

## AN EXEMPLARY CONFLICT: TACITUS' PARTHIAN BATTLE NARRATIVE (*ANNALS* 6.34–35)

RHIANNON ASH

ONE CONSPICUOUS FEATURE of Tacitus' *Annals* is the regularity with which the narrative of events in Rome is punctuated by extensive sections on Parthia.<sup>1</sup> Critics have read Tacitus' interplay between Rome and Parthia in different ways. So, Syme emphasises the topicality of such passages about the east for Tacitus' contemporaries, who were living in the aftermath of Trajan's problematic campaigns in Parthia in A.D. 114–116.<sup>2</sup> Alternatively, Keitel argues that the contrapuntal narrative of events in Rome and in the east articulates the inevitable and timeless pattern that dynastic politics tends to follow everywhere.<sup>3</sup> Tacitus' own gloomy claim about his Parthian *excursus* at *Annals* 6.31–37 is that it provides his readers with some respite from the uninterrupted sequence of domestic miseries (*Ann.* 6.38.1), but this proves disingenuous, since themes of murder, treachery, and betrayal are just as pronounced in some sections of this eastern narrative as they are in Rome.<sup>4</sup> Yet the *excursus* does offer some relief—or so at first it might appear. This paper will examine the absorbing narrative of a minor battle between the Parthians and a composite army of Albanians, Iberians, and Sarmatians (*Ann.* 6.34–35), which lies at the heart of Tacitus' Parthian *excursus*

The idea for this article arose during a Latin Literature seminar on Tacitus *Annals* 6 held in Oxford in 1997. I would like to thank Michael Winterbottom, who organised the seminar with me, as well as Chris Pelling and Peter Derow for helpful comments at various stages. I am particularly grateful for constructive criticism from audiences at University College, London in May 1997 and at the "Greek Romans or Roman Greeks?" conference held at the University of Lund, Sweden, in June 1998. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees of *Phoenix* for their useful observations and advice.

<sup>1</sup> See Tac. *Ann.* 2.1–4, 2.56–60, 6.14, 6.31–37, 6.41–44, 11.8–10, 12.10–14, 12.44–51, 13.6–9, 13.34–41, 14.23–26, 15.1–18, and 15.24–31.

<sup>2</sup> Syme 1958: 495–496. With regard to this topicality, it clearly matters whether Tacitus wrote the *Annals* before, during, or after Trajan's campaigns. Various dates of composition have been proposed: Syme (1958: 471–473) suggests that the first hexad was composed or published no earlier than A.D. 116, and acknowledges the possibility that *Annals* 6 could be even later than A.D. 117. Martin and Woodman (1989: 102–103) suggest that *Annals* 4.5.2 pre-dates A.D. 116. The debate is made more complex by the fact that even datable references in the narrative could have been written at an early or a late stage. Bowersock (1993) suggests that Tacitus started the *Annals* soon after A.D. 109, thus challenging Syme 1958: 768–770.

<sup>3</sup> Keitel 1978.

<sup>4</sup> McCulloch (1984: 59–61) discusses the uncomfortable parallels between events in Rome and in Parthia. There is a poisoning in Parthia (*Ann.* 6.32.2), which recalls similar scenes in Rome (*Ann.* 4.10 and 4.54), and the treacherous subordinates Abdus and Sinnaces (*Ann.* 6.31.2) must recall Sejanus (*Ann.* 4.1.1). On the theme of poisoning in the *Annals*, see Henderson 1989: 181. On Tacitus' inversion of the traditional pledge of the ancient historian that his work will be entertaining, cf. *Ann.* 4.32, 6.7, and 16.16; see Martin and Woodman 1989: 169–170.

for A.D. 35–36 (*Ann.* 6.31–37). I shall consider how Tacitus embellishes the battle scene not only in order to enhance its aesthetic appeal, but also to signpost it as a compelling historical *exemplum* for contemporaries. I will suggest that Tacitus has woven into his description of the battle certain literary threads, that is, features such as ethnographic colour and the generals' speeches in *oratio obliqua*,<sup>5</sup> which generate excitement for readers and thus make the passage memorable. However, the surrounding narrative will eventually sour the entertainment provided by the vivid scene of barbarians fighting with each other. In accordance with the notion of *metus hostilis*, it is the very absence of a decent foreign enemy which ultimately gives free rein to the self-destructive behaviour in Rome.<sup>6</sup>

Before turning in detail to the battle description, I want to make some preliminary remarks about the practice of embellishing scenes in Roman historiography. A sceptical modern reader might be entitled to ask how Tacitus knew any details of a battle in which there were no Roman participants.<sup>7</sup> Yet that would be a question based on modern assumptions about the nature of history. The French writer and politician, Barrès, once responded to similar demands for truth as follows: "My book on Persia is already done . . . . The only trouble is that I have to go to the damn place to satisfy a bunch of idiots."<sup>8</sup> Like Barrès, Tacitus may sometimes have relied more on his imagination than on a detailed historical source or an eye-witness account. The rhetorical technique of *inventio*, that is fleshing out an unadorned historical fact with plausible and entertaining material, was a pervasive feature of ancient historiography.<sup>9</sup> Although most ancient historians at least paid lip service to the idea that the historian told the truth and wrote for posterity, Rawson has observed that "historiography was also one of the most approved subjects for rhetoric, that is, for the writing of artistic prose."<sup>10</sup> Certain types of scene were particularly ripe for embellishment, as Brunt notes (my italics):

<sup>5</sup> On battle exhortations, see Hansen 1993 and 1998; Pritchett 1994.

<sup>6</sup> Kühnert (1973: 494) suggests that *Ann.* 6.33–35 is the only section of the *excursus* which offers some respite from the uninterrupted sequence of domestic miseries, but he presents no extended analysis of the battle scene itself, about which he says: "Gleichzeitig hat dieser Teil die Funktion, einen deutlichen Einschnitt zu markieren zwischen den aussenpolitischen Misserfolgen des Tiberius und dem erfolgreichen Handeln des Vitellius." This division between an unsuccessful Tiberius and a successful Vitellius seems too schematic and is a point to which I will return.

<sup>7</sup> On Tacitus' sources in the *Annals*, see Fabia 1893; Syme 1958: 688–710; Sage 1990: 997–1017. One of the consuls for A.D. 35, Servilius Nonianus, mentioned at the start of the Parthian digression (*Ann.* 6.35.1), was probably one source for Tacitus: cf. Syme 1964 and Wilkes 1972: 197–199. Gowing (1990: 317, n. 8) suggests that Tacitus' likely source for Parthian events was Cluvius Rufus.

<sup>8</sup> Theraud and Theraud 1928: 204–205.

<sup>9</sup> On *inventio*, see Wiseman 1981: 388–389 and 1994: 1–22; Woodman 1988: 87–94. Woodman (1983: 120) once warned an audience that "our primary response to the texts of the ancient historians should be literary rather than historical since the nature of the texts themselves is literary. Only when the literary analysis has been carried out can we begin to use these texts as evidence for history . . . ." Cf. Moles 1993: 90.

<sup>10</sup> Rawson 1985: 215.

"Geographical discourses were often introduced in order to import an agreeable variety and colour, and *like battle scenes* tempted historians to free inventions to amuse or thrill their readers."<sup>11</sup> This combination of fact and embellishment need not cause insurmountable problems for a modern reader, provided that the texts of ancient historians are not judged by the same criteria which are applied to modern historiography.

Ancient audiences, therefore, would not have been shocked to read historians who creatively embellished particular scenes for the sake of entertainment. Yet that did not mean that an author automatically let his imagination run riot when narrating every military encounter. There are certainly cases in the *Annals* where Tacitus is happy to provide an unelaborated report of a battle, such as when he records (only a few chapters later) the Roman general Marcus Trebellius' successful campaign against the rebellious Cietae (*Ann.* 6.41.1). So, why did Tacitus decide to elaborate the battle between the Parthians and their enemies (*Ann.* 6.34–35) rather than the encounter between the Cietae and the Roman army (*Ann.* 6.41.1)? Even if the battle involving Trebellius was really only an unglamorous skirmish to protest about taxation, there was at least direct Roman involvement in the fighting, which might have offered Tacitus the scope to create an entertaining narrative.<sup>12</sup> After all, a Roman audience might have had considerable interest in a conflict involving Roman legionaries. Moreover, the consequences of the Parthian battle are short-lived. The grand climax (*Ann.* 6.37) is the crowning of a new king of Parthia, Tiridates, beside the river Euphrates, but this is hardly an event of lasting historical importance. Tiridates will rule for less than a year before the old king, the scheming Artabanus, will recover power.<sup>13</sup> Can it be that Tacitus has temporarily lost his sense of historical perspective?

<sup>11</sup> Brunt 1980: 317 = 1993: 187. A classic treatment of the embellishment of battle-narratives through *inventio* is Woodman 1979; cf. Martin and Woodman 1989: 171. Kraus (1998: 273–276) notes the phenomenon whereby Livy "doubles" battle narratives (e.g., 6.7–8 and 6.22–24), particularly in the early books, to encourage readers to draw historical lessons from them. This Livian technique suggests that the truthful reporting of what happened in a particular battle was less important than how that battle related to the surrounding narrative. On topographical writing and *inventio*, see Horsfall 1985.

<sup>12</sup> Another harshly abridged battle description is *Ann.* 2.52, where Tacfarinas fights Furius Camillus, governor of Africa: *igitur legio medio, leves cohortes duaeque alae in cornibus locantur. nec Tacfarinas pugnam detrectavit. fusi Numidae, multosque post annos Furio nomini partum decus militiae.* Tacitus could clearly have worked up this scene into a full battle description if he had wanted to do so. Likewise Tacitus does not lengthen his narrative of the revolt in Thrace (*Ann.* 3.38–39) by a battle description: *neque aciem aut proelium dici decuerit in quo semerimi ac palantes trucidati sunt sine nostro sanguine* (*Ann.* 3.39). Yet Woodman and Martin (1996: 322) note that Tacitus' account of the revolt in Gaul (3.40–47) "is six times the length of the Thracian, is carefully structured . . . and is equipped with pre-battle speeches, the second of them including *oratio recta*." Tacitus clearly selects carefully which conflicts to expand.

<sup>13</sup> On the history of Parthia in this period, see Ziegler 1964: 45–96; Levick 1976: 145–147; Frye 1981: 250; Bivar 1983; Campbell 1993.

Not only the battle (*Ann.* 6.34–35), but also the whole Parthian segment in which it appears (*Ann.* 6.31–37) is on an unusually lavish scale.<sup>14</sup> Certain factors illustrate this clearly. First, the parallel accounts of the same events in Josephus and Cassius Dio are relatively skeletal and do not even narrate the battle at all.<sup>15</sup> Second, Tacitus uses only nine chapters to narrate the events of A.D. 35: *seven* chapters (*Ann.* 6.31–37) address Parthia and only *two* chapters deal with Rome (*Ann.* 6.38–39). It is almost as if Rome is the digression from Parthia, rather than vice versa, particularly as Tacitus breaks the “Livian” annalistic format by beginning with foreign rather than domestic affairs (*Ann.* 6.31).<sup>16</sup> The arrangement seems especially jarring when set against the preceding narrative. In the accounts of both A.D. 32 (*Ann.* 6.1–14) and A.D. 33 (*Ann.* 6.15–27) there is no coverage of foreign affairs: the report concerning the miraculous phoenix in Egypt (*Ann.* 6.28) is the first chance Tacitus’ readers have to get away from the oppressive atmosphere in Rome.<sup>17</sup> Like Rubrius Fabatus, who was arrested for attempting to flee from Rome to the mercy of the Parthians (*Ann.* 6.14.2), in the first half of *Annals* 6 we are firmly locked into events at the centre of the empire. Finally, Tacitus offers a double departure from the traditional annalistic format by joining together the events of two years, which helps to lengthen the Parthian narrative.<sup>18</sup> Similar divergences occur elsewhere in accounts of external affairs (cf. *Ann.* 12.40.5 and 13.9.3), purportedly for the sake of clarity, but are unusual in the first hexad.

Let us turn now to the battle description itself (*Tac. Ann.* 6.34–35). The background is that Artabanus III, king of Parthia from A.D. 10/11 to 38, is being simultaneously challenged by one pretender, Tiridates, in his own country, and by another, Mithridates, in neighbouring Armenia, which the Parthian king has been trying to dominate through his sons. One son, Arsaces, has already been murdered by the Armenians, but the Parthian king swiftly sends another son,

<sup>14</sup> Martin (1990: 1549) suggests that the scale of the Parthian narrative may reflect the fact that Tacitus was hard up for material and talks of the “*ennui* that permeates *Annals* 6.” For the structure of *Ann.* 6.31–37, see Wille 1983: 462–464.

<sup>15</sup> Jos. *AJ* 18.96–104 and Dio 58.26 and 59.27. On Josephus’ distortion of the chronology and the meeting between L. Vitellius and Artabanus on the Euphrates, see Garzetti 1956. Elsewhere, an extreme instance of Tacitean expansion is his account of the mutinies (*Ann.* 1.16–52), which Cassius Dio subsequently narrates in only two chapters (57.4–5). On the relationship between Tacitus and Dio, see Syme 1958: 688–692; Sage 1990: 998–1004.

<sup>16</sup> Kraus (1994: 11) notes: “The simplest—and ideal—form of the year is one in which annalistic material (the record of the state at peace) frames the narrative of a foreign campaign.” Ginsburg (1981: 84–85) points out that Tacitus in the first hexad frequently departs from the Livian pattern. On annalistic patterning, see McDonald 1957; Woodman and Martin 1989: 7; Ginsburg 1981: 10–14 and 54. On the annalistic genre, see Verbrugghe 1989; Scholz 1994.

<sup>17</sup> On Tacitus’ narrative of A.D. 32, see Ginsburg 1981: 141–142; on that of A.D. 33, see Ginsburg 1981: 73–76 and Syme 1983: 3–23 (= 1988: 223–244). On the myth of the phoenix, see Hahn 1933: 61–64; McDonald 1960. Pliny (*Ep.* 8.20.2) considers Egypt as a *miraculorum ferax commendatrixque terra*.

<sup>18</sup> Furneaux (1896: 638) locates the bridge between A.D. 35 and 36 at *Ann.* 6.36: *mox Artabanus*.

Orodes, to replace him. The two main generals in the battle are, therefore, Orodes, the Parthian king's son, and Pharasmenes, king of Iberia, who is acting on behalf of his brother Mithridates, the pretender, and who is in charge of a mixed force of Iberians, Albanians, and Sarmatians. The bone of contention is Armenia and the scene of battle is an unspecified location somewhere in Armenia. Tacitus describes the battle as follows:

(34.1) *interim Oroden sociorum inopem auctus auxilio Pharasmenes vocare ad pugnam et detrectantem incessere: adequitare castris, infensare pabula; ac saepe <in> modum obsidii stationibus cingebat, donec Parthi contumeliarum insolentes circumsisterent regem, poscerent proelium, atque illis sola in equite vis: Pharasmenes et pedite valebat. (2) nam Hiberi Albanique saltuosos locos incolentes duritiae patientiaeque magis insuevere; feruntque se Thessalis ortos, qua tempestate Iaso post avectam Medeam genitosque ex ea liberos inanem mox regiam Ae<e>tae vacuosque Colchos repetivit; multaque de nomine eius et oraculum Phrixii celebrant; nec quisquam ariete sacrificaverit, credito vexisse Phrixum, sive id animal seu navis insigne fuit. (3) ceterum directae utrimque acie Parthus imperium Orientis, claritudinem Arsacidarum contraque ignobilem Hiberum mercenario milite disserebat; Pharasmenes integros semet a Parthico dominatu, quanto maiora peterent, plus decoris victores aut, si terga darent, flagitii atque periculi laturos; simul horridam suorum aciem, picta auro Medorum agmina, hinc viros, inde praedam ostendere.*

(35.1) *enimvero apud Sarmatas non una vox ducis: se quisque stimulant, ne pugnam per sagittas sinerent: impetu et comminus praeveniendum. variae hinc bellantium species, cum Parthus sequi vel fugere pari arte suetus distraheret turmas, spatium ictibus quaereret, Sarmatae omisso arcu, quo brevius valent, contis gladiisque ruerent; modo equestris proelii more frontis et tergi vices, aliquando ut conserta acies corporibus et pulsu armorum pellerent pellerentur. (2) iamque et Albani Hiberique prensare, detrudere, ancipitem pugnam hostibus facere, quos super eques et propioribus vulneribus pedites adflctabant. inter quae Pharasmenes Orodesque, dum strenuis adsunt aut dubitantibus subveniunt, conspicui eoque gnari, clamore telis equis concurrunt, instantius Pharasmenes; nam vulnus per galeam adegit. nec iterare valuit, praelatus equo et fortissimis satellitum protegentibus saucium. fama tamen occisi falso credita exterruit Parthos, victoriamque concessere.*<sup>19</sup>

(34.1) Meanwhile, Pharasmenes, who had been reinforced by auxiliary troops, challenged Orodes, who was short of allies, to a battle, and attacked him when he refused. Pharasmenes rode up to the camp, destroyed the food, and often surrounded the enemy with outposts in the manner of a siege until the Parthians, unaccustomed to such insults, surrounded their king and demanded battle, despite the fact that their only strength lay in their cavalry: Pharasmenes was also strong in infantry. (2) For the Iberians and Albanians, who lived in wooded areas, were more inclined to toughness and endurance. They claim that they are sprung from Thessalians, from the time when Jason, after carrying off Medea and fathering children by her, returned afterwards to the empty palace of Aeetes and to the Colchians, who lacked a king. They honour many sites in his name, including an oracle of Phrixus. Nobody is allowed to sacrifice a ram, since people believe that a ram carried Phrixus, whether this was an animal or a ship's figurehead. (3) However, once the battle-lines were

<sup>19</sup>The text used is Heubner 1983. For a discussion of the historical and literary aspects of these chapters, see Koestermann 1965: 322–326.

drawn up on both sides, the Parthian spoke about the empire of the east, the fame of the Arsacids in contrast with the ignoble Iberian with his mercenary force. Pharasmenes told his troops that they were free from Parthian domination and that the more they sought, the greater the glory they would win as victors, or if they retreated, the greater the disgrace and danger they would incur. At the same time he pointed out the bristling battle-line of his own men and the ranks of the Medes, decked out in gold, and the fact that on one side there were men, while on the other side there was loot.

(35.1) Nevertheless, among the Sarmatians, the general's voice was not the only one. Each man urged himself not to allow an archery battle. They must anticipate the other side by a charge and by fighting at close quarters. As a result, there were different displays amongst the fighters since the Parthian cavalry, accustomed to pursue or to flee with equal skill, opened ranks and sought space for shooting, but the Sarmatians charged with pikes and swords, after abandoning archery, in which they have a shorter range. Now, in the manner of a cavalry battle there were alternating charges and retreats, but sometimes it happened that the interlocked battle-lines, using their bodies and thrusting weapons, pushed forward and were driven back. (2) Now the Albanians and Iberians grabbed their opponents, tried to pull them off their horses and made the battle hazardous for their enemies, whom the cavalry attacked from above and the infantry wounded from close at hand. Amidst this, Pharasmenes and Orodes, while they supported the brave or helped the waverers, were conspicuous and therefore known, so they charged at each other with shouting, weapons, and horses, although Pharasmenes did so more violently; for he wounded Orodes through the helmet. Pharasmenes did not manage to strike again, since he was carried past by his horse and the bravest men protected the wounded Orodes. However, the rumour that Orodes had been killed was believed, false though this was, and terrified the Parthians, who conceded the victory.

The most striking aspect of this battle description is that Tacitus has heightened the ethnic identities of the two sides to offer maximum contrast.<sup>20</sup> On one side there are Orodes' Parthians. Tacitus gives us little direct information about them, but we are reminded that *sola in equite vis* (*Ann* 6.34.1), which obliquely suggests images of the stereotypical Parthian archers on horseback, who turn in the saddle and shoot as they ride away.<sup>21</sup> Hollis notes Ovid's use of this theme and observes: "One might have thought the Parthian shaft exhausted as a fruitful literary theme."<sup>22</sup> This was indeed a risk, but Tacitus economically assumes basic knowledge of Parthian fighting techniques in the account of the battle itself, rather than offering a separate description. So, familiarity with the Parthian archers is presumed when Tacitus describes how the cavalry open ranks to create

<sup>20</sup>Cf. Walser 1951: 84: "Überhaupt sind ethnographische Details vielfach als Lumina der Erzählung verwendet." Yet tantalisingly, Walser does not elaborate this comment with detailed discussion.

<sup>21</sup>For Parthian archers, see *Ov. Ars am.* 1.209–211; *Rem. am.* 155; *Hor. Carm.* 1.19.10–12, 2.13.17–18; *Plut. Ant.* 41.7 and *Crass.* 24.6; *Verg. G.* 3.31; *Luc. Phars.* 8.380–387; *Sil. Ital. Pun.* 7.646–647.

<sup>22</sup>Hollis 1977: 80.

space in which to shoot: *Parthus sequi vel fugere pari arte suetus distraheret turmas, spatium icibus quaereret* (*Ann.* 6.35.1).<sup>23</sup> Elsewhere, Tacitus tends to describe unusual fighting methods as a means of enhancing a nation's identity, but here he assumes that a Roman audience in the second century A.D. no longer needs such elaboration of basic Parthian techniques.<sup>24</sup>

Tacitus sharpens the polarity by focalising the Parthians through the Iberian king Pharasmenes, who vividly contrasts his own bristling army with the *picta auro Medorum agmina* (*Ann.* 6.34.3).<sup>25</sup> It is significant that Pharasmenes loosely refers to the Parthians as Medes,<sup>26</sup> and that by mentioning their golden paraphernalia, he activates a negative Persian stereotype, which was well-established in ancient historiography.<sup>27</sup> If Pharasmenes refers to the Parthians as glittering Medes in his pre-battle harangue, in one sense he is shrewdly drawing on a negative cliché which will stir his soldiers to fight better. Yet at the same time, Pharasmenes' scornful description of the Parthian enemy as loot tells us something about his own men: they are primarily motivated by greed, as we might already have guessed when Orodes refers to Pharasmenes' men as mercenaries (*Ann.*

<sup>23</sup> By Tacitus' era, there were a number of Parthian units who served in the Roman army as *auxilia*: see Kennedy 1977. See Plut. *Crass.* 18.3–5 for a passage which suggests that Romans had not always been so familiar with Parthian fighting techniques. Beyond the military sphere, Tacitus does explain peculiar aspects of Parthian culture for the benefit of his audience elsewhere in *Annals*: see 2.3.2 (brother and sister marriages); 6.42.4 (Parthian term for hereditary commander-in-chief); 12.13.3 (the cult of Heracles); 12.47.2 (Parthian alliances sealed by licking blood; cf. Hdt. 1.74.5 and 4.70).

<sup>24</sup> It is a common theme in Roman historiography and elsewhere that techniques of fighting and weaponry are important indicators of national character. See for example Flor. 1.7.4; Tac. *Germ.* 17.2, *Ann.* 14.35.1 and *Agr.* 12.1 with Ogilvie and Richmond 1967: 179; Sil. Ital. *Pun.* 8.570, 15.685, and 17.416–417; Verg. *Aen.* 8.661; Caes. *BG* 1.25.2, 4.24.1, 4.33, and 5.16.2; Pompon. *De chorographia* 3.6.52; Livy 21.8.10; Isid. *Etym.* 19.23.4. Cf. Pelling 1982.

<sup>25</sup> On internal and external focalisation, see Genette 1980: 188–189. Focalisation is roughly equivalent to point of view: internal focalisation is when the narrator directs his narrative through a given character, while external focalisation is when the narrator describes a given character's actions from the outside, without revealing the inner thoughts of that character. For the first sustained application of this theory to a classical text, see de Jong 1987.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Hor. *Carm.* 1.2.22, 1.2.51, 1.21.15, 2.1.31, 2.16.6, 3.3.44, 3.5.4, and 4.14.42, referring often loosely to the Parthians as *Medi* or *Persae*. Pliny (*NH* 6.16.41) specifically notes that Persians and Parthians are not the same people, which implies that this misconception prevailed even in the first century A.D. Continuity between Persians and Parthians seems to have been a theme of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae*: certainly, Justin (*Epit.* 12.4.12) says that the Parthians were descended from the Persian nobleman Andragoras (cf. Arr. *Parth.* fr. 1) and that Darius III, the last king of the Persians, died in Parthia (*Epit.* 11.15.1–2). See Alonso-Núñez 1987: 63–64; Yardley and Heckel 1997: 209–210. Dewar (1996: 145) notes the tendency of writers in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. to refer to the Goths as Thracians, which mirrors the convention of referring to the Parthians as Medes or Persians. Fears (1974: 624) observes that the terms *Persae* / *Parthi* are used interchangeably by writers in the third and fourth centuries A.D. Note Julian *Or.* 2.63a–b for the notion of Parthians dressing up as Persians in order to make it seem as if they are reclaiming their old empire.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Hdt. 7.83.2, 9.80; Xen. *An.* 1.2.27, 5.8, 8.29. On Persians and gold, see Hall 1989: 128; cf. Hall 1993. Hardie (1997: 46) argues that "Augustan writers and artists were conscious of their inheritance of the fifth-century iconography of the barbarian Other."

6.34.3). At best, avarice amongst soldiers meant the loss of strategic advantages (Sall. *Iug.* 38.8; Tac. *Ann.* 1.65.6 and *Hist.* 5.17.1), but at worst, it meant an entirely unnecessary loss of life. A particularly relevant parallel is *Histories* 1.79.2, where some foolhardy Sarmatians become so heavily laden with spoils that they become an easy target for Roman legionaries. Amongst Pharasmenes' listeners are, of course, some Sarmatian soldiers. A reader already familiar with the passage from the *Histories* might justifiably conclude that for the general to characterise the Parthians as loot is a dangerous enticement. Such a reader might also speculate that the collective desire of the Sarmatians at *Annals* 6.35.1 to charge the enemy and to fight hand-to-hand is generated not by martial valour but by greed.<sup>28</sup> Certainly, Tacitus has already told us that the Sarmatian *sceptuchi* initially accepted, *more gentico* (*Ann.* 6.33.2), gifts from both sides, which underlines their mercenary nature. In fact, the only reason why the Parthian leader Orodes does not also have a contingent of Sarmatians fighting for him is that the Iberians, having brought their own Sarmatian mercenaries from the north, then promptly closed the passes and thereby prevented further soldiers of fortune from joining the Parthian army.<sup>29</sup> This all helps to build up narrative tension: at first, the arrogant Parthians seem as if they will be an easy target for Pharasmenes' hardy troops, but Tacitus' presentation of the Sarmatian mercenaries, motivated by money rather than by loyalty to the cause, destabilises our preliminary assumptions about which side will win and which side will lose.<sup>30</sup>

What else does Tacitus tell us about the ethnic identity of Pharasmenes' heterogeneous army? Tacitus' picture of Pharasmenes' Iberian, Albanian, and

<sup>28</sup> Even if an ancient reader was unfamiliar with *Hist.* 1.79, it is a common motif that groups of common soldiers, barbarian and Roman, often display an unhealthy taste for loot. See Tac. *Hist.* 3.19.2, *Ann.* 1.65.6, 4.48.1; Caes. *BC* 2.39.3, *BG* 5.19.2, 6.34.4; Livy 2.11.5, 2.26.1, 2.47.5, 8.36.9, 8.38.12, 21.11.4; Luc. *Phars.* 7.736–737. Cf. Goldsworthy 1996: 259–261.

<sup>29</sup> On the mountains and passes of Iberia, see Braund 1994: 40–47. Pliny (*NH* 6.40) complains about the *error multorum*, who wrongly refer to the Caucasian gates in Iberia as the Caspian gates. Tacitus perpetuates the mistake by referring to the *Caspia via* (*Ann.* 6.33.3). Braund (1994: 216) says: "Even Tacitus, who exhibits a general awareness of the importance of passes across the Caucasus, presents an account which was no more intricate than his historiographical purpose required." Yet Tacitus does include one fairly intricate detail that the Derbend pass along the west coast of the Caspian Sea was open to travellers, but impassable because the Etesian winds were causing floods (*Ann.* 6.33.3).

<sup>30</sup> Heterogeneous armies are often presented as being potentially vulnerable in battle, partly because the different languages spoken by the soldiers caused problems of communication. For an extreme example, see Polyb. 11.19.4 and Livy 28.12.3 on Hannibal's army. Onasander *Strat.* 26 recommends that, for the allies' sake, the response to the watchword should not be by voice, but by gesture. Veg. *Mil.* 3.5 divides military signals into three categories: voiced (e.g., a watchword), semi-voiced (e.g., a trumpet blast), and mute (e.g., smoke signals). In fact, the mountain-dwelling Iberians may have had more in common with the Sarmatian tribes from the north than with other Iberians who lived on the plain in their geographically divided country: see Strabo 11.3.3 and Braund 1994: 211. Tacitus will develop subsequently the theme of growing hostility between Iberians and Albanians (*Ann.* 12.44–51).



Sarmatian force is much fuller than his portrait of the Parthians, perhaps because since the battle of Carrhae in 53 B.C., knowledge of Rome's most famous enemy had become widespread.<sup>31</sup> Yet Tacitus is still selective. For example, he could have been much more explicit about the Sarmatians, who tended to fight using heavily-armed cavalrymen mounted on horses protected by chain mail.<sup>32</sup> So when Tacitus notes *Pharasmenes et pedite valebat* (*Ann.* 6.34.1), the historian highlights the infantry (who will play a crucial role), but sidesteps a potentially interesting digression on the bizarre Sarmatian cavalry.<sup>33</sup> Why did he do this, given that ancient readers enjoyed hearing about such colourful martial details? Perhaps Tacitus assumed that his readers already knew about the Sarmatian cavalry from the *Histories* passage and from Trajan's Dacian wars, just as they already knew about the Parthians.<sup>34</sup> This is probably true, but an additional factor in Tacitus' decision not to elaborate the fighting techniques of the Sarmatians may be the aesthetics of the battle scene. By omitting any direct description of the Sarmatian cavalry, Tacitus accentuates the Parthian army's identity as primarily a *cavalry* force and their opponents' identity as primarily an *infantry* force. Differences are exaggerated rather than elided. This narrative strategy may nudge Tacitus' readers to anticipate a particularly enjoyable battle scene: the distinctive disposition of the forces on each side will necessitate some fast thinking from the respective leaders, as each must decide how best to defeat the enemy most efficiently.<sup>35</sup> In this context, we should observe that Roman audiences at gladiatorial shows had, on a number of occasions, enjoyed grand re-enactments of famous historical battles on land and sea. One relevant factor

<sup>31</sup> By contrast, knowledge of the Iberians and Albanians was perhaps less secure, although both nations were gaining a higher profile under Trajan. Bosworth (1977: 227) notes that in A.D. 114, at Elegeia, the emperor "apparently installed a new king over Albania and received formal submission both from the Iberians and from the Sarmatian peoples beyond the Caucasus" (*Eutr. Brev.* 8.3.1; *Festus Brev.* 20.2; *Jer. Chron.* p. 194 Helm). Cf. Martin and Woodman 1989: 102 on *Ann.* 4.5.2. For a summary of the history of Transcaucasia, see Dabrowa 1989.

<sup>32</sup> There is a carving of a Sarmatian prisoner wearing heavy armour on Trajan's column; see Richmond 1982: plate 18c. Rice (1981: 286) notes that the Sarmatians often buried a rider with his horse's paraphernalia and that at Starobelsk, Sarmatian burial chambers included horses' hooves and skulls. The classic discussion of Sarmatian cavalry is Syme 1929. See too Valerius Flaccus 6.231–234.

<sup>33</sup> Certainly, the Sarmatian horsemen feature usefully in the actual battle, but Tacitus avoids drawing attention to their distinctive fighting techniques. Even his reference to the Sarmatian swords and pikes (*Ann.* 6.35.1) remains unelaborated. Cf. *Hist.* 1.79.3, where he draws our attention to these same swords and pikes *quos praelongos utraque manu regunt*. For *praelongus*, see Gerber and Greef 1903: 1164.

<sup>34</sup> Note that in the second century A.D. the Roman cavalry was beginning to develop cataphract techniques of its own, which may have reduced the need for a separate description: see Eadie 1967.

<sup>35</sup> On patterns of action in cavalry versus infantry combat, see Goldsworthy 1996: 228–235. In the battle description itself, Tacitus acknowledges two sharply contrasting styles of cavalry fighting—the Parthians tend to attack from afar with missiles, while the heavily armed Sarmatian cataphracts prefer to engage the enemy at close quarters. This emphasis on discordant cavalry techniques enhances audience enjoyment and creates scope for the decisive intervention of the hardy Albanian and Iberian infantry.

in choosing the opposing sides in the arena seems to have been nationality and fighting techniques: the greater the difference between the two armies or navies, the more entertaining the show.<sup>36</sup> How much common ground really existed between the spectators at such shows and Tacitus' readers is debatable, but in each case, exaggerated differences between the two sides can be said to maximise audience enjoyment.<sup>37</sup>

Where Tacitus' Pharasmenes had associated the Parthian army with the eastern stereotype, a different set of literary conventions is activated to characterise the Iberians and the Albanians as northern barbarians. The very fact that their status as infantry fighters has been highlighted may suggest a northern identity: Tacitus says of the Britons *in pedite robur* (*Agr.* 12.1) and of the Germans *plus penes peditem roboris* (*Germ.* 6.3; cf. *Germ.* 30.3: *omne robur in pedite*). Moreover, Tacitus emphasises the wooded habitat, which has made the Iberians and Albanians tough (*Ann.* 6.34.2). In accordance with ancient notions of environmental determinism, the shady landscape, high in the Caucasian mountains, has protected them from the debilitating effects of the extreme heat, making them more like northerners than easterners.<sup>38</sup> So, Caesar points out how the Germans are characterised by *duritia* from early boyhood (*BG* 6.21.3), partly as a result of their rugged habitat. By contrast, easterners were often depicted in ancient literature as being soft and unmanly, as when Aeneas' enemies taunt him for his effeminate appearance.<sup>39</sup> Certainly, the Parthians, who liked to hunt and ride, were sometimes credited with greater toughness (cf. *Ann.* 2.2.1–4; Justin 41.3.3), but they could easily be presented as typical languid easterners when it was convenient. Besides, Tacitus has already heightened our awareness of environmental determinism by showing us (*Ann.* 6.32.2) the deadly impact the eastern climate has had on one individual, the Parthian nobleman Phraates, who actually dies after being sent to Parthia from Rome to challenge Artabanus' power. This man was born in the east, but has lived

<sup>36</sup> So, Athenians and Persians were pitted against one another during the principates of Augustus and of Nero (*RG* 23; Dio 55.10.7; Tac. *Ann.* 12.56; Dio 61.9.5). On such re-enactments, see Wiedemann 1992: 90; Coleman 1993: 67–68. One might also note the increasingly polarised literary narratives of the battle of Actium, culminating in Florus' portrait (2.21.5–6) of Antony's gargantuan ships stuffed with eastern spoils confronting the nimble vessels of Octavian.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Livy 7.10.6 (with Claudius Quadrigarius fr. 10b in Peter 1914 = Aul. Gell. *NA* 9.13) on the spectacular duel of Manlius Torquatus and the huge Gaul, *nequaquam visu ac specie aestimantibus pares*. The disparity and differences between the two fighters make the clash particularly entertaining and illustrate the cross-fertilisation between ancient historiography and the gladiatorial arena.

<sup>38</sup> On ethnography and environmental determinism, see Vasaly 1993: 141–145 and Rawson 1985: 250–266. On ethnography in Tacitus, see Thomas 1982: 124–132.

<sup>39</sup> Verg. *Aen.* 4.215–217 and 12.97–100. On the connection between environment and character, see Hdt. 9.122.3; Juv. 10.50; Sen. *Ep.* 51.10–12 and *De ira* 2.15.5; Tac. *Ann.* 2.64.4; Vitr. 6.1.10; ps.-Hippoc. *Aer.* 62; Flor. 1.20.2; Sid. Apoll. *Epist.* 8.11.9; Luc. *Phars.* 8.363–366. Persians were sometimes credited with being rugged (e.g., Hdt. 1.71.2; Pl. *Leg.* 695a; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.67; Arr. *Anab.* 5.4.5), although often this happens when a sharp contrast is being drawn between past ruggedness and present effeminacy.

in Rome for many years, which leaves him vulnerable to the enervating eastern climate.<sup>40</sup>

Other details enhance the polarity between the two armies. When Pharasmenes refers to his own troops as a *horrida acies* (*Ann.* 6.34.3), on one level this encapsulates the jagged visual effect of soldiers carrying spears. However, on another level, Tacitus triggers the image of the shaggy northern barbarian. So, Horace refers to *Germania . . . horrida* and Tacitus highlights the *horrens capillus* of the Suebi.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, even Pharasmenes' boast that his men were *integros . . . a Parthico dominatu* (*Ann.* 6.34.3) taps into a motif particularly associated with northern barbarians, namely that they should embrace freedom and never be subservient to anyone.<sup>42</sup> Finally, Tacitus even invests the Iberians and Albanians with a barbarian genealogy, which links them to Medea and Jason, and highlights their original home as Thessaly.<sup>43</sup> Not only do these mythical details prompt a reader to think of the soldiers' original home as situated in the north, particularly in relation to Parthia, but they also add colour and distinction to the Iberians and Albanians, who will play such an important role in the battle.<sup>44</sup> In a vivid passage, Lucan had described Thessaly as the birthplace of war, a primeval area, which was waterlogged by rivers (*Phars.* 6.333–412). A nation which had its roots in a rugged place like Thessaly was not likely to have much in common with the typical soft easterner.

Tacitus' prelude to the battle description therefore encourages an audience to anticipate an exciting encounter between soft eastern cavalry fighters (Parthians)

<sup>40</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 3.2.2 provides an example going in the other direction, where Vitellius' tough German soldiers have been rendered useless by the enervating urban environment of Rome. Cf. *Ann.* 2.44.1, where Tiberius sends his son Drusus away from the city, *urbano luxu lascivientem*.

<sup>41</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 4.5.26 and Tac. *Germ.* 38.2. Cf. Livy 9.40.4 and Tac. *Hist.* 2.88.3. Hairiness may be implicit in the "barbarians as wild animals" motif, for which see Dauge 1981: 604–609. Tacitus' description of the distinctive Suebian hairstyle (*Germ.* 38.2) contains a textual crux which has sparked a lively scholarly debate: for bibliography, see Lund 1991: 2157–60.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Tac. *Agr.* 30.2 and *Ann.* 1.59.6, 3.40.3, 3.46.1, 4.24.1, 12.34; Thuc. 7.68.2–3; Caes. *BG* 3.8.4, 7.77.13–16; Sall. *Iug.* 31.22, *Cat.* 58.8; Flor. 1.45.21.

<sup>43</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 6.34.2. On this concept of mythical colonisation, see Hall 1989: 36; on real colonisation of the Black Sea area, see Drews 1976. Just. *Epit.* 42.2.12 preserves a fuller version of this same legend about Jason from Pompeius Trogus, and also notes the claim made by the Albani that they originally came from the Alban Hill in Rome, before they followed Hercules to the East (*Epit.* 42.3.4). This mythical link between Rome and Albania may reflect an attempt to improve diplomatic relations after the Mithridatic Wars. In a similar vein, note that the Transcaucasian Iberians were often presented as being kinsmen of the Iberians in Spain: see App. *Mithr.* 101 and Strabo 1.3.21. These factors further dilute the straightforward eastern identity of the Iberians and Albanians. On Pompeius Trogus, who devoted two books (41 and 42) of his *Historiae Philippicae* to the Parthians, see Alonso-Núñez 1987.

<sup>44</sup> The mythical details also slow down the narrative before Tacitus offers the final battle description for our enjoyment. This technique allows readers the pleasure of anticipating the military encounter for a little longer. A work which takes narrative *mora* to considerable extremes is Lucan's *Pharsalia*: see Masters 1992: 3–10, 54–55, 119–122.

and tough northern infantry forces (Iberians and Albanians).<sup>45</sup> Which side is likely to win remains unclear, even if Tacitus sends out signals that we should sympathise with the Iberian and Albanian army.<sup>46</sup> Although the Parthian Orodes has no allies and is acting in a sufficiently proud manner to suggest that a fall is imminent, Pharasmenes' tough soldiers may still be jeopardised by their greedy Sarmatian allies, who care more about the money than the cause. It seems as if victory could still go in either direction.

Yet Tacitus' battle description proves to be deflationary, and what we actually get borders on the farcical. The fighting begins as an orthodox cavalry engagement, but quickly degenerates as the two lines of horsemen clash like infantry without being explicitly ordered to do so: *pellerent pellerentur* (*Ann.* 6.35.1).<sup>47</sup> As a result, the Albanian and Iberian infantry are forced to improvise by trying to pull the Parthians from their horses. However, the Parthians, who appear to have no infantry forces, cannot reciprocate or even defend themselves, which is much more damaging to their chances.<sup>48</sup> The Parthian cavalry archers are thereby crucially prevented from discharging their usual shower of arrows from a distance, which had proved so deadly at Carrhae.<sup>49</sup> This rapid interlocking of the two sides can be contrasted both with the Parthians' preferred method elsewhere of fighting from a distance and with Tacitus' description of other battles such as Mons Graupius, where fighting is initially conducted by Agricola's auxiliaries at long range until he sends in the Batavian and Tungrian cohorts in an organised way

<sup>45</sup> Vergil exploits a similar polarity when Turnus' brother-in-law Numanus compares his own people, who toughen up their new-born sons by immersing them in icy rivers, with the Trojans, who wear saffron and purple and like dancing (*Aen.* 9.598–620; cf. Horsfall 1971). Likewise, Curtius Rufus makes Charidemus compare the Persian army, gleaming with purple and gold, with the rugged and disciplined Macedonian troops (3.2.11–16). His words are supported by the subsequent description of the two armies (Persian at 3.3.9–25 and Macedonian at 3.3.26–28). The discrepancy in length between the two descriptions may arguably mirror the grotesquely overblown state of the Persian army on the one hand and the lean efficiency of the Macedonian troops on the other.

<sup>46</sup> See Kühnert 1973: 494.

<sup>47</sup> There is a variant of this phrase, which nicely reflects the vicissitudes of battle, in Tacitus' description of the second battle of Bedriacum: *pellunt hostem, dein pelluntur* (*Hist.* 3.23.1). For *pello*, see Gerber and Greef 1903: 1084–86.

<sup>48</sup> Note that Arrian, confronting the mailed cavalry of the Sarmatian Alans, uses legionary infantry as his most important defence mechanism (*Ectaxis* 15–17), keeps his cavalry behind the infantry as a reserve force (*Ectaxis* 20), and stations archers to rain missiles on the Alans (*Ectaxis* 21), hoping thereby to keep the enemy away from his infantry. Stadter (1980: 47) suggests that these tactics were completely successful in halting the Alan attack. If so, then the Parthian cavalry made a terrible mistake in ever allowing the Sarmatian cavalry to get near them. See Bosworth 1977: 244 on *Ann.* 6.34–35 and the *Ectaxis*.

<sup>49</sup> At Carrhae, the Parthians were greatly helped by their general's strategy of positioning his archers some distance away from the Romans and continuously delivering fresh supplies of arrows to them by camels (Plut. *Crass.* 24.4). Justin (*Epit.* 41.2.7), discussing Parthian fighting techniques, says that the Parthians were ignorant of close fighting and could not fight for long periods, which suggests that the Sarmatians' plea, *impetu et comminus praeveniendum* (*Ann.* 6.35.1), is sensible.

(*Agr.* 36.1).<sup>50</sup> Likewise, Caesar notes that an entirely separate cavalry combat took place between the two battle-lines as a prelude to the battle of the Aisne in 57 B.C. (*BG* 2.9.1).<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately, Tacitus' Parthians find themselves having to engage with the enemy too quickly and *en masse*, thus losing the chance to inflict from a distance what Tacitus elsewhere calls *crebra et inulta vulnere* (*Ann.* 4.47.3).<sup>52</sup> Still, the novelty of seeing the Parthian cavalry archers forced into this uncomfortable situation probably gave some of Tacitus' Roman readers considerable pleasure, thereby ensuring that at least some of the Parthian *excursus* offers respite from the uninterrupted sequence of domestic miseries in the surrounding narrative (*Ann.* 6.38.1).

Nevertheless, some readers might have expected that the two commanders, who have been named and succinctly characterised in the prelude to the battle, could still have a significant impact on the quality of the fighting. Tacitus does sometimes present miniature portraits of exceptionally brave commanders, both Roman and barbarian, participating in combat. So the Roman Decrius tries unsuccessfully to inspire his soldiers by his extraordinary courage but is killed in battle in Africa, while the Numidian Tacfarinas meets a similar fate subsequently at Roman hands.<sup>53</sup> Certainly, when Tacitus zooms in on Pharasmenes and Orodes, both leaders are participating valiantly in the fighting, encouraging the brave and coming to the aid of those in difficulty.<sup>54</sup> There is even a string of verbs in the historic present (*adsunt, subveniunt, concurrunt*) at precisely the point when those two generals are highlighted (*Ann.* 6.35.2), which makes the scene vivid.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps after all, this encounter between the two enemy commanders will re-enact the type of personal clash between individual heroes

<sup>50</sup> Ogilvie and Richmond (1967: 272) suggest that it was a common military practice during the Trajanic era to keep legionaries in reserve while sending auxiliaries in to fight: "Tacitus is the first literary source to describe the new method." See Goldsworthy 1996: 150–152 for further discussion of the battle.

<sup>51</sup> For this battle, see Pelling 1981: 742–747.

<sup>52</sup> Such mass engagements might seem epic, but this model of epic fighting has been questioned. Van Wees (1988) challenges the notion that Homeric armies advance *en masse* and fuse together in combat.

<sup>53</sup> For Decrius, see *Ann.* 3.20.2 with Woodman and Martin 1996: 198–205; for Tacfarinas, *Ann.* 4.25.3 with Martin and Woodman 1989: 155–160. Naturally, Tacitus raises fundamental questions about the appropriate style of military leadership in these two passages. Decrius is brave and glamorous, but ultimately gets himself killed by leading from the front. The troublesome Tacfarinas is finally killed during a dawn raid initiated by Dolabella, whose methods may seem cowardly but they do get results. See Goldsworthy 1996: 94 for the Roman practice of removing a charismatic enemy leader to dishearten the enemy troops.

<sup>54</sup> Goldsworthy (1996: 156–161) discusses the conduct of generals depicted close to the front line of battle in ancient historiography and stresses the potential dangers when such commanders became conspicuous to the enemy as well as to their own side.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Chausserie-Laprée 1969: 369–410. There is a similar switch into the present during the narrative of Decrius' death (*Ann.* 3.20.2).

which is familiar from epic or from Livian historiography.<sup>56</sup> However, what happens is an anti-climax. The Iberian Pharasmenes manages to wound his opponent *per galeam*, but cannot strike the death-blow since he is carried past by his over-excited horse, and this enables the Parthian officers to protect the wounded Orodes. Compare Pharasmenes with Vergil's Turnus, who strikes Hyllus with a spear *per galeam* (*Aen.* 12.537) and does not even need a second shot to inflict death. Nor does Pharasmenes emerge well when we compare Livy's *equus* Ducarius, who digs his spurs into his horse and transfixes the consul Flaminius with a spear after first killing an armour-bearer (Livy 22.6.3–4). Such climactic moments from epic and historiography further underline the ineffectual and anticlimactic nature of the encounter between Pharasmenes and Orodes.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, the battle as a whole is not resolved by proper military action, but by a false report of Orodes' death, which terrifies the Parthians into conceding victory.<sup>58</sup> Their total collapse in the face of a mere rumour undercuts Orodes' proud boast of an eastern empire in his pre-battle harangue (*Ann.* 6.34.3) and suggests that the Parthian soldiers are more concerned with survival than with glory. Rumours on the battlefield could certainly wreak havoc on a campaign, and efficient communication during combat was often difficult.<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, we might conclude that, in addition to such practical difficulties, the political and dynastic instability in Parthia, where different factions have been fighting for control, has contributed significantly to the lack of staying power in Orodes' army.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, Tacitus' description fulfils few of the basic criteria for a

<sup>56</sup> Howie (1996) discusses the interaction between historiography and epic in battle-descriptions. See Hammond 1993: 161–357 for Livian historiography and Fenik 1968 for Homeric epic. Horsfall (1987) discusses the difficulties Vergil faced in narrating battles, given the marked shortage of major heroes of warrior age mentioned in the prose sources. Oakley (1985) discusses single combat in the Roman Republic.

<sup>57</sup> It was not always desirable for commanders to take an active role in the fighting, since they were more valuable to the army as leaders than as common soldiers. See Onasander *Strat.* 33.6. Goldsworthy (1996: 155) notes the tactical disadvantages of a general who fights like a common soldier.

<sup>58</sup> There is a contrast to be drawn here with a much grander battle involving easterners, the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. Once the Persian commander Mardonius had been killed, his men quickly lost the will to fight, but this was a real death and not a rumour: see Hdt. 9.63. Cf. von Clausewitz 1982: 254–258.

<sup>59</sup> So, a rumour during the first battle of Bedriacum that the Vitellians had abandoned their emperor severely damaged Othonian morale when it proved false: see Tac. *Hist.* 2.42.1; Plut. *Otho* 12.1–2; Suet. *Otho* 9.2. Likewise, a rumour that Julius Civilis had been thrown from his horse and killed caused his men to panic: see Tac. *Hist.* 4.34.5. On noise, rumours, and accurate memory of events in battle, see Woodman 1988: 18–19.

<sup>60</sup> See *Ann.* 2.1–4 and 6.31–2. Cf. Goldsworthy 1996: 61: "Many of the periods of long peace between Parthia and Rome, and most especially the diplomatic success under Augustus, coincided with times of internal strife and civil war in the kingdom." Cf. Campbell 1993.

standard rhetorical *descriptio pugnae*, particularly in the final stages.<sup>61</sup> For example, there is no announcement of the death tally on each side, which could at least have created a sense of closure. Tacitus does sometimes include such closural devices when it suits him: so at Mons Graupius, ten thousand Britons and three hundred and sixty Romans are said to have been killed.<sup>62</sup> We might have expected that an author intent on creating an entertaining martial show-piece would have lavished some attention on the closing stages of the battle: instead, the account of the military action just stops abruptly, despite the carefully narrated build-up.<sup>63</sup> Such features suggest that the role of this idiosyncratic battle in Tacitus' narrative should be analysed carefully.

What Tacitus has done is to narrate an episode which deploys polarised ethnographic details and succinct characterisation of the two commanders to entertain, but also to convey a more serious message. In the battle description itself and particularly in the ineffectual closure of the fighting, Tacitus deconstructs the traditional image of Parthia as an intimidating military power. The Parthians are characterised as inflexible combatants, whose complacent reliance on their famous archery and cavalry tactics leads them into difficulties. This is a theme which will recur in Tacitus' account of a siege during Corbulo's campaigns: *sed Partho ad exequendas obsidiones nulla comminus audacia: raris sagittis neque clausos exterret et semet frustratur* (*Ann.* 15.4.3). In the campaign of A.D. 35–36 Parthian morale is too dependent on the fate of their leader and they have virtually no staying power.<sup>64</sup> Are these Parthians really the same nation which humiliated Rome by seizing Crassus' standards in 53 B.C.?<sup>65</sup> In this instance, Tacitus' embellishment of the battle makes a point, not only about Parthian national

<sup>61</sup> See Aphth. *Prog.* 46.21 and 47.1; Hermog. *Prog.* 16.17; Lib. 8.460–464. Cf. Kraus and Woodman 1997: 67–68. Townend (1964: 479), discussing battle descriptions in Dio, characterises the rhetorical approach as a “monstrous method of composition.”

<sup>62</sup> Tac. *Agr.* 37.6. Cf. *Ann.* 14.37.2 (80,000 Britons, 400 Romans); 13.39.4 (every adult male Armenian killed, no Roman deaths, enslavement of civilians); 4.73.4 (900 Romans killed); 3.39.2 (no Roman deaths). For other closural devices, see *Ann.* 2.22.1 (construction of a victory mound); 3.46.4 (suicide of Sacrovir); 4.46 (surrender of Thracians); 12.35.3 (capture of Caratacus' wife and daughter); *Hist.* 2.44.1 (Othonians flee to Bedriacum).

<sup>63</sup> Koestermann (1965: 326), commenting on *victoriam concessere* (*Ann.* 6.35.2), suggests that Tacitus “erhebt sich sichtlich über eine rein rhetorische Ausmalung des Geschehens und bekundet sein Verständnis auch für militärische Fragen.” That Tacitus' narrative is simply a reflection of what actually happened at the end of the battle is one explanation of the abrupt closure, but there may be more to it than that. Chaumont (1976: 90) speculates: “Il est plausible en tout cas que ce très éphémère roi d'Arménie ne survécût pas longtemps à ses blessures car nous n'entendrons plus parler de lui.” If this is true, then Tacitus could have rounded off the battle description with a substantial piece of information about one of the protagonists, but instead, Orodes just disappears from the narrative and is never mentioned again.

<sup>64</sup> It was a familiar topos in ancient literature that barbarians (usually Gauls) were fierce in the first moments of a battle but then tended to fade away: see Livy 7.12.11, 10.28.3, 38.17.7; Tac. *Germ.* 4.3; Caes. *BG* 3.19.6; Flor. 2.4.1; Sil. Ital. *Pun.* 4.311–312, 8.16, 15.718.

<sup>65</sup> In the Roman construction of the Parthian national character, this was an event which the Parthians regarded as an important yardstick (cf. *Ann.* 2.2.2).

character, but also about Tiberius' foreign policy. A patriotic Roman's enjoyment of the episode could have been soured because the Parthians are defeated by a motley group of neighbouring tribes rather than by legionaries. Yet a pragmatist could surely appreciate how economical it was to allow foreign enemies to fight each other instead of Rome.<sup>66</sup> On a practical level, Tacitus stresses (*Ann.* 6.36.1) that the Iberians, who knew the local terrain, had a great advantage over the Parthian army: Roman legionaries would not have been so well placed.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, Roman historiography attached great importance to the notion of *metus hostilis*, that is the beneficial fear created by the presence of a competent foreign enemy, which forced nations to put aside their internal differences and unite against the common foe.<sup>68</sup> If Parthia had been fighting against Rome directly, then the outcome of the battle might have been very different. The Iberians, Albanians, and Sarmatians conducted themselves competently enough in the battle, but this heterogeneous army was perhaps not likely to provoke the Parthians to fight with the same desperation that confronting a Roman army on the battlefield would have generated—or so the notion of *metus hostilis* would flatteringly suggest.

And what does the episode tell us about Tacitus' attitude to Tiberius' foreign policy? Tacitus had previously argued that the practical Tiberius liked *destinata retinens, consiliis et astu res externas moliri, arma procul habere* (*Ann.* 6.32.1). Avoidance of warfare was Tiberius' method both in Thrace, where he dealt with the problematic king Rhescuporis *astu* (*Ann.* 2.64.2), and in Germany where he achieved more *consilio quam vi* (*Ann.* 2.26.3).<sup>69</sup> Certainly, Tiberius could dress up this unimpressive reality in rousing rhetoric: when a German chieftain offers to kill the rebel Arminius with poison, the emperor's thundering reply is that *non fraude neque occultis, sed palam et armatum populum Romanum hostis suos ulcisci* (*Ann.* 2.88.1). As Woodman observes, this statement echoes the words of the rebel Arminius, who claimed that *non enim se proditione . . . sed palam adversus armatos bellum tractare* (*Ann.* 1.59.3).<sup>70</sup> This is feisty talk, but Arminius is eventually murdered by that very method, treachery, which he here rejects. In contrast, Tiberius' rousing statement is fine propaganda, but does not reflect the reality

<sup>66</sup> This is why the contrast made by Kühnert (1973: 494) between a successful Vitellius and an unsuccessful Tiberius seems too schematic.

<sup>67</sup> On the importance of the right terrain for battle, see Tac. *Hist.* 2.42.2, *Ann.* 1.65.4 and 2.5.3; Livy 21.25.13.

<sup>68</sup> On *metus hostilis*, see Vretska 1976: 200–206; Conley 1981; Levick 1982; Paul 1984: 124.

<sup>69</sup> These passages are linked by Koestermann (1965: 317), who also cites *Ann.* 2.43.1 and 2.65–67. See Wheeler 1988: 73–74 on *astus* and 1988: 59 on *consilium* as a euphemism for *dolus*. Gowing (1990: 327) notes that duplicity and delay were not always successful measures and emphasises that “Rhescuporis is finally removed only after the Romans made a show of force.” However, Tacitus does note (*Ann.* 2.66) that the governor of Moesia, Pomponius Flaccus, takes advantage of his friendship with Rhescuporis, which enables the Romans to trap the troublesome king without an expensive campaign.

<sup>70</sup> See Kraus and Woodman 1997: 95.



of his devious foreign campaigns.<sup>71</sup> The days when heroic Romans confronted their enemies on the battlefield were gone, to be replaced by less glamorous but sometimes more successful modes of warfare. According to Tacitus, even Nero's talented general Corbulo preferred to have a war on hand rather than fight one (*Ann.* 15.3.1).<sup>72</sup>

This tension between two conflicting ideologies under the principate where honourable methods of military campaign are constantly vying with what is practical takes us right to the heart of the collective Roman psyche and to a debate which can be traced back to the second century B.C.<sup>73</sup> In 172 B.C. Marcius Philippus buys time for Rome in a war with Perseus of Macedon by using a deceptive embassy, but some of the more traditional senators are disgusted by such tactics. Livy puts into their mouths some familiar words, to which Tacitus may even have been alluding at *Ann.* 1.59.3 and 2.88.1: *non per insidias et nocturna proelia . . . nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur, bella maiores gessisse* (42.47.5).<sup>74</sup> Livy's senators are disgusted with this "new-fangled wisdom", which sanctioned any method provided that the result was a Roman victory. The practical Tiberius would probably have been less critical of Marcius Philippus, but the emperor's posthumous image suffered from using such unglamorous methods. Tacitus' Claudius, asked by the Parthians to provide them with a king, happily evokes Augustus as a precedent *omissa Tiberii memoria, quamquam is quoque miserat* (*Ann.* 12.11.1). Yet, as Syme has persuasively argued, those of Tacitus' readers who disapproved of Tiberius' actions needed only to look at what happened to Trajan, who tried to emulate the conquests of Alexander the Great (Dio 68.29.1 and 30.1), only to find that his campaigns in Parthia in A.D. 114–116 were ineffectual.<sup>75</sup>

To a certain extent, then, Tacitus is prepared to see the merits in Tiberius' foreign policy in Parthia and elsewhere. Leaving foreign enemies to fight one another was certainly more practical than doing the job oneself. So, Tacitus

<sup>71</sup> Tiberius' practice attempts to mirror Augustus' careful shrouding of practical foreign policy with a glamorous public image. According to Gruen, "in the East Augustus affected war but practised diplomacy" (1996: 159) and "the behaviour was marked by restraint but the public posture was one of aggressiveness" (1996: 163). See Zanker 1988: 183–192 for discussion of Augustus' public response to his victory over the Parthians in 20 B.C., in particular the famous cuirassed statue of Augustus at Prima Porta.

<sup>72</sup> Gilmartin (1973: 625), discussing Corbulo, notes that "public demonstrations and propaganda play a crucial role in foreign affairs, particularly when major powers are in conflict over such a token prize as Armenia and must both retain prestige."

<sup>73</sup> The question of Roman attitudes to warfare is closely related to the question of Roman attitudes to imperialism. Millar (1982: 1) distinguishes between "the conception of empire . . . either . . . as an offensive system designed for further conquests, or as an essentially static defensive system." Cf. Harris 1979: 105–130 and 163–254 with North 1981.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Diod. Sic. 30.7.1; Polyb. 36.9.9. On this episode, see Briscoe 1964; Derow 1989: 309, n. 27. On Tacitus' use of Livy, see Syme 1958: 685–686, 733–734.

<sup>75</sup> On Alexander, see Syme 1958: 770–771. On Trajan's Parthian campaigns, see Lepper 1948; Bowersock 1971; Bivar 1983: 86–92; Lightfoot 1990.

refers to the defeat of the Bructeri by a coalition of neighbouring tribes and apostrophises enthusiastically: *maneant, quaeso, duretque gentibus, si non amor nostri, at certe odium sui, quando urgentibus imperii fatis nihil iam praestare fortuna maius potest quam hostium discordiam* (Germ. 33.2). Self-destructive barbarians are at times convenient, but there are also potentially damaging repercussions for Rome. In the wider narrative which surrounds the description of the battle between Parthians and Iberians, Albanians, and Sarmatians at *Annals* 6.34–35, the succession of suicides and murders in Rome after Sejanus' downfall has been relentless.<sup>76</sup> Tacitus describes the situation which leads to unburied, rotting corpses being thrown into the Tiber: *iacuit immensa strages, omnis sexus, omnis aetas, inlustres ignobiles, dispersi aut aggerati* (Ann. 6.19.2). The vocabulary and the anaphora here suggestively recall an earlier occasion when Roman legionaries attacked the Marsi at night: *non sexus, non aetas miserationem attulit* (Ann. 1.51.1).<sup>77</sup> The transfer to a domestic context of language which had previously appeared in a foreign context must enhance a Roman reader's sense of horror.<sup>78</sup> Tacitus' Tiberius is content to leave his enemies in the east to fight each other, which is practical, but at the same time this situation frees him from the worries of foreign campaigns and enables him to turn his aggression self-destructively against Rome.<sup>79</sup> Had the Parthians been a more competent fighting force, then perhaps Tiberius would not have had the scope to do this: the notion of *metus hostilis* and its absence can, therefore, be applied provocatively to the political situation in Rome too.

In conclusion, Tacitus' embellished description of the battle is entertaining, but it also contributes to a reader's understanding of the nuts and bolts of foreign campaigning in the east. It may even offer an exemplary model for contemporary Romans who might themselves be sent out to the turbulent eastern provinces on foreign campaigns, but at the same time it hints at the internal dangers created by the absence of decent foreign enemies. Lucian advised the potential historian (*How To Write History* 56) to pass quickly over the trivial and unnecessary and to develop the significant points at adequate length. To some historians, this battle between Parthians and a motley collection of other eastern tribes might have seemed trivial enough to treat on a much smaller scale than Tacitus does. However, ancient historiography had as much to do with the writer's own world as it did with his past: Tacitus' entertaining battle narrative, extended by literary touches, offers provocative military and moral

<sup>76</sup>In *Annals* 6 alone, there are twenty-six deaths and suicides. Most of these are presented as being unnatural: when Calpurnius Piso dies a natural death (Ann. 6.10.3), Tacitus notes this as being extremely unusual.

<sup>77</sup>For *sexus . . . aetas*, see Gerber and Greef 1903: 1484.

<sup>78</sup>Cf. Woodman 1972: 150–158.

<sup>79</sup>Schmidt (1982: 285), discussing Tacitus' transfer of the historical principle of *metus externus* to the emperor and to internal relationships, suggests a link between Ann. 6.51.3: *postquam remoto pudore ac metu* and Sall. *Hist.* 1.12 (Maurenbrecher): *postquam remoto metu Punico*.

lessons to those who had to represent Roman interests on the fringes of the empire.

DEPARTMENT OF GREEK AND LATIN  
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON  
GOWER STREET  
LONDON WC1E 6BT  
U.K.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alonso-Núñez, J. M. 1987. "An Augustan World History: The *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus," *G&R* 34: 56–72.
- Bivar, A. D. H. 1983. "The Political History of Iran Under the Arsacids," in E. Yarshater (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran* 3.1. Cambridge. 21–99.
- Bosworth, A. B. 1977. "Arrian and the Alani," *HSCP* 81: 217–255.
- Bowersock, G. W. 1971. "A Report on Arabia Provincia," *JRS* 61: 219–242.
- 1993. "Tacitus and the Province of Asia," in T. J. Luce and A. J. Woodman (eds.), *Tacitus and the Tacitean Tradition*. Princeton. 3–10.
- Braund, D. 1994. *Georgia in Antiquity: A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian Iberia 550 B.C.–A.D. 562*. Oxford.
- Briscoe, J. 1964. "Q. Marcius Philippus and *nova sapientia*," *JRS* 54: 66–77.
- Brunt, P. A. 1980. "Cicero and Historiography," in M. J. Fontana, M. T. Piraino, and F. P. Rizzo (eds.), *Φιλίας Χάριν: Miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni*. Rome. 309–340 (= P. A. Brunt, *Studies in Greek History and Thought* [Oxford 1993] 181–209).
- Campbell, J. B. 1993. "War and Diplomacy: Rome and Parthia 31 B.C.–A.D. 235," in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*. London. 213–249.
- Chaumont, M.-L. 1976. "L'Arménie entre Rome et l'Iran I. De l'avènement d'Auguste à l'avènement de Dioclétien," *ANRW* II.9.1: 71–194.
- Chausserie-Laprée, J. P. 1969. *L'Expression narrative chez les historiens latins*. Paris.
- Coleman, K. 1993. "Launching into History: Aquatic Displays in the Early Empire," *JRS* 83: 48–74.
- Conley, D. F. 1981. "The Stages of Rome's Decline in Sallust's Historical Theory," *Hermes* 109: 379–382.
- Dabrowa, E. 1989. "Roman Policy in Transcaucasia from Pompey to Domitian," in D. H. French and C. S. Lightfoot (eds.), *The Eastern Frontier of the Roman Empire*. British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara Monograph 11. Oxford. 67–76.
- Dauge, V. A. 1981. *Le Barbare*. Brussels.
- Derow, P. S. 1989. "Rome, the Fall of Macedon and the Sack of Corinth," in *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 8: 290–323.
- Dewar, M. ed. 1996. *Claudian Panegyricus De Sexto Consulatu Honorii Augusti*. Oxford.
- Drews, R. 1976. "The Earliest Greek Settlements on the Black Sea," *JHS* 96: 18–31.
- Eadie, J. W. 1967. "The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry," *JRS* 57: 161–173.
- Fabia, P. 1893. *Les Sources de Tacite*. Paris.
- Fears, J. R. 1974. "Parthi in Q. Curtius Rufus," *Hermes* 102: 623–625.

- Fenik, B. 1968. *Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad: Studies in the Narrative Technique of Homeric Battle Descriptions*. Wiesbaden.
- Frye, R. N. 1981. "Parthia and Sassanid Persia," in F. Millar, *The Roman Empire and Its Neighbours*<sup>2</sup>. London. 249–269.
- Fuks, A. 1961. "Aspects of the Jewish Revolt in A.D. 115–117," *JRS* 51: 98–104.
- Furneaux, H. ed. 1896. *The Annals of Tacitus* Volume 1. Oxford.
- Garzetti, A. 1956. "La Data dell'incontro all'Eufrate di Artabano III e L. Vitellio Legato di Syria," in *Studi in onore di A. Calderini e R. Paribeni*. Milan. 1.211–229.
- Genette, G. 1980. *Narrative Discourse*. Tr. J. E. Lewin. Oxford.
- Gerber, A. and A. Greef. 1903. *Lexicon Taciteum*. Leipzig.
- Gilmartin, K. 1973. "Corbulo's Campaigns in the East," *Historia* 22: 583–626.
- Ginsburg, J. 1981. *Tradition and Theme in the Annals of Tacitus*. New York.
- Goldsworthy, A. K. 1996. *The Roman Army at War 100 B.C.–A.D. 200*. Oxford.
- Gowing, A. 1990. "Tacitus and the Client Kings," *TAPA* 120: 315–330.
- Gruen, E. 1996. "The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus," in *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 10: 147–197.
- Hahn, E. 1933. *Die Exkurse in den Annalen des Tacitus*. Leipzig.
- Hall, E. 1989. *Inventing the Barbarian*. Oxford.
- 1993. "Asia Unmanned: Images of Victory in Classical Athens," in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Greek World*. London. 108–133.
- Hammond, C. 1993. "Narrative Explanation and the Roman Military Character." Diss., Oxford.
- Hansen, M. H. 1993. "The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography," *Historia* 42: 161–180.
- 1998. "The Little Grey Horse—Henry V's Speech at Agincourt and the Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography," *Histos* 2 (<http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/1998>).
- Hardie, P. 1997. "Fifth-Century Athenian and Augustan Images of the Barbarian Other," *Classics Ireland* 4: 46–56.
- Harris, W. V. 1979. *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327–70 B.C.* Oxford.
- Henderson, J. 1989. "Tacitus / The World in Pieces," *Ramus* 18: 167–210.
- Heubner, H. ed. 1983. *P. Cornelii Taciti libri qui supersunt* 1. Stuttgart.
- Hollis, A. S. ed. 1977. *Ovid Ars Amatoria Book 1*. Oxford.
- Horsfall, N. 1971. "Numanus Remulus: Ethnography and Propaganda in *Aeneid* 9.598f," *Latomus* 30: 1108–16.
- 1985. "Illusion and Reality in Latin Topographical Writing," *G&R* 32: 197–208.
- 1987. "*Non viribus aequis*: Some Problems in Virgil's Battle-Scenes," *G&R* 34: 48–55.
- Howie, J. G. 1996. "The Major *Aristeia* in Homer and Xenophon," *PLLS* 9: 197–217.
- de Jong, I. J. F. 1987. *Narrators and Focalizers*. Amsterdam.
- Keitel, E. 1978. "The Role of Parthia and Armenia in Tacitus *Annals* 11 and 12," *AJP* 99: 462–473.
- Kennedy, D. C. 1977. "Parthian Regiments in the Roman Army," in J. Fitz (ed.), *Limes. Akten des XI Internationalen Limeskongresses*. Budapest. 521–531.
- Koestermann, E. ed. 1965. *Cornelius Tacitus Annalen Buch 4–6* 2. Heidelberg.
- Kraus, C. S. 1994. *Livy Ab Urbe Condita Book 6*. Cambridge.
- 1998. "Repetition and Empire in the *Ab Urbe Condita*," in P. Knox and C. Foss (eds.), *Studies in Honor of Wendell Clausen*. Stuttgart and Leipzig. 264–283.

- and A. J. Woodman. 1997. *The Latin Historians. Greece and Rome New Surveys in the Classics* 27. Oxford.
- Kühnert, F. 1973. "Der Orientbericht Tacitus *Ann.* VI 31–37," *WZ Jena* 22: 491–496.
- Lepper, F. A. 1948. *Trajan's Parthian War*. Oxford.
- Levick, B. M. 1976. *Tiberius*. London and Sydney.
- 1982. "Morals, Politics and the Fall of the Roman Republic," *G&R* 29: 53–62.
- Lightfoot, C. S. 1990. "Trajan's Parthian War and the Fourth-Century Perspective," *JRS* 80: 115–126.
- Lund, A. A. 1991. "Kritischer Forschungsbericht zur *Germania* des Tacitus," *ANRW* II.33.3: 1989–2222.
- Martin, R. H. 1990. "Structure and Interpretation in the *Annals*," *ANRW* II.33.2: 1500–81.
- and A. J. Woodman (eds.). 1989. *Tacitus Annals Book 4*. Cambridge.
- Masters, J. 1992. *Poetry and Civil War in Lucan's Bellum Civile*. Cambridge.
- McCulloch, H. Y. 1984. *Narrative Cause in the Annals of Tacitus*. Königstein.
- McDonald, A. H. 1957. "The Style of Livy," *JRS* 47: 155–172.
- McDonald, M. F. 1960. "Phoenix Redivivus," *Phoenix* 14: 187–206.
- Millar, F. 1982. "Emperors, Frontiers and Foreign Relations," *Britannia* 13: 1–23.
- Moles, J. L. 1993. "Truth and Untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides," in T. P. Wiseman and C. Gill (eds.), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. Exeter. 88–121.
- North, J. 1981. "The Development of Roman Imperialism," *JRS* 71: 1–9.
- Oakley, S. P. 1985. "Single Combat in the Roman Republic," *CQ* n.s. 35: 392–410.
- Ogilvie, R. M. and I. A. R. Richmond (eds.). 1967. *Cornellii Taciti De Vita Agricolae*. Oxford.
- Paul, G. M. 1984. *A Historical Commentary on Sallust's Bellum Jugurthinum*. Liverpool.
- Pelling, C. B. R. 1981. "Caesar's Battle-Descriptions and the Defeat of Ariovistus," *Latomus* 40: 741–766.
- 1982. Review of G. Zecchini, *Cassio Dione e la Guerra Gallica di Cesare* (Milan 1978) *CR* 32: 146–148.
- Peter, H. ed. 1914. *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*<sup>2</sup>. Leipzig.
- Pritchett, W. K. 1994. *Essays in Greek History*. Amsterdam.
- Rawson, E. 1985. *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic*. London.
- Rice, T. T. 1981. "The Scytho-Sarmatian Tribes of South-Eastern Europe," in F. Millar, *The Roman Empire and Its Neighbours*. London. 281–293.
- Richmond, I. A. R. 1982. *Trajan's Army on Trajan's Column*. London.
- Sage, M. M. 1990. "Tacitus' Historical Works: A Survey and Appraisal," *ANRW* II.33.2: 851–1030.
- Schmidt, E. A. 1982. "Die Angst der Mächtigen in den Annalen des Tacitus," *WS* 16: 274–287.
- Scholz, U. W. 1994. "*Annales* und *Historia(e)*," *Hermes* 122: 64–79.
- Stadter, P. 1980. *Arrian of Nicomedia*. Chapel Hill.
- Syme, R. 1929. "The *Argonautica* of Valerius Flaccus," *CQ* 23: 129–137.
- 1958. *Tacitus*. Oxford.
- 1964. "The Historian Servilius Nonianus," *Hermes* 92: 408–24 (= *Ten Studies in Tacitus* [Oxford 1970] 91–109).
- 1983. "The Year 33 in Tacitus and Dio," *Athenaeum* 61: 3–23 (= A. R. Birley [ed.], *Roman Papers* 4 [Oxford 1988] 223–244).

- Theraud, J. and J. 1928. *Mes années chez Barrès*. Paris.
- Thomas, R. F. 1982. *Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographical Tradition*. Cambridge Philological Society Suppl. 7. Cambridge.
- Townend, G. B. 1964. "Some Rhetorical Battle-Pictures in Dio," *Hermes* 92: 467–481.
- Van Wees, H. 1988. "Kings in Combat: Battles and Heroes in the *Iliad*," *CQ* n.s. 38: 13–22.
- Vasaly, A. 1993. *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Verbrugghe, G. P. 1989. "On the Meaning of *Annales*, on the Meaning of Annalist," *Philologus* 133: 192–230.
- von Clausewitz, C. 1982. *On War*. Tr. J. J. Graham. Harmondsworth.
- Vretska, K. ed. 1976. *Sallust De Catilinae Coniuratione*. Heidelberg.
- Walser, G. 1951. *Rom, das Reich und die fremden Völker in der Geschichtsschreibung der frühen Kaiserzeit*. Baden-Baden.
- Wheeler, E. L. 1988. *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery*. Leiden.
- Wiedemann, T. 1992. *Emperors and Gladiators*. London and New York.
- Wilkes, J. J. 1972. "Julio-Claudian Historians," *CW* 65: 177–203.
- Wille, G. 1983. *Der Aufbau der Werke des Tacitus*. Amsterdam.
- Williams, B. 1989. "Reading Tacitus' Tiberian *Annals*," *Ramus* 18: 140–166.
- Wiseman, T. P. 1981. "Practice and Theory in Roman Historiography," *History* 66: 375–393.
- 1994. *Historiography and Imagination*. Exeter.
- Woodman, A. J. 1972. "Remarks of the Structure and Content of Tacitus, *Annals* 4.57–67," *CQ* n.s. 22: 150–158 (= Woodman 1998: 142–154).
- 1979. "Self-Imitation and the Substance of History: Tacitus *Annals* 1.61–5 and *Histories* 2.70, 5.14–15," in A. J. Woodman and J. Powell (eds.), *Creative Imitation and Latin Literature*. Cambridge. 143–155 (= Woodman 1998: 86–103).
- 1983. "From Hannibal to Hitler: The Literature of War," *University of Leeds Review* 26: 107–124 (= Woodman 1998: 1–20).
- 1988. *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*. London and Sydney.
- 1998. *Tacitus Reviewed*. Oxford.
- and R. H. Martin (eds.). 1996. *The Annals of Tacitus Book 3*. Cambridge.
- Yardley, J. C. and W. Heckel (eds. and tr.). 1997. *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*. Oxford.
- Zanker, P. 1988. *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus*. Tr. A. Shapiro. Ann Arbor.
- Ziegler, K. 1964. *Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich*. Wiesbaden.