the safest counsel was to refer the matter back home for proper consideration.²⁸ Evidently, some change in circumstances must have occurred after the departure of Andocides and his colleagues from Athens which appeared to render their instructions invalid and left them in favour of accepting the peace terms offered by Sparta after all.

Why would Athens bother to send an embassy to Sparta at all, if she gave her ambassadors instructions not to accept the peace terms as proposed?²⁹

²⁶Part of the problem is that the designation of *autokrator*, whether applied to ambassadors or generals, is an extraordinary one and, by its very nature, was given on an *ad hoc* basis. Consequently, no precedents existed for the limitation of the authority of a particular *autokrator*, as there were for other magistracies, but it had to be decided afresh upon each occasion.

²⁷Mosley (36) suggests that the title of *autokrator* was or became no more than a mark of courtesy to a major state. The examples which we have from the classical period, however, show the *presbeis autokratores* involved in important embassies, even though their powers were limited to the instructions given by their home state before departure. I have attempted to show that the sending of *presbeis autokratores* was an indication of not wanting to waste time over matters which needed (or should need) little negotiation. Whether or not the sending of *presbeis autokratores* was a mark of courtesy surely depended on the matter to be discussed and the relation between the powers doing the discussing.

²⁸Mosley 22–24. Auccello (367) remarks that ambassadors plenipotentiary also were limited to their instructions; in case of something unexpected, they had to refer back.

²⁹Andocides and the other ambassadors may have received instructions to accept only if the Spartans made specific changes. It is certain from the defensive position

The answer probably lies in Athens' desire at this period to maintain good relations with Persia. Persia by this time appears to have been wearying of the Spartan war in Asia Minor,³⁰ and presumably expected that a "common peace" would involve a Greek recognition of the Persian "right" to the Greek city-states of Asia Minor. By sending ambassadors, Athens could indicate a willingness to negotiate a peace, while having no intention of accepting the terms offered. The choice of Epicrates as a member of the embassy seems to corroborate this conclusion, since he had previously been sent as an ambassador to Persia and on at least two occasions had been rumoured to have received Persian bribes.³¹ Furthermore, the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* records Epicrates as being active politically against Sparta in the earlier part of the decade (7.2). Epicrates, therefore, would be a logical choice to send on an embassy not to accept the peace terms as proposed by Sparta, but willing at least to make an appearance in order to keep as much as possible on Persia's good side.

This change in circumstances then must have been something potentially very disastrous for Athens, if it did indeed induce Andocides and the others to defy their instructions and give at least a provisional acceptance (that is, one dependent upon final ratification by the Athenian assembly) to the peace terms offered by Sparta, as the Philochorus fragment (F 149a) tells us. I would propose that this change in circumstances is the aftermath of the capture of Lechaeum, which is the latest event referred to by Andocides. Lechaeum is the only Spartan victory which could have changed the circumstances in which the ambassadors found themselves. If anything had happened afterwards to strengthen the Spartans' position, Andocides would have referred to it in order to make his case. As it is, he mentions Lechaeum as the third of three major Spartan victories in order to show how magnanimous the Spartans are in being willing to accept terms so favourable to Athens (3.18-19).³² In addition to being a major victory, the capture

which Andocides takes in the *De pace*, however, that their instructions had not been to accept the terms which he presents at that time. It is impossible to ascertain whether the instructions he had originally been given were to refuse outright or to hold out for certain changes.

³⁰Xenophon's (4.8.14) report of Antalcidas' negotiations with Tiribazus at the conference in Sardis indicates a Persian willingness to make peace with Sparta.

³¹For Epicrates, see J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971) no. 4859. Even if one accepts a date of 391 or even 390 for the production of the *Ecclesiazusae*, it need not preclude a date of 392/1 for Epicrates' conviction, since Aristophanes could make a reference to Epicrates' beard (71) in the full knowledge that people would still remember it, even in his absence (see Seager 107, n. 110).

³²F. Jacoby (*FGrHist* 3b, Supplement 2.413, n. 7) comments that there is "something nauseating" in Andocides' manner of representing the terms offered "as emanating from Spartan generosity which the Athenians actually do not deserve." Regardless of whether or not Lechaeum was as significant a Spartan victory as Andocides portrays it, it is important to remember that the Spartans would have spared no pains to persuade the

of Lechaeum allowed the Spartans to make a breach in the Long Walls at Lechaeum and to take several towns along the Saronic Gulf (Xen. 4.4.13). This disheartening news presumably had the desired effect of forcing the Athenian ambassadors to reconsider their response to the proposed peace terms.

Despite the ambassadors' endorsement of the peace, however, the Athenian assembly was still not prepared to accept the peace terms, and convicted Andocides and the others on the charge of disobeying their instructions.³³ This reaction seems very odd in light of Sparta's position of superiority as Andocides describes it in the *De pace*. Instead of grasping eagerly at terms which Andocides indicates Athens was lucky to have been offered, the Athenians expressed their disapproval not merely by a rejection of the proposed peace but by condemning their ambassadors. Clearly the Athenians as a whole did not share Andocides' and the other ambassadors' pessimistic views about Athens' situation in light of what had happened at Lechaeum. What could have happened to reverse Athens' position of weakness and place her in an apparent position of strength?³⁴ One possible cause is the arrival of the pro-Athenian Struthas on the coast of Asia Minor (Xen. 4.8.17).³⁵ A second is the destruction of the Spartan *mora* by Iphicrates and consequent Boeotian change of heart about making peace with the Spartans (Xen. 4.5.1-10).³⁶ A third possibility is an Athenian change of attitude towards Persia, which resulted in a reversal (at least, for a time) of the policy of careful maintenance of good relations with the Great King. In a section of his narrative shortly after the sending of Struthas to

Athenian ambassadors that it was a devastating blow to Athens, in order to convince them that they should agree to the peace terms.

³³Andocides' own admission that he had instructions (3.35) and Demosthenes' inclusion of disobedience of instructions among the charges listed in reference to this trial (19.278) make it almost certain that this was the (main) charge on which Andocides and the other ambassadors were convicted. Therefore, Baumann's suggestion (88-89) that the charge was *asebeia* (for violation of the sanctity of the trophies commemorating the fifth-century victories over the Persians) is not supported by the evidence, and is also intrinsically unlikely, given the general Athenian concern at this time not to offend the Great King.

³⁴It may seem peculiar that Andocides does not mention a change in circumstances which resulted in the Athenian assembly's unwillingness to accept the peace terms recommended by the ambassadors. It should not be surprising, however, that Andocides does not give arguments against a peace in the *De pace*, given that he and the other ambassadors had committed themselves to recommending acceptance of the terms.

³⁵This possibility has been noted by Roberts 91 and Barry S. Strauss, *Athens After the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1986) 147, n. 62.

³⁶In view of its immediate military impact, the destruction of the Spartan *mora* by Iphicrates seems a more convincing explanation for the sudden Athenian change of heart. As discussed above in note 2, however, it is uncertain whether the Isthmian Games associated with this event were those of 392 or of 390.

the coast, Xenophon (4.8.24) mentions that ten Athenian triremes were intercepted by the Spartans on their way to Evagoras of Cyprus and comments upon the oddness of the Athenians' sending help in a war against the Persian king, whom they considered their friend.³⁷ This willingness to act openly against Persia by helping Evagoras may well have been preceded by a reluctance to agree to a Persian-backed peace.³⁸ Whatever the reason, the Athenian assembly appears to have been extremely displeased with the unauthorized about-face of its ambassadors. Instead of showing a steadfast and resolute front at the peace negotiations, they had presented Athens in a humble light, which was shown by later events to have been unnecessary. The Athenian assembly then vented its displeasure at this public loss of face by condemning the ambassadors for disobeying their instructions not to accept the proposed peace terms. Five years later, however, Athens was obliged to accept terms very similar to these in the detested King's Peace of 387/6.³⁹

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³⁷Lysias (19.21) also mentions an Athenian grant of ten triremes to Evagoras, but associates them with the arrival of an embassy from Cyprus to obtain an alliance with Athens (this alliance may also have included Egypt, as a chance reference in Aristophanes [*Plutus* 178] indicates). Most scholars identify Lysias' ten triremes with those captured by Sparta (e.g., Tuplin 172), but P. J. Stylianou ("How Many Naval Squadrons did Athens Send to Evagoras?," *Historia* 37 [1988] 463–471) argues that these were a different expedition of ten triremes, sent prior to the ten mentioned in Xenophon's narrative (8.2.24).

³⁸The chronology of the Evagoras conflict, as is the case for most of this period, is notoriously difficult (for detailed discussions of the chronology, see Tuplin 170–186 and Gordon Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy Against Egypt and the Date for the Battle of Citium," *Phoenix* 45 [1991] 1–20). The main problem is that Diodorus, who says the conflict lasted almost ten years (15.9.2), fits it into his annalistic framework in only three places (14.98.1–4; 15.2.1–4.3; 15.8.1–9.2). Xenophon, on the other hand, alludes to it briefly only twice (4.8.24; 5.1.10). Most scholars agree that the war began in 391/0 (see esp. Tuplin 170–186), although Catherine I. Reid [Rubincam] ("Ephorus Fragment 76 and Diodorus on the Cypriote War," *Phoenix* 28 [1974] 123–143) argued that hostilities between Evagoras and his neighbours may have begun as early as 394/3. I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees of *Phoenix* for bringing Athens' willingness to support Evagoras to my attention.

³⁹An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1990 meeting of the Classical Association of Canada in Victoria, B.C. I should like to thank John Cole and Phillip Harding for commenting upon an early draft of this article. I have benefitted tremendously from the extensive discussion and helpful criticism generously offered by M. B. Wallace at all stages in the writing of this paper. These scholars do not necessarily agree with all of the views expressed here, however, and all errors which remain are, of course, my own.