

GREGORY S. BUCHER

ἥ τε τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχὴ ἔργων μὲν πέρι καὶ ἀρετῆς οὐδ' ἐς τὰ σμικρότατα
τῶν Εὐρωπαϊῶν παραβάλλεται δι' ἀσθένειαν καὶ ἀτολμίαν τῶν ἔθνων.
καὶ τοῦτο δηλώσει καὶ ἥδε ἡ γραφὴ προϊοῦσα.

Appian *Preface* 9.32–33

I. INTRODUCTION

IT IS UNREMARKABLE TO FIND EVIDENCE of feelings of superiority in cultural Greeks towards people they called barbarians, particularly Asians. Already in Homer (*Il.* 3.2–9) the Trojans—though scarcely objects of contempt—are depicted as vastly different from the Greeks in their approach to battle. The focus is on the Trojans' garrulity; Homer goes so far as to compare them to a flock of birds and contrast them strongly with the Greeks, who silently advance to battle "breathing menace" (μένεα πνείοντες, 3.8) in the stock Homeric phrase.¹ Although Homer makes no explicit statement, he leaves us with the impression that the Greeks take their fighting more seriously in that they eschew frivolous chatter when getting down to business.² Beginning with the Persians' lopsided defeats and propelled by Herodotus, the original simple Homeric observation of different approaches to fighting evolved over time into a full-blown stereotype emphasizing "barbarian" martial incompetence.³ Works such as Xenophon's *Anabasis* served to reinforce the stereotype, and to Hippocrates it was so much a natural fact of life that he felt the need to try to explain it through environmental

App. *Preface* 32–33: "With regard to their achievements and bravery, the empire of Asia is not even comparable to the smallest of the European peoples because of Asians' weakness and cowardice. My treatise will demonstrate this, too, as it progresses."

I first bumped into this topic while a graduate assistant at the Center for Hellenic Studies in 1993 and then at the American Academy in 1993–94. I would like to dedicate this article to the staff and fellows of both institutions in those extraordinarily happy years. I also owe a great debt to many colleagues and mentors who unstintingly helped me at various stages of this project: Ernst Badian, Geoff Bakewell, Mac Bell, Debby Boedeker, John Camp, Ted Champlin, Christina Clark, Charles Fornara, David Petrain, Kurt Raaflaub, Ron Simkins, and Bill Stephens. Lastly, I owe a debt to the perspicacious anonymous reviewers for *Phoenix*.

¹Stock phrase: Hom. *Il.* 2.536, 3.8, 11.508, 24.364. All translations of Appian's *Civil Wars* are from Carter 1996 to offer neutral readings; discussion or alternate translations of mine will be offered at points in the text.

²Kirk 1985: *ad* 3.8–9: "Here, the silence indicates discipline and resolve (as well as unity of language in contrast with the Trojans) . . . The Trojans have had the hostile cranes to symbolize their martial spirit (and their foreignness, too); the Achaeans simply have this plain and factual statement of their calm determination." Specifically on Homeric silence, see Montiglio 2000: *passim*, esp. 46–81 and 286–288. Mackie (1996) sees a subtle portrait of the Trojans as inferior.

³On the development of the topos, see above all Coleman 1997: 175–220; Morris 1992: 362–386; Hall 1991: 56–62, 79–84, 99–100; Hengel 1980: 55–66; Balsdon 1979: 61–62, 66–67; Momigliano 1975: 7; Hadas 1959: 11–13.

determinism in the *Airs, Waters, and Places* (*Aer.* 12–16).⁴ By the time Appian wrote his *Roman History* in the years after A.D. 150, the stereotype had so devolved into a cliché that he could exploit it without apology as a foil to emphasize Roman military superiority. It is interesting that Appian tells the reader in advance that his history will demonstrate Asian “weakness and cowardice,” an idea that subverts his desire to celebrate, *inter alia*, Roman bravery, endurance, and success against long odds in their conquests.⁵ Appian did in fact redeem his promise to demonstrate Asian cowardliness in his account of the Battle of Pharsalus by adding a damning portrait of Pompey’s allies to his battle narrative. In the following section of this essay I isolate the fictive elements while 1) showing their improbability based upon inconsistencies they produce in the overall battle narrative and 2) their lack of support in the parallel tradition and even contradiction of that tradition. In section III, I go further, arguing that Appian employs not only stereotypical elements from existing collections of, for example, *strategemata*, but also ideas he develops in extremely similar ways in other parts of the *Roman History*. In section IV, I analyze a distinction Appian draws between Pompey’s non-Greek allies and the Greek and notionally Macedonian ones, and in the concluding section I suggest an explanation for this distinction and point to how the results of this investigation fit into and affect the picture of Appian currently being developed in the scholarship.⁶

II. THE PHARSALUS NARRATIVE

Ancient historians often juxtaposed two opponents before narrating a great battle by listing their forces, and then offered the reader (usually fictitious)

⁴On the Persian Wars as the factor motivating Hippocrates to write, see Jouanna 1981: 11–15, esp. 12; also Backhaus 1976: 170–185.

⁵Gómez Espelosín (1993) discusses Appian’s general use of inherited topoi connected with “the barbarian” on the basis of his close reading of the *Iberike*. While he succeeds in documenting Appian’s creativity, the most intriguing result of his study is his demonstration that Appian uses—and adapts—the traditional models of “the barbarian” in order to channel, or better, find an outlet (*válvula de escape*: see esp. 123–124) for certain emotions he held as a provincial citizen of Rome. Gómez Espelosín’s restrained account contrasts with Hahn’s (1993: 377–383) argument that Appian was substantially disaffected from the empire and used at least one speech in the mouth of an opponent of Roman expansion to express his own doubts or negative feelings as a citizen of a subject people.

⁶Gowing (1990) has advanced the most serious argument for literarily significant intervention by Appian in the *Roman History* to date. He argues convincingly that Appian sought to pull together the threads of history (as he understood them) leading up to Philippi in Cassius’ speech at *B Civ.* 4.90–100, a fictive composition or at best a speech highly adapted from his source. I advanced a similar argument about Caesar’s speech before Pharsalus, and my conclusions substantially reduce the probability that these speeches are anything but fiction: see Bucher 1997: 177–193. We had already known that Appian used a variety of source materials (Hahn 1964, 1970, and 1982; Magnino 1993; Brodersen 1988) and that he was intellectually involved in every part of his work, in no way a slave to his sources (Goldmann 1988; Gowing 1992; Bucher 1997). Most recently, I have argued that the entire *Roman History* is fundamentally structured in accordance with Appian’s program, and that this program was motivated by factors arising from Appian’s *Sitz im Leben*: see Bucher 2000.

battle exhortations ostensibly given by one or both commanders.⁷ Appian is no exception.⁸ Beginning with these standard elements, he has woven into his account of Pharsalus a moralizing subplot, not seen in other accounts of that battle, in which he lauds the (for him) signal virtues of discipline and order not only explicitly but implicitly through the contrasting cowardliness and weakness of Pompey's eastern allies.

Setting the Stage: Caesar's Speech before the Battle

Caesar's battlefield exhortation at Pharsalus, ostensibly spoken in the moments before the battle, serves the surrounding narrative in complex ways. The first half of the speech is retrospective, briefly gathering together and recapitulating many historical threads which run through the narrative of the Pharsalus campaign (from Caesar's crossing into Epirus to Pharsalus itself). This is analogous to what Gowing was able to show a decade ago in an impressive article about the speech Appian gives to Cassius at Philippi: his thesis is a solid base upon which all future discussion of Appian's speeches must rest.⁹ Gowing also observed that several of Appian's speeches have a predictive quality and he noted this characteristic in Caesar's speech at Pharsalus as well.¹⁰ Gowing takes the summarized narrative to predate Appian's composition of the speeches, and it is certainly reasonable to think that the clairvoyant part of Caesar's speech (or any speech exhibiting predictions, for that matter) was in any event prepared together with the narrative which describes the fulfillment of the predictions.¹¹

It is this second half of Caesar's speech, which adumbrates the role the allies will play in the battle, that concerns us here. Its multiple proleptic remarks and even an explicit prediction must alert the reader to the fact that it is not just a rhetorical exercise. I quote the pertinent sections of Caesar's speech and a small but important piece of narrative (2.74.308–75.311).

308 “καὶ τὰδε μοι περὶ μόνων ἐστὶ τῶν Ἰταλῶν, ἐπεὶ τῶν γε συμμάχων μὴδὲ φροντίζετε μὴδ' ἐν λόγῳ τίθεσθε μὴδὲ μάχεσθε ὅλως ἐκείνοις· ἀνδράποδα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ Σύρια καὶ Φρύγια καὶ Λύδια, φεύγειν αἰεὶ καὶ δουλεῦν ἔτοιμα· οἷς ἐγὼ σαφῶς οἶδα, καὶ ὑμεῖς δὲ αὐτίκα ὄψεσθε, οὐδὲ Πομπήιον αὐτὸν τάξιν ἐγγυῶντα πολέμου.

⁷ Hansen (1993: 161–162) offers a catalog and argues *passim* for a skeptical view of the veracity of all battle exhortations. See also Hansen 1998 at n. 45.

⁸ On Appian's speeches see Gowing 1990: 164–166 and 1992: 225–245; Hahn 1982: 253–254. Gowing, who noticed that Caesar's speech shared some of the qualities of Cassius' (1990: 164, n. 21), did not look more closely because it was outside of the period he was focusing on. Representative catalogs of forces: *Hisp.* 25 (before Carmone in Spain); *Hann.* 19–20 (Cannae); *Syr.* 17 (Antiochus' battle at Thermopylae); *Syr.* 31–32 (Magnesia); *Mith.* 41 (Chaeronea); *B Civ.* 1.39–40 (the Social War), 1.79, 82 (the Sullan invasion of Italy), 3.66.273–67.274 (Forum Gallorum), 4.108 (Philippi).

⁹ See Gowing 1990, expanded slightly in 1992: 239–244. On Caesar's speech, see Bucher 1997: 154–157, 177–187.

¹⁰ Gowing 1990: 165, 172–174 (esp. 173).

¹¹ Gowing 1990: 169, n. 39.

- 309 ἔχεσθε οὖν μοι τῶν Ἰταλῶν μόνων, κἄν οἱ σύμμαχοι δίκην· κυνῶν περιθέωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ θορυβοποιῶσι. τρεψάμενοι δ' αὐτοὺς τῶνδε μὲν ὡς συγγενῶν φειδόμεθα, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἐς τὴν τῶνδε κατάπληξιν ἐξεργάσασθε.
- 310 πρὸ δὲ πάντων, ὥς ἂν εἰδείην ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε ὧν συνετίθεσθε μεμνημένους τε καὶ νίκην πάντως ἢ θάνατον αἰρουμένους, καθέλετέ μοι προϊόντες ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην τὰ τεῖχη τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν τάφρον ἐγχώσατε, ἵνα μηδὲν ἔχωμεν, ἂν μὴ κρατῶμεν, ἴδωσι δ' ἡμᾶς ἀσταθμεύτους οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ συνῶσιν, ὅτι πρὸς ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων σταθμεῦσαι.”
- 308 “... And it is only to the Italians that even these considerations [*sc.* the hortatory first half of the speech] apply. You need not think about the allies, nor take any account of them; in short you need not fight against them. These are slaves from Syria and Phrygia and Lydia, always ready to flee and always ready to be enslaved. I know well, as you shall soon see for yourselves, that not even Pompeius will trust them with a place in his line of battle.
- 309 I ask you to engage only with the Italian troops, even if the allies hang on your heels and harass you like a pack of dogs. When we have gained the day, let us spare the Italians because they are our kin, but instill fear into them by destroying their allies.
- 310 Most of all, though, I would like to be sure that you remember what you agreed, and have chosen total victory or death. As you go out to battle, pull down your own ramparts and fill in the ditch, so that if we fail to win we shall have nothing, while the enemy will see that we lack a camp and understand that necessity compels us to make our quarters in theirs.”

Appian adds:

- 311 δ μὲν τοσάδε εἰπὼν φυλακὴν ὁμῶς τῶν σκηνῶν κατέπεμπε δισχιλίους τοὺς πάνυ γέροντας· οἱ δ' ἐξιόντες τὸ τεῖχος ἤρειπον μετὰ σιωπῆς βαθυτάτης καὶ ἐς τὴν τάφρον αὐτὸ ἐνεχώννυσον.
- 311 After saying this he nevertheless posted a guard of 2,000 of the oldest men on the tents. The others, as they went out, pulled down the earth bank in complete silence and filled up the ditch with it.

This version of Caesar's battle exhortation is unique; there is nothing else like it in the tradition, and Caesar's own account does not support it. Appian exploits this speech to outline the plot of his story of the allies under the guise of an astute commander's accurate prediction; noteworthy is Caesar's characterization of the allies as ready to be enslaved and his rapid *pars pro toto* sketch of Pompey's allies as Syrians, Lydians and Phrygians, the obvious stereotypical targets Appian wants us to have in mind in the course of his battle narrative.¹²

Perhaps it is best to begin analysis of the speech with Caesar's problematic and implausible order (at 2.74.310) to his men to tear down their camp's palisade.

¹² Appian provides an artificially lengthened list of Pompey's forces in order to give substance to his claim (a commonplace in the tradition) that “all the peoples of the East” fought for Pompey: see Bucher 1997: 143–151. The pejorative singling out of Lydians, Phrygians, and Syrians is paralleled elsewhere: cf. Xen. *Vect.* 2.1–3.5.

Caesar himself writes (*B Civ.* 3.89.2) that in drawing up his men for battle he left seven cohorts to guard his camp.¹³ In any event, given that Caesar was desperately undermanned, any number of cohorts, especially as many as seven, would have been an unthinkable waste of manpower had there been no defensible—i.e., fortified—camp to guard.¹⁴ Appian knows (arguably from Caesar's account) that the camp had in fact been guarded, and thus added, in an attempt to reconcile the contradiction plausibly, the 2,000 "very old men" (a detail Caesar does not offer) left as guards.¹⁵ Lucan shares a version of this with Appian, though he tells it differently (7.326–329):

*sternite iam vallum fossasque inplete ruina
exeat ut plenis acies non sparsa manipulis.
parcite ne castris: vallo tendetis in illo
unde acies peritura venit.*

Pull down the wall and fill the ditch with the refuse,
so that the battle line may exit without its maniples in disorder.
Don't spare your camp! Aim for that rampart
from which the army you are going to destroy is coming.

Lucan's Caesar is a dynamo, the storm (in the famous metaphor) which will expose the feebleness of Pompey's hollow old oak. Nothing can hinder the storm's destroying the oak, and likewise, not even the wooden palisade of Caesar's own camp will hinder him bursting out to attack Pompey. We must not attempt, as some have, to salvage historical fact in this literary conceit. Appian, it seems, recognized the notable effectiveness of this passage and adapted the idea in his own account. The calculation implicit in Lucan's version makes its appearance unlikely to have been due to an innocent misreading of his source (which is among the explanations proposed for it).¹⁶

¹³ Though the mss give two cohorts, the conjecture of seven is probably correct, and is unanimously accepted in the modern editions. For the calculation giving seven cohorts, see, for example, Kraner, Meusel, and Hofmann 1906–11: 272 and Carter 1993: 212.

¹⁴ This is especially true now that Morgan (1983) has compellingly established the hypothesis that the battle took place on the north bank of the river Enipeus; Caesar's camp was almost certainly situated in such a way as to guard the crossing of the river, and was accordingly placed in the flattest part of the plain, unlike Pompey's, which could exploit the slopes of the hills bounding the valley on the north.

¹⁵ Carter does not bring out the force of τοὺς πάνυ γέροντας in rendering it "of the oldest men" (so too Veh 1989: 143), which without definition could logically mean robust men of 45 years from an army of men preponderantly in their twenties or thirties. Appian has two goals: to tell the truth (so, he relates truthfully that men were left guarding the camp) and, for literary purposes, to persuade us that Caesar called his men to demolish their own camp. He chose to reconcile this contradiction by asserting that Caesar left "very old" troops to guard his unfortified camp: see LSJ⁹ s.v. πάνυ I.1. Paschoud (1981: 181) sees the contradiction in Appian's account.

¹⁶ That Lucan might have built his idea upon some misunderstood event in the battle need not deter us from seeing his creativity here. The best discussions of the similar passages are those of Rice Holmes (1923: 3.468) and Morgan (1983: 53 and n. 184). See also Paschoud 1981: 181–183. Among

While adapting Lucan's flourish, Appian had no reason to follow him exactly: though he acknowledges Caesar's dynamism elsewhere, Appian uses his version to show Caesar imbuing his troops with the strength of desperation and seeking to inflict a psychological defeat on the Pompeians.¹⁷

The Battle Narrative

Early in the battle narrative Appian has Pompey draw up his battle line (2.75.314–315):

314 ... πολύθρουν δὲ ἦν τὸ Πομπηίου συμμαχικὸν καὶ πολύγλωσσον·
315 καὶ αὐτῶν ὁ Πομπήιος Μακεδόνας μὲν καὶ Πελοποννησίους καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Ἀθηναίους, ἀποδεξάμενος τῆς εὐταξίας καὶ σιωπῆς, παρεστήσατο τῇ φάλαγγι τῇ Ἰταλικῇ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους, ὅπερ ὁ Καῖσαρ εἵκαζεν, ἔξω τάξεως ἐκέλευσε κατὰ φυλὰς ἐφεδρεύοντας, ὅταν ἐν χερσὶν ὁ ἀγὼν γένηται, κυκλοῦσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ διώκειν, ὅσα δύναιντο βλάπτοντα, καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτὸ Καίσαρος ἀχαράκωτον ὄν διαρπάζειν.

314 ... Pompeius' [allies] were noisy and polyglot,
315 and from them he picked the Macedonians, Peloponnesians, Boeotians, and Athenians to station next to the block of legions, because he was convinced of their quietness and good discipline. He ordered the others, as Caesar guessed he would, to lie in wait in their units outside the main formation; then, when battle was joined, they were to outflank the enemy, pursue them while inflicting as much damage as they could, and sack Caesar's own camp, unprotected as it was by any ditch.

the commentators, Dilke (1960: 118) finds Lucan's version unlikely but nevertheless thinks Appian's version independent; Francken (1896–97: 2.68), too, sees a common source (Livy) behind Lucan's and Appian's versions, as does Paschoud, who thinks the idea that Appian might have used Lucan's account an *absurdité*. The latter's polemic stance stems from his desire to find historical authority in (or behind) parallel accounts of Pharsalus comparable to Caesar's. He thus sees Livy behind both, each having misread his model. Perrin (1884: 325–330) sees that the passage is from Lucan, under the reasonable assumption that Appian would have made contact with the *Pharsalia* during his lengthy sojourn in Rome. Could Lucan have been prompted by Caesar's statement that he noticed Pompey's offering favorable battle conditions when his men had already been ordered to break camp (*signo iam projectionis dato tabernaculisque detensis*, 3.85.3)? Kraner *et al.* (1906–11: 266) saw that the *vallum* of Caesar's camp must still have been standing at this point. Lastly, Plutarch, despite numerous correspondences with Appian, makes no mention of harming the camp, though he too states that Caesar was breaking camp the morning of the battle (he alone specifies to Scotussa, *Caesar* 43.7; cf. *Pomp.* 68.5). He adds that the soldiers went calmly and professionally to their battle lines and stood there waiting (*Pomp.* 68.7). Paschoud finds the later authors' error in a misunderstanding of the term *vallum* (palisade, *agger*, or combined *agger* and *fossa*?).

¹⁷ On the often repeated motif of the extra strength of desperate troops, see Hahn 1970: 298–299. It seems reasonable to think that Appian did in fact find some sort of report of the Caesarians altering their own camp (even if it was only the commencement of breaking it down to abandon Pharsalus), and he exaggerated it for the purposes of his portrait of Pompey's allies, adding another favorite theme which Goldmann (1988: 16, n. 45) discusses, quoting *Hisp.* 40.162 as a parallel: the elder Cato sends his fleet away from Emporium to Massilia in the face of overwhelming opposition so they might have no escape except through victory (ὥς οὐκ ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ κρατοῦμεν, οὐδὲ σωτηρίαν).

"Just as Caesar had conjectured," the (non-Greek) allies are drawn off and relegated to the harassment duty of circling around the enemy. Pompey's order to "circle the enemy" corresponds neatly to Caesar's prophetic phraseology ("even if the allies hang on your heels and harass you like a pack of dogs").¹⁸ The allies' duty to sack Caesar's unfortified camp—guarded by only 2,000 "very old men"—is an important, though latent, piece of dramatic irony as is ultimately revealed by the allies' paradoxical betrayal of their general.

Thus, Caesar's explicit prediction (2.74.308) is immediately fulfilled: Pompey refuses to accept his tumultuous polyglot allies into his Italic battle array.¹⁹ What will ultimately be of great interest is the way Appian distinguishes the Macedonian and Greek allied contingents by making it a point to tell us that they *were* taken into the Italic battle formation. Through the strong contrast, this *unicum* in the tradition drives home what Appian sees as the fundamental difference between the two groups: the silent discipline of the Macedonians and Greeks, and the clamorous unreliability of the other allies.

In his own account, Caesar wrote that Pompey planned to win the battle by having his numerically superior cavalry encircle Caesar's right flank and precipitate a rout once battle had been joined. Noticing the lopsided disposition of Pompey's cavalry, Caesar detached six cohorts to form a reserve fourth battle line as a defense in case of an encirclement. In the event, though on foot, Caesar's men turned and routed the Pompeian cavalry. This left Pompey's force denuded of cavalry support, and his defeat proceeded from there. Pompey retired from the battle, and ultimately, after a stiff defense by the Pompeians and especially their Thracian allied auxiliaries, their camp fell and the battle was effectively over.²⁰

Appian's account differs in substantial ways. Caesar stationed himself on his right with the tenth legion and Pompey put "the best" of his cavalry opposite

¹⁸ Carter's (1996: 109) translation admirably emphasizes the canine imagery while underplaying the notion of encirclement inherent in Appian's *κἂν οἱ σύμμαχοι δίκην κυνῶν περιθέωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ θορυβοποιῶσι* and thus does not mark the correspondence between Pompey's *κυκλοῦσθαι* and Caesar's *περιθέωσιν*.

¹⁹ Carter (1996: 108, n. 122) misses Appian's literary purposes and mistranslates through an effort to give the account historical realism: "in this [segregating the allies], Pompeius was adopting the normal practice of his day, when the main line of battle was always composed of legionaries, who were by definition Roman citizens ('Italians')." Appian is clear that Pompey approved of (*ἀποδεξάμενος*, stronger than being "convinced of") the Macedonian and Greek discipline and silence, and stationed them alongside (*παρεστήσατο*) the Italic troops. Whether he knew of standard practices of Pompey's day is an imponderable. Saddington's (1982: 5–9, 179–186) study of auxiliaries offers little help in interpreting this passage, but he does stress the *ad hoc* nature of "national contingents." Appian implies that their good order and silence put the Greek forces on a par with the legions—for as Appian describes the battle, they would have to operate in concert with Pompey's legionaries (without legionary training?) and meet Caesar's troops head-on.

²⁰ See Caes. *B Civ.* 3.86.2–4, where Pompey expounds his plan; Caesar's countermeasure at *B Civ.* 3.89.4–5; Caesar's stratagem working and the Pompeian cavalry being routed at 3.93.4–8; Caesar's verdict: *neque vero Caesarem fefellit quin ab eis cohortibus, quae contra equitatum in quarta acie conlocatae essent initium victoriae oriretur*, 3.94.3. See also Plut. *Pomp.* 71.6–10; *Caes.* 45.4; *Florus* 2.48–49.

Caesar's position to encircle and rout him if possible. Caesar set 3,000 of his best men in an ambush to counter the enemy cavalry. Watchwords issued, the two generals hesitate on the brink, contemplating the moment. Finally, Pompey sees his allies falling into disorder and begins the attack; the two Italic armies come together in deep silence. Before the armies on foot even meet, the Pompeian cavalry attempts to encircle the tenth legion but is foiled by Caesar's ambush and we hear no more about it. The armies finally clash and Caesar's troops, unhindered by enemy cavalry, are able to encircle Pompey's left, hurling their spears into the enemy's sides. This critical moment begins to turn the battle, though the fighting rages on evenly elsewhere. Pompey's allies are dumbstruck by the Italians' show of bravery and discipline and are too stricken to attack even the "few old men" guarding Caesar's tents. Once they notice Pompey's left giving ground, they flee from the battlefield without having landed a blow, shouting "we are beaten!" They retreat in a panic to their camp and tear it apart, plundering it as they ransack it for their possessions. Pompey's Italic army is slowly reduced to flight. Caesar sends orders to the beaten Pompeians: surrender and be saved. In accordance with Caesar's order in his battle exhortation, the Caesarians slaughter the allies. Pompey had meanwhile retreated numbly to his camp at the turning of the battle, but as Caesar storms Pompey's camp, he flees to Larissa. Caesar and his men quarter in Pompey's camp as Caesar had initially threatened.²¹

Appian's reconstruction of the battle is artificially segmented because he places the entire cavalry action at the beginning of the battle to remove it (as an unwanted complicating factor) from the central narrative of the battle on foot, and this permits him to maintain an approving focus on the desperate struggle between the well-trained, disciplined Italic troops. It is into this central narrative that Appian wove the highly mannered story of the morally disgraceful conduct of Pompey's (non-Greek) allies.

Let us look at some of the key passages in greater detail. 2.78.325–326 provides a pat confirmation of Caesar's prediction that the allies would create disorder in the Pompeian battle line:

- 325 μέλλουσι δ' ἔτι καὶ ἐξ ἀλλήλους ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡ ἡμέρα προύκοπτε. καὶ τὸ μὲν Ἰταλικὸν ἅπαν εὐσταθῶς ἐφ' ἡσυχίας ἀκριβοῦς ἀνέμενε· τὸ δὲ συμμαχικὸν δὲ Πομπήιος αὐτοῦ ταρασσόμενον ὁρῶν ὑπὸ τῆς μελλήσεως καὶ δέισας, μὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀταξίας κατάρξειεν, ὑπεσῆμαινε πρῶτος, καὶ ἀντήχησε Καῖσαρ.
- 326 αὐτίκα δ' αἱ τε σάλπιγγες αὐτοὺς ἐξώτρυνον ὀρθίοις κλαγγαῖς ὥς ἐν τοσῶδε πλήθει πολλαὶ κατὰ μέρη, καὶ οἱ κήρυκες καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάται περιθέοντες ἤπειγον. οἱ δὲ σοβαρῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐπήσαν μετὰ τε θάμβους καὶ σιωπῆς βαθυτάτης ὥς πολλῶν ἀγῶνων τοιῶνδε ἐμπειροπόλεμοι.

²¹ Rossi (2000: 240–242, 245–246, 249–250) argues that Caesar himself exploited a subtle version of the Asian stereotype in his description of the disturbing signs of overconfidence and luxury he found in Pompey's camp after the battle: through these failings the Pompeian Romans are conceptually pushed towards categorization with their Asian allies. If Rossi is correct, Caesar's employment of the stereotype does not seem to have affected Appian's, since they are diametrically at cross-purposes.

- 325 As they still hesitated and watched each other, the day was wearing on. All the Italian troops waited quietly, exactly in their places, but Pompeius noticed that his allied contingents were becoming disordered as a result of the delay and was afraid that they would initiate a collapse of discipline before fighting started. So he was the first to give the signal for battle, and Caesar sounded in answer.
- 326 Immediately the trumpets, of which there were many in the different units of so large an army, roused the men with their high-pitched blasts, and the criers and officers hurried among them urging them on. They advanced proudly towards each other in amazement and in the profoundest silence, as they were used to war and had experienced many such encounters.

Appian here shares with Plutarch (*Pomp.* 69.6) the idea of disorder in Pompey's army. Plutarch simply states that the "greater part of his army" was in the beginning stages of disorder,²² but unsurprisingly he offers no trace of Appian's subsequent additions to the story.

It is instructive to compare what Appian chooses to tell us of the Italian soldiers' and the allies' respective roles in the battle. As Pompey's left begins to yield, Appian emphasizes the brave, dignified endurance of the Italians (2.79.332):

- 332 κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος ἦν ἔτι τραυμάτων καὶ φόνων ἔργα πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα· βοὴ δὲ οὐδεμία ἐκ τοσσησδε φάλαγγος τοιάδε δρώσης οὐδ' οἰμωγαὶ τῶν ἀναιρουμένων ἢ πλησσομένων, ἀλλὰ βρυχήματα μόνα καὶ στόνοι πιπτόντων, ἐνθα συνετάχθησαν, εὐσχημόνως·

- 332 In the rest of the battle-line all manner of death and injury was still being inflicted. From such a great legionary army, engaged on such dreadful work, there rose not a cry nor a scream as the men were wounded or killed but only grunts and groans as they fell in perfect order where they had been stationed.

Common sense and soldiers' battlefield reports instantly refute Appian's romantic depiction of hacked-up men falling decorously.²³ It is indeed so improbably counterintuitive that only the subsequent emphasis on the panicked shriek of the allies as they run away unhurt finally explains its presence, as a foil.²⁴

²² Plutarch does refer more than once to the lack of experience and training of Pompey's army (*Pomp.* 64.2, 69.6), as does Dio, who also makes a perfunctory remark about the Asian element of Pompey's army at 41.61.1: ὁ Πομπήιος ἄτε καὶ Ἀσιανὸν καὶ ἀγύμναστον τὸ πλεῖον τοῦ στρατοῦ ἔχων ἡττήθη.

²³ Everyone will have a favorite account. I prefer Fussell's (1989: 267–297).

²⁴ Appian's account has no parallel nor any corroboration in the sources. Dio (41.60.6), seeking plausibility, states that some troops raised a *paian*, for it was Greek custom to do so, and the verb *παιωνίζειν* came to signify the raising of a battle cry by non-Greeks. See von Blumenthal 1942: 2346–47, citing Polyb. 3.43.8, Dion. Hal. 2.41.3, and Dio 43.37.2. Appian uses the word *παιωνίζειν* only once (my electronic search was based upon the pattern *παιων*), at *B Civ.* 4.3.13, where Octavian's troops rejoice in the news of lands to be distributed to them and the word appears to mean "give a battle cry." *εὐσχημόνως* suggests the moral dimension Appian intends to impart. That and the related *εὐσχημων* have a range of meanings running from "elegant in figure, mien, and bearing" to "decent" and "becoming." The substantive *τὸ εὐσχημον* can mean "decorum," and the adverb can mean "with grace and dignity, like a gentleman" (see LSJ⁹ s.v.).

Appian's account offers clear moral approval of the Italians' actions—yet because the account has strayed so far into fiction we are left to infer that Appian has indulged himself in this literary embellishment because orderliness, discipline, and endurance were important to him.²⁵

It is crucial to grasp this in order to understand how fully Appian has schematically inverted the picture of the Italic troops to create his depiction of the allies. And if the Italic troops merit moral approval for their actions, the allies evidently merit disgust for theirs (2.79.333–80.334):

333 οἱ σύμμαχοι δέ, καθάπερ ἄγωνα πολέμου θεώμενοι, κατεπλήσσοντο τὴν εὐταξίαν καὶ οὔτε ἐξ τὰς σκηνὰς τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐτόλμων ὑπὸ θαύματος, ὀλίγων αὐτὰς καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν φυλασσόντων, περιδραμεῖν οὔτε τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐστῶτες ἐθάμβουν.

334 ὥς δὲ ἐνέδωκε τὸ λαὶὸν τοῦ Πομπηίου, αὐτοὶ μὲν καὶ τότε βάδην ὑπεχώρου ἅμα καὶ συνεπλέκοντο, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι προτροπάδην ἔφευγον ἀπρακτοὶ, βοῶντες· “ἡσήμεθα.”

333 Like the audience at a battle spectacle, the allies were amazed at the discipline shown. Their wonder prevented them from finding the nerve to charge on to Caesar's tents, although these were guarded by a mere handful of the more elderly men, and they simply stood there astounded.

334 When Pompeius' left wing crumbled, even then the legionaries retreated step by step still locked in battle, while the allies fled headlong, making no resistance and shouting “we've lost.”

Here we see the calculated inversion of the Italians' and allies' roles: the Italians are reliable, whereas Pompey by contrast removes all but a select few allies from his battle lines in distrust. The silent Italians are contrasted with the polyglot babbling throng of allies, and the silence of the former even in the rigors of combat inversely mirrors the allies' shriek of failure when they jump to the conclusion that the battle is lost. (Appian must surely want us to wonder what would have happened had the allies come to Pompey's aid.) The Italians dutifully remain at their stations even in death; the allies superficially mimic this behavior as they stay rooted in place, but this is in direct disobedience to Pompey's order to them to circle around and sack Caesar's camp.²⁶

²⁵ Naturally, these traits were not of interest to Appian alone but run through Greek literature since Homer. See especially Montiglio 2000 (above, n. 2).

²⁶ The image of soldiers standing by and looking on as though they were viewing a spectacle might be an example of a topos used by authors wishing to “dress up” their battle narratives. If the ultimate source is not Homer's *teichoskopia*, we might look to Livy, who employs the same figure in his version of the battle of Cynoscephalae (33.9.4): *media acies, quae propior dextrum cornu erat, stabat spectaculo velut nihil ad se pertinentis pugnae intenta*. Briscoe (1973: 264) and Walsh (1961: 161) are in agreement that Livy's version is either a misunderstanding or a distortion of Polybius 18.25.3; Walsh, in particular, views Livy as having recast the battle into a standardized literary form. Appian might thus have picked the image up from Homer, a general catalog of topoi, or more directly from his reading of a historian like Livy. One might argue that Appian

With the allies panicked and in full flight, Appian brings the story to a climax which reveals the significance of many earlier parts of the story (2.80.334–335):

- 334 ...καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς σφῶν αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ χαρακώματα ὥς ἀλλότρια προλαβόντες διέσπων καὶ διήρπαζον ἐς τὴν φυγὴν ὃ τι δύναιτο ἐπάγεσθαι.
- 335 ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν Ἰταλῶν ὀπλιτικὸν τῆς ἐπὶ τὰδε ἥσσης αἰσθανόμενον ὑπεχώρει κατὰ πόδα, πρῶτον ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ ἔτι ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀμυνόμενοι· ἐπικειμένων δ' αὐτοῖς ὥς ἐν εὐπραξίᾳ τῶν πολέμιων ἐστράφησαν ἐς φυγὴν.
- 334 ... They were the first to take their own tents and fortifications as though these belonged to the enemy, and they sacked and pillaged from them whatever they could carry away with them in their flight.
- 335 By now the remainder of the Italian legionaries, who had seen the reverse in this part of the battlefield, were also in gradual retreat. At first they kept formation and continued to defend themselves as far as was possible; but when they were pressed by enemies who were fired by success, they turned to run.

The allies' panicked rush to their camp offers us yet another striking series of calculated, inversely contrasting parallels, this time with the actions that were expected of them. Pompey's order "to do what damage they could and to plunder Caesar's camp since it was unwall'd" (ὅσα δύναιτο βλάπτοντας, καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτὸ Καίσαρος ἀχαράκωτον ὃν διαρπάζειν, 2.75.315) correlates inversely with the allies' actions in two striking and I think deliberate parallels more obvious in the Greek than in the translation: (1) τὸ στρατόπεδον ... ἀχαράκωτον ὃν διαρπάζειν :: τὰ χαρακώματα ... διέσπων; (2) ὅσα δύναιτο βλάπτοντας :: διήρπαζον ... ὃ τι δύναιτο ἐπάγεσθαι. Very simply, the plunder intended for Caesar's camp is instead visited upon their own, and Appian drives home his point by telling us of the allies' "seizing their own tents and ramparts *as though it were the enemies' and tearing them apart*" (τὰς σκηνὰς σφῶν αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ χαρακώματα ὥς ἀλλότρια προλαβόντες διέσπων). Not only do they plunder their camp, but the comparison of the action to an attack on an enemy camp cannot but bring to mind their failure to attack Caesar's camp and so highlight it. But if the passage recalls Pompey's orders to his allies, it also echoes Caesar's orders to *his* men to tear down *their* camp. Implausible as Caesar's order may have been, we can see now that aside from its proximate goal of underscoring Caesar's élan and his troops' courage and discipline it also looks forward to the Pompeian allies' tearing down of their own camp. Finally, Caesar's men tore down their camp in an act of determined bravery; Pompey's allies tear apart their

is simply reporting the facts as he knew them, but this is made highly improbable by his reuse of the topos (with slight variation) at *B Civ.* 3.68.281, which strongly suggests that he has raided his store of topoi for this phenomenon twice. I might add here that I am not discounting the role of morale in battles, and clearly, Appian has not created a palpably unsound scenario for Pompey's loss in a general sense (see, e.g., McCall 2002: 16–20). The problem is that his vision—as he has worked it into his narrative—contradicts the facts as we know them and creates inconcinnities in his narrative.

camp through panicked cowardice.²⁷ We can see, then, that Appian has sown his narrative with surprises which are only revealed at the climax of the story of the allies' role in the battle: statements murky, confusing, or contradictory in their original context are suddenly revealed as pregnant with meaning. Inept mishandling of sources did not lead Appian to report implausibilities such as Caesar's order to tear down his camp; rather, he has created an account with its own inner logic whose moralizing purpose is not entirely compatible with accurate reporting or, as we shall now see, internal consistency.

What of the 4,000 Italians Pompey left as a guard over his camp (2.75.313)? How could the allies sack their own camp when they were too frightened to confront Caesar's 2,000 superannuated guards? Of course, Pompey's guards would have been able to handle a panicked mob. (Caesar reports that Pompey's guards defended their camp stoutly against his own concerted attack later in the day.)²⁸ Furthermore, when the Caesarians have won in the field and now attack Pompey's camp, how can Appian propose that there could be defenders (ἀπομαχομένου, 2.81.343) of a camp that has been ripped apart and plundered? How could Pompey return to his camp (after his allies' sacking of it) and sit silently for some time in his tent, stunned over his defeat (2.81.339)?²⁹ Why would Caesar exhort his men to attack the enemy camp, apparently still intact (2.81.341)? How could the Caesarians be uplifted from their fatigue by the "hope that they would take the defences of the camp and capture its considerable contents" (ἐλπὶς, ὅτι καὶ τὸν χάρακα αἰρήσουσι καὶ πολλὰ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, 2.81.342), if it were already torn apart? How could Pompey, rising from his stupor, cry out, "so they are at our camp as well?" (οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα ἡμῶν, 2.81.343)? Finally, how could Caesar and his men eat the Pompeians' dinner and quarter in their camp

²⁷ The situation of Asians attacking their own camp finds a parallel (but without the irony) at *Mith.* 81.362–365. Mithridates, perceiving himself to be in an untenable situation after battle, contemplates a panicked flight (362). His generals decide to remove their property from the camp before the morning to ensure its secure withdrawal—evidently they carried so much with them, and were eager to save so much of it, that "there was a great number of men carrying baggage around the gates" (περὶ τὰς πύλας σκευοφόρων πολὺ πλῆθος ἦν, 363). This does not go unremarked by the army, which divines the situation: "with fear and annoyance because nothing had been announced to them, *they assaulted their own camp, broke it up*, and they fled on all sides from the field in disorder, wherever each of them was able" (σὺν δέει καὶ ἀγανακτήσει τοῦ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐπηγγέλθαι, τὸν χάρακα σφῶν ἐπιδραμόντες ἔλυον καὶ διέφευγον ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου πάντοθεν ἀκόσμως, ὅπῃ δύναιτο ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ..., 364). When Mithridates sees this "disordered" (σὺν ἀταξίᾳ) flight he tries to speak, but to no avail, and ends up fleeing by horse with a few comrades (365). It is not necessary to think that Appian got the idea for his treatment of the allies at Pharsalus in part from this battle (since he seems rarely to consult his own previous work, if at all) to see that he nevertheless has a predisposition to fall into formulaic (not to say repetitive) ways of depicting similar situations.

²⁸ *Caes. B Civ.* 3.95.3: *castra a cohortibus, quae ibi praesidio erant relictæ, industrie defendebantur, multo acrius a Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis.*

²⁹ Echoing Caesar (*B Civ.* 3.94.5–6), who adds that Pompey had given orders to prepare for a defense of the camp *si quid durius acciderit*.

“as he threatened while drawing up his forces” (ὥς ἐπηπείλησε παρατάσσων, 2.81.344):³⁰ In the story of the allies, the desire for symmetry in the destruction of both camps trumped the need or desire for internal consistency.³¹ It might be suggested, in an attempt to salvage some sort of historical data from this literary embellishment, that Appian tacitly means us to understand that the allies stormed a *second* Pompeian camp reserved for them, as opposed to a putative first camp where the Italic soldiers were bivouacked. While this cannot strictly be disproven, it is at the very least an uneconomical theory whose sole recommendation is that it creates the equivalent of a *lectio faciliior* which is not to be preferred. To be clear, the σφῶν in τὰς σκηνὰς σφῶν αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ χαρακώματα contrasts with ἀλλότρια and hence does not help to distinguish two Pompeian camps—just Pompey’s camp from Caesar’s (for text and translation, see above, 60).

When the story of the allies has reached its conclusion, Appian removes them from the scene by reporting that they were slaughtered (2.80.338), as Caesar had bidden in his speech (2.74.309: text and translation above, 53). He adds as a postscript that no count of the allied dead was made “because of the great mass of them and the contempt in which they were held” (ὕπὸ πλῆθους καὶ καταφρονήσεως, 2.82.345), a phrase which echoes Appian’s initial disclaimer (2.70.289) that none of the reliable authors had provided information on the allied contribution in the battle. Two further observations on the passage reveal Appian’s employment of sophisticated and artificial stylistic devices in his narrative as well.

Pompey begins to lose the battle when Caesar’s tenth legion circles around his left flank and hurls their spears into it obliquely (2.79.331). Caesar and Plutarch (our only other sources for this) agree that Caesar’s reserve fourth battle line (which had repulsed the cavalry) attacked the Pompeian flank while the tenth legion was still engaged frontally. Morgan, the preeminent student of the battle, quite rightly points out that we cannot credit the notion that the Pompeians would not simply have turned to face the new threat.³² Morgan’s analysis is flawed only in that it treats Appian as having failed to write an accurate account of the battle through sheer ineptitude rather than through a conscious decision to sacrifice accuracy for other goals. In his handling of the encircling movement Appian seeks to do two things: he streamlines his narrative by eliminating complicating elements and he plays with the theme of encirclement which pervades his reconstruction

³⁰ Rossi (2000: 240–241) wrongly, in my opinion, cites Appian’s lack of corroboration of Caesar’s description (*B Civ.* 3.96.1–2) of the luxurious appurtenances in Pompey’s camp as significant. Appian pursued the line of an allied sack of Pompey’s camp, and avoided the inconcinnity of then depicting the luxurious displays (as though they could still be intact).

³¹ Dio contradicts elements of the story of the allies just as he did Appian’s account of the Italic troops. He mentions the superior strength of Caesar’s troops while adding that Pompey’s numbers made the contest *equal*, not treating the allies as a hindrance (41.55.4). He adds that the *allies* began the battle, fighting eagerly and unsparingly (41.58.3, 59.4). Finally, he makes no mention of any premeditated exemplary slaughter of the allies as Appian does at *B Civ.* 2.80.338.

³² Morgan 1983: 53 and n. 181. Carter (1996: 374, n. 126) rightly concludes: “his version of the battle seems to be a mixture of authentic detail and colourful invention.”

of this battle. Pelling has noted in Plutarch's Roman *Lives* a propensity, which Appian here shares, to simplify his narrative by removing complicating factors which might make his task of storytelling harder or distract the reader.³³ Here the factually inaccurate statement that Caesar's tenth legion encircled Pompey's left flank is prompted by Appian's desire to restrict the number of characters (individual or corporate) in his narrative. Appian knows that the tenth legion was important, and has made a point of signalling that importance to the reader: it is under Caesar's direct command, as was his custom (καθάπερ ἦν ἔθος αὐτῷ, 2.76.317); it received the attack of Pompey's cavalry (the Pompeians "encircled" it, ἐκυκλοῦντο, 2.78.327); and here it encircles Pompey's left flank (περιδραμεῖν, 2.79.331).³⁴ For the sake of narrative economy he has collapsed the reserve line and the tenth legion into one entity. We find a similar phenomenon when Appian places the Pompeian cavalry attack before the meeting of the armies: by dispensing with Pompey's horse early, Appian could avoid interrupting the battle on foot.³⁵

With his repetition of words and ideas, on the other hand, Appian creates emphasis and a linking device. We saw the concept of encirclement arise twice immediately above, and, in both the active and passive sense, it is a recurring theme in the battle narrative. Caesar's prediction that Pompey would send the allied forces around in order to harass his army, for example ("even if the allies *run around you* like dogs," περιθέωσιν, 2.74.309),³⁶ saw subsequent fulfillment in Pompey's order to his allies to encircle the enemy ("to *encircle* the enemy and pursue," κυκλοῦσθαι, 2.75.315); the Tenth Legion is encircled by the Pompeian cavalry at the beginning of the battle (ἐκυκλοῦντο, 2.78.327; στρατήγημα . . . ἄριστον ἐν περικυκλώσει, 2.79.330; περιδραμεῖν, 2.79.331), and later, Caesar's victory begins as his men circle Pompey's left flank ("*ran around* Pompey's left flank," 2.79.331). With that, Appian now carries the idea of encirclement over to the story of the allies, who, dumbstruck at the discipline of the Italians, do not

³³ Pelling 1980: 129. Although he treats the phenomenon differently, Gargola (1997: 578–580) has clearly found and described a case of it in Appian's account of the staseis of Ti. and C. Gracchus. Having decided to focus on some issues central to the period of the Gracchi, Appian has adapted the story of Gaius in order to exploit (anachronistically) certain aspects of the backstory as established in the account of Tiberius.

³⁴ Later, in quelling a legionary revolt, Caesar dismisses the tenth legion, his favorite (δὲ προετίμησεν αὐτῇ, 2.94.394). The only other mention of a tenth legion is a "so-called" tenth legion once conscripted by Antony, mentioned in the following book (τό τε καλούμενον δέκατον τέλος, ἐξαναγμῆνον ὑπὸ Ἀντωνίου πάλαι, 3.83.342). The "so-called" would be omitted but for the strength of the association of "the tenth legion" in Appian's mind with Caesar.

³⁵ We might expect this on general grounds, given the analogous instance of Appian's express impatience with being pulled (geographically) hither, thither, and yon in trying to follow the course of Roman history in his research (*Preface* 12.46–13.49) and his resulting decision to break up his history into books each concentrating on a single geographical area. He is an author who prefers to follow one train of thought at a time.

³⁶ Cf. Carter's (1996: 108) "hang on your heels and harass you like a pack of dogs"; for text and translation, see above, 53.

even *circle around* to attack Caesar's tents (περιδραμεῖν, 2.79.333), but simply stand rooted in place, amazed. Such maladroit repetition bears comparison with the close-order repetition of words in the so-called Appianos sarcophagus found in Rome. If Appianos was not our Appian, he nevertheless shares a propensity to commit a distinctive literary infelicity with him.³⁷

III. TWO PARALLEL BATTLE NARRATIVES IN THE *ROMAN HISTORY*

In a general discussion, Hahn produced a discursive catalog of stereotypical, standardized elements that Appian employs in constructing his battle narratives. Appian, who was no soldier, appears to have used these elements to compensate for his own lack of experience, and they are summoned forth like reusable modules as analogous battle situations offered scope for their use. This was an important discovery in its day (1970), because it was an early recognition of Appian's independence in supplementing his narrative with non-historical material.³⁸

Goldmann and Gowing both noted similarities between Appian's accounts of Pharsalus and the Battle of Forum Gallorum³⁹ but fell short of seeing how the two battle narratives illuminate one another through their similarities and allow us to see special features of the story of the allies through their differences.

Forum Gallorum: B Civ. 3.67.274–69.284

At Forum Gallorum (*B Civ.* 3.67.274–69.284), two excellent Italic forces once again meet in desperate combat. With two crack legions, Antony lies in ambush in some marshes on either side of a narrow path, awaiting the advent of C. Pansa and D. Carsuleius⁴⁰ with one legion (the *legio Martia*) and Caesar's (i.e., Octavian's) praetorian cohort. Pansa and Carsuleius also have some raw recruits who fill the role played by Pompey's allies at Pharsalus. The untrained recruits

³⁷ On the Appianos sarcophagus, see Bucher 2003 with bibliography.

³⁸ The fundamental discussion is Hahn 1970. Some of Hahn's examples: the recourse to divine influence to explain victory or defeat; the typical action of the divinity by provoking human error; various *strategemata* taken from a source, such as the need to make use of sudden opportunities, the total annihilation of the defeated enemy, the use of famine preferred over open conflict, the extra strength of desperate enemies, and the bad position of a general who is forced into battle by spirited troops or subordinates. Hahn's conclusion concerning Appian's military writing bears repeating: "er arbeitet auch hier mit der schon bekannten Methode der Motivübertragung und der Schaffung stereotyper Situationen und typischer Charaktere. Das militärische Problem vor Karthago, Numantia, Pharsalus und Philippi ist in seiner Darstellung grundsätzlich dasselbe: das ermöglicht ihm, die menschlichen Konflikte ebenfalls in ihren typischen Wesenszügen zu zeichnen" (301).

³⁹ See the general discussions in Goldmann 1988: 19–20, 50–84; Gowing 1992: 209–223, esp. 218, n. 26. The elements can be as small and unimportant as turns of phrase (Gowing 1992: 214, nn. 13, 14). Gowing also rightly catalogs Appian's interest in the concept of silence in battles (1992: 215, n. 17) but fails to see its importance to him. In this light we ought to notice that just because Appian seems to rely on some stock ideas and highlight some repeated concepts in the *Roman History* we need not write them off as unimportant to him.

⁴⁰ In what appears to be a failure of Appian's memory, we get Carsuleius for the true Carfulenus. See Münzer 1899: 1589–90; *MRR* II 324, 352; *MRR* III 50.

lack discipline—a theme that runs through the entire battle narrative, which has been recast so as to explore the virtue of discipline, paralleling exactly the failure of Pompey's allies. As with Pompey's allies, death is their just deserts for their failure to keep their wits about them.

When the ambush is sprung, the seasoned troops tell the recruits to stand aside so as not to spread disorder (3.67.275; cf. Pompey's seclusion of his allies to avoid disorder, 2.78.325). When the battle begins in earnest, Appian follows elements of the model we saw in the Pharsalus account: ὑπὸ δὲ ἐμπειρίας οὔτε ἠλάλαξαν ὥς οὐκ ἐκπλήξοντες ἀλλήλους, οὔτε ἐν τῷ πόνῳ τις αὐτῶν ἀφῆκε φωνὴν οὔτε νικῶν οὔτε ἡσώμενος ("because of their experience they [sc. the seasoned soldiers] did not cry out, since they were not going to frighten one another, nor did any of them emit a sound in the battle, whether winning or losing," 3.68.279). Appian continues with this model (3.68.280–281), writing a passage almost perfectly echoing 2.79.332 (see above, 58):

280 περιόδους δὲ οὐκ ἔχοντες οὔτε δρόμους ὥς ἐν ἔλεσι καὶ τάφροις, ἀραρώτως συνίσταντο, καὶ οὐδέτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους ὥσασθαι δυνάμενοι τοῖς ξίφεσιν ὥς ἐν πάλῃ συνεπλέκοντο. πληγὴ τε οὐδεμία ἦν ἀργός, ἀλλὰ τραύματα καὶ φόνοι καὶ στόνοι μόνον ἀντὶ βοῆς· ὅ τε πίπτων εὐθὺς ὑπεξεφέρετο, καὶ ἄλλος ἀντικαθίστατο.
281 παραινέσεων δὲ ἢ ἐπικελεύσεων οὐκ ἐδέοντο, δι' ἐμπειρίαν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ στρατηγῶν. ὅτε δὲ καὶ κάμοιεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἐς ἀναπνοὴν ὀλίγον ἀλλήλων διίσταντο καὶ αὐθις συνεπλέκοντο. θάμβος τε ἦν τοῖς νεήλυσιν ἐπελθοῦσι, τοιάδε ἔργα σὺν εὐταξίᾳ καὶ σιωπῇ γιγνόμενα ἐφορῶσι.

280 Since the marshes and ditches gave them no chance of making outflanking movements or charging, and they were unable to push each other back, they were locked together with their swords as if in a wrestling contest. Every blow found a target, but instead of cries there were only wounds, and men dying, and groans. If a man fell, he was immediately carried away and another took his place.

281 They had no need of encouragement or cheering on, because each man's experience made him his own commanding officer. When they were tired they separated for a few moments to recover as if they were engaged in training exercises, and then grappled with each other again. When the new recruits arrived they were amazed to see this going on with such discipline and silence.

There is no need to belabor the astonishing similarities: the emphasis on the absolute silence and discipline of the experienced legionaries, arising from their professionalism and discipline (cf. 2.79.332: βοή δὲ οὐδεμία, κτλ.; the idea that the no-nonsense professionalism of the soldiers makes the battle look like an athletic exercise; and the dumbstruck amazement of the onlooking recruits [cf. 2.79.333: οἱ σύμμαχοι δέ, καθάπερ ἄγῶνα πολέμου θεώμενοι, κτλ.; see above, 59]).

As at Pharsalus, when the battle turns, the retreat is slow and orderly. "At that point the men around him began to retreat, at first a step at a time, then moving position more quickly as if in flight" (3.69.282: οἱ κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνεχώρουν, ἐπὶ πόδα πρῶτον, εἶτα μεταβαλόντες δξύτερον ὥς ἐν φυγῇ; cf. 2.80.335: τὸ ἄλλο

τῶν Ἰταλῶν ὀπλιτικὸν . . . ὑπεχώρει κατὰ πόδα, πρῶτον ἐν κόσμῳ . . ., see above, 60), except for the recruits, who, in their inexperience, panic and dash for a hastily built stockade:

283 καὶ οἱ νεήλυδες ἰδόντες ἔφευγον ἀτάκτως καὶ μετὰ βοῆς ἐς τὸ χαράκωμα . . .
οἱ μὲν δὴ νεήλυδες ἐς αὐτὸ ἀτάκτως συνειλοῦντο, Ἰταλοὶ μὲν ὄντες ὁμοίως τοῖς
Ἀρείοις· ἡ δὲ ἄσκησις ἄρα τοῦ γένους ἐς τοσοῦτον ἀρετῇ διαφέρει.

283 When the recruits saw this they fled in noisy disorder to the earth fortification . . .
The recruits crowded into it in confusion, although they were just as Italian as the
men of the Martian legion: so much more difference than racial origin does training
make to bravery.

The men of the *legio Martia* disdain to run into the fortifications, bravely standing outside and awaiting all comers; avoiding further struggle with them, Antony turns his troops against the recruits: “Antony kept away from them as difficult targets, but attacked the recruits and killed many of them” (3.69.284: Ἀντώνιος δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀρείων ἀπέσχετο ὡς ἐπιπόνων, τοῖς δὲ νεήλυσιν ἐπιδραμὼν πολὺν εἰργάζετο φόνον; cf. 2.80.338: “Caesar’s men . . . began to kill the allies, who were unable to resist, and the most tremendous carnage ensued,” οἱ τοῦ Καίσαρος τοὺς συμμάχους οὐ δυναμένους ἀντέχειν ἀνήρουν· καὶ ὁ πλεῖστος ἐνταῦθα ἐγίγνετο φόνος; cf. Caesar’s order at 2.74.309: τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἐς τὴν τῶνδε κατὰπληξιν ἐξεργάσασθε, above, 53). Though having fled into the camp, the recruits are slaughtered while the men of the *legio Martia* wait outside (implausibly refusing to aid their *commilitones*), a conundrum which betrays, as in the Pharsalus narrative, Appian’s preoccupation here with a moral sketch that supersedes concern for internal consistency and common sense. Sulpicius Galba’s eyewitness account (preserved in Cicero’s correspondence, *Fam.* 10.30) relates that Antony lost men in attacking the camp and accomplished nothing.⁴¹

⁴¹ For a comprehensive exposure of the inaccuracies of Appian’s account, see Rice Holmes 1928–31: 1.209–210. For the battle in general, see Shackleton Bailey 1977: 2.519–522 (*ad Fam.* 10.30), 2.550–552 (*ad Fam.* 10.33); Frisch 1946: 267–276 (not entirely reliable); Gardthausen 1891: 100–101; Philipp 1933: 942–946; and the other bibliography in Magnino’s (1984: *ad loc.*) commentary. This is not the place to write a commentary on the battle of Forum Gallorum, but the following points should be raised: the eyewitness account of Galba (Cic. *Fam.* 10.30) is in disagreement with Appian’s account in many ways. In particular, Galba makes it clear that the recruits had no place in the battle. Shackleton Bailey (1977: 2.519–522 [*ad Fam.* 10.30]) shows the tension between the two accounts at several points (§§2, 3, and 4 of Galba’s letter); he is at pains to explain several discrepancies between the accounts by an appeal to the Antonian bias of Appian’s presumed source, Pollio, as opposed to the account of Galba, who fought against Antony in the battle. Many problems can be explained by discounting Appian’s embellishments, as seems to have been the decision of Stockton (1971: 316), who cites Galba and ignores Appian. Syme (1952: 174) accepts (and quotes) Appian’s report of the recruits’ awe, but Frisch (1946: 272), impressed by Appian’s detailed description of the discipline and silence of the soldiers and the recruits’ amazement, goes so far as to ascribe the story to “an expert and contemporary source”!

Appian's observation about training explains a lot. His emphasis on the natural ability of Italians to fight has long been recognized, and the lesson of this passage is: training makes even Italians better.⁴² How does this relate to and illuminate Appian's story of Pompey's allies? Discipline, as reflected in ideas of order and silence, is key to both passages, of course. Both Pompey and the experienced troops at Forum Gallorum get the undisciplined troops out of the way and the penalty for lack of discipline is the same in both cases. To this extent, Asians are not singled out, as even Italians can illustrate the problem of a lack of discipline. The difference is that at Forum Gallorum the fatal lack of discipline arises from a theoretically remediable lack of training, whereas at Pharsalus it stems from a prejudicial view of the inherent inferiority of Asians (and others) freely admitted by Appian at the outset of his history (a prejudice which he clearly does not expect to be challenged). The two battles form something like a comparative study of discipline examined from all angles. They reveal an interesting and unexpectedly analytical turn of thought in Appian's history.

The Sullan Battle of Chaeronea: Mith. 41.156–45.175

Appian's account of the Sullan battle at Chaeronea in 86 also merits attention. Here, under Mithridates' general Archelaus, 120,000 Thracians, Scythians, Cappadocians, Bithynians, Galatians, Phrygians, "and whatever other peoples Mithridates had recently conquered" meet one third as many Italians, and "however many Greeks or Macedonians had recently come over to him from Archelaus," under Sulla (41.158–159). In Appian's account, Archelaus thoughtlessly (ἀμελῶς, 42.162) chooses an unfavorable camp where there is insufficient space to employ his forces effectively or retreat properly, and Sulla is quick to force him to fight. The Asians are turned, flee to their camp, and are locked out by Archelaus, who acts foolishly in doing so (ἀπειρότατα δὴ τότε μάλιστα συμφορῶν πολεμικῶν, 44.171). Sulla catches the enemy, who are unable to retreat, turn effectively against him, or enter their camp (44.171–173); a general slaughter ensues. Desiring to save a portion of his army, Archelaus repents and opens the camp, but it is the Roman, not the Asian army, that rushes in, and the victory is exploited to the bitter end (τὴν νίκην ἐς τέλος ἐξεργάσαντο, 44.174). Not many more than 10,000 of the 120,000 Asians survive, whereas only thirteen Romans are killed (45.174). Sulla won chiefly δι' εὐβουλίαν ("through good planning"), Archelaus lost δι' ἄφροσύνην ("through thoughtlessness," 45.175).

While Forum Gallorum offers a closer parallel to Pharsalus, we nevertheless once again see certain Greeks and Macedonians singled out as the only non-Romans fighting on the winning side. In addition, the Chaeronea episode allows us to see another common element in these battle narratives, the role of the

⁴² Seen by Goldmann (1988: 20): "Dass sich die natürliche Kampfkraft der Italiker durch Training noch erhöhen lässt, stellt Appian fest anlässlich einer Schlacht bei Forum Gallorum."

military camp. In theory a haven of safety to be defended, the camp is made into the focus of a paradox by Appian each time. At Pharsalus, the allies fail to attack Caesar's barely defended camp and paradoxically turn upon their own; at Forum Gallorum, the inexperienced recruits run for the safety of their camp, which becomes a killing ground, while the men of the *legio Martia* paradoxically look on in safety outside their camp; at Chaeronea, their own camp is closed to the retreating Asians, causing their slaughter, and when it is finally opened it is the Roman army that rushes in. One also remembers Caesar's order to destroy his own camp to force his troops to quarter themselves in the enemies' camp.

Why did Appian not take advantage of the battle of Chaeronea to make the point about Asians and Romans he would explore in the Pharsalus narrative?⁴³ First of all, the Asian forces are integral to the story of Chaeronea, rather than a supplement (εἰς προσθήκην, 2.70.289; ὥς ἐξ ἐπίδειξιν, 2.75.314) to the Italian armies, as Appian styles them at Pharsalus. They could neither be omitted nor could their role be trivialized without diminishing the Roman achievement and spoiling the battle narrative. This is all the more strongly felt when we remember that the *Mithridatic Wars* is an ethnic book (one of the dozen books in which Appian explored Roman expansion and contacts with foreign peoples before turning to the Romans' near self-destruction in the *Civil Wars*), meant to show Roman *virtutes* in action against foreign enemies in the expansion of their empire (*Preface* 11.43–44).⁴⁴ Were Appian to have portrayed the Romans as simply walking over an ineffectual enemy at Chaeronea, he would have undermined his own program. On top of everything else, the battle went very well for the Romans; despite some distortion in Appian's account, he had no need to underline what was already a humiliating defeat for the Asians. He is satisfied simply to emphasize the generals' disparate powers of command.

Hammond's is still the most detailed treatment of the Sullan Battle of Chaeronea; in it, *inter alia*, he dismisses Appian's account as "short and confused," preferring the account in Plutarch's *Sulla* because of its detail and its author's familiarity with Chaeronean topography.⁴⁵ Far from finding Archelaus at fault, Hammond praises his strategy, noting that, to the best of our ability to reconstruct the battle topographically, Archelaus chose a plain wide enough for the numbers of his army and his cavalry, and kept his lines of communication open, in contradiction to Appian's account.

⁴³ See Bucher 2000: 415–429 for the order of composition of the extant books of the *Roman History*.

⁴⁴ See Bucher 2000: 429–433.

⁴⁵ Hammond 1938: 188; similarly Goldmann 1988: 11–12, especially on Plutarch's authoritative account, the reliability of which is supported by recent topographical finds at Chaeronea: see Camp, *et al.*: 1992. McGing (1993: 511) finds that Appian's is "a perfectly competent account of the battle of Chaeronea" (not citing Hammond), and Hind (1994: 154–159) follows Appian in many particulars without any special remarks on his accuracy.

IV. APPIAN'S EGYPTIAN "ESCAPE CLAUSE"

Having seen the traces of literary pretension in Appian's account of Pharsalus and buttressed the case by observing similar elements in the battles of Forum Gallorum and Chaeronea, it is now time to see how Appian has carefully exempted Egypt (or more properly, the Lagid kingdom) from being tarred with the same brush as the allies in the Pharsalus narrative. I will suggest why in the conclusion.

At the very end of the long list of Pompey's forces at Pharsalus Appian adds that Egypt contributed a contingent of sixty ships. With Egypt, he cannot, for obvious reasons, use this strategy of equating the Macedonians and Greeks with the Italians. Instead, in a rare (and significant) editorial remark he highlights their forced inaction due to Pompey's failure to use them (2.71.296–299):⁴⁶

- 296 λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου νῆες ἐξήκοντα αὐτῷ παραγενέσθαι παρὰ τῶν Αἰγύπτου βασιλέων, Κλεοπάτρας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, παιδὸς ἔτι ὄντος. ἀλλ' αἶδε μὲν οὐ συνεμάχισαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἄλλο ναυτικόν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἀργίας ἐν Κερκύρα κατέμενε.
- 297 καὶ δοκεῖ Πομπήιος τόδε μάλιστα ἀφρόνως ἐργάσασθαι, τῶν μὲν νεῶν καταφρονήσας, αἷς δὲ πολλὰ προύχων ἐδύνατο πανταχοῦ τὴν ἐπακτὸν ἀγορὰν τοὺς πολέμιους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐν δὲ ἄγωνι πεζῷ συνενεχθεὶς ἀνδράσιν ἐκ πόνου πολλοῦ μεγαλαύχους τε καὶ θηριώδεσιν ἐς μάχας γενομένοις.
- 298 ἀλλ' αὐτὸν αὐτοὺς φυλαξάμενον περὶ Δυρράχιον θεοβλάβεια δοκεῖ παραγαγεῖν, ἐν καιρῷ μάλιστα δὴ πάντων ἦδε τῷ Καίσαρι γενομένη· διὰ γὰρ αὐτὴν ὁ στρατὸς ὁ τοῦ Πομπηίου κουφόνως μάλα ἐπήρθη, καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ σφῶν κατεκράτησαν καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔργον ἀπειροπολέμως ἐτράποντο.
- 299 ἀλλὰ τάδε μὲν ὠκονόμει θεὸς ἐς ἀρχὴν τῆσδε τῆς νῦν ἐπεχούσης τὰ πάντα ἡγεμονίας·

- 296 It is said that Pompeius was also reinforced by sixty ships from Egypt, sent by the king and queen, Cleopatra and her brother, who was still a boy. But these did not fight with him, because neither did the rest of his fleet, which stayed inactive at Corcyra.
- 297 I think it was particularly foolish of Pompeius to ignore his navy, where he was much superior. With it he could have completely deprived the enemy of imported supplies, but he engaged in an infantry battle against soldiers who boasted of their recent feats and endurance, and when it came to fighting behaved like wild beasts.
- 298 It seems that although he was on his guard against them at Dyrrachium he was led astray by some heaven-sent madness, which could not have come at a better time for Caesar. Because of it Pompeius' army became thoughtlessly confident, overrode their commander, and turned to the task like men with no experience of war.
- 299 However this was arranged by God to bring into being the imperial power that now embraces all.

If the Egyptians were excluded from fighting, they certainly could not be blamed for Pompey's defeat. But a bare statement that the Egyptian contingent

⁴⁶ Caesar states that Pompey's son was in charge of the Egyptian fleet at *B Civ.* 3.3.1, 3.5.3, and 3.111.3; in the latter passage the contribution is said to have been fifty ships. This does not contradict Appian's statement that the Egyptian ships were not called upon to fight.

did not fight was evidently not enough, and Appian takes the idea in an interesting direction by editorially suggesting not only that Pompey had acted injudiciously in ignoring his fleet and coming to grips with battle-hardened veterans, but even attributing Pompey's bad decision to providence.⁴⁷ Appian reveals his hand not only because this passage is important for the story of the allies, but also because it is important in the entire programmatic scheme of the *Roman History* as it had evolved by the time this book was composed. Looked at closely, the passage begs us to make an inference favorable to Egypt.⁴⁸ The sixty ships from Cleopatra and her brother form the only naval contingent explicitly mentioned in the list of Pompey's forces (2.71.296). Appian says that Pompey unwisely kept the fleet inactive at Corcyra, engaging Caesar's seasoned troops rather than using his fleet to blockade Caesar's supplies and—in the inference Appian would have us make—win without landing a blow. Put in other words, Pompey might have won with his fleet ("the Egyptians and the others," to paraphrase his emphasis) but for divine interference. Therefore, if the Asian allies did nothing good for Pompey and may have helped precipitate his rout, the Ptolemaic fleet did him no harm and might have led him to victory but for divine hindrance. The Alexandrian historian has carefully worded his description of the Egyptian role in the Pharsalus campaign so as to exempt the Egyptians completely from culpability in Pompey's defeat and to isolate them from the instructively negative portrait he wished to paint of Pompey's non-Greek allies.

V. CONCLUSION

Appian's independence and originality, as well as several interesting aspects of his working method and program, are by now a matter of record. It is exciting to extend that record in the present case by recognizing his willingness to alloy his narrative gold with the base metal of a fictive literary conceit. Having seen an exemplary instance of this technique, we now have a model to use in looking for more of the same; perhaps more importantly, the doors are now open to a broader systematic search of Appian's text for non-historical literary material beyond the usual suspects, the speeches.

And yet, the evident relish with which Appian pursued his prejudicial account of Pompey's allies is as interesting as the fact that he created it. I would look for the cause among the petty jealousies of the rival peoples of the Roman empire, in this case, an Alexandrian's slap at the other inhabitants of the

⁴⁷ Once again we see standard Appianic topoi: unused opportunity (Hahn 1970: 296, n. 9); the advantage of winning by using *Aushungerung* and the avoidance of desperate enemies (Hahn 1970: 298); the motif of divine influence upon a character to provoke him to make a faulty decision (see also Goldmann 1988: 30). It also fits into Appian's program, especially in the way the final part of the passage quoted goes far beyond his normal practice in describing divine influence in attributing direct, guiding action to the divinity in subverting the Republic and establishing the Empire (see Bucher 2000: 429–448).

⁴⁸ On the importance of Egypt in the *Roman History*, see Bucher 2000: 439–440, 447.

eastern end of the empire.⁴⁹ The pleasure of attributing shameful actions to “all the peoples of the East” (Πομπήϊω δὲ πάντα τὰ ἑῶα ἔθνη κατὰ πλήθος, 2.70.292) under the cachet of history was not free of the risk of exposing his own homeland to attack. Some careful exceptions had to be constructed, and, as we have seen, Egypt’s martial reputation is explicitly protected through Appian’s device of removing the Macedonian and Greek contingents from the story of the allies (in the process equating them with the Italic troops) and pointedly signalling the nonparticipation of the Ptolemaic fleet. The device works, at least for Appian, because Alexandrians characteristically remembered their ostensible Macedonian roots in order simultaneously to distance themselves from the despised native Egyptians⁵⁰ and to emphasize a martial and world-historical link with Alexander and his Macedonian Empire. Indeed, in his *Preface*, Appian calls it second only to Rome.⁵¹ An illuminating example of the confidence of culturally Greek Alexandrians in their Macedonian roots is reflected in the cenotaph of the working-class jeweler Kanobos which begins: πατρὶς Ἀλεξάνδρεια Μακεδονὶς Αἰγύπτιοι (“The Macedonian homeland, Alexandria of Egypt”).⁵² It is worth recalling here that when Appian singles out the Greek allies for inclusion in the Roman battle line, first mention, and thus a sort of emphasis, goes to the Macedonians (2.75.315). While Appian usually uses the name Egypt, he has in fact appropriated it to stand for the Lagid monarchy and its hellenic and hellenized subjects; further, though we can only guess at the details of what we have lost in his *Egyptian History*, in

⁴⁹ It is not hard to find other examples of Appian either praising Alexandria or denigrating rivals. For example, consider the biting remark Appian either invented or at the very least singled out for inclusion in his text at 2.88.368 as Caesar pardons the Athenians for fighting against him: “How often is the glory of your ancestors going to save you from self-destruction?” (ποσάκις ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπολλυμένους ἢ δόξα τῶν προγόνων περισώσει; note also the spitting consonance in π and perhaps φ). Hahn (1967: 73–75) brilliantly analyzes another example. Antony is portrayed as soberly and modestly enjoying cultural life with Cleopatra in Alexandria during the winter of 41–40 B.C. (*B Civ.* 5.11.43–44), and with almost identical details and wording, with Octavia in Athens in the winter of 39–38 B.C. (*B Civ.* 5.76.322–323). Hahn saw that the duplication is nothing so simple as a doublet or a mistake but a conscious attempt, by creating a parallel account set in Alexandria (the sojourn in Athens is attested elsewhere), to equate Athens and Alexandria as places where one might pursue a modest, cultured lifestyle and thus seek to counter prejudicial stereotypes about Alexandria.

⁵⁰ Cultural Greek (and *a fortiori* Alexandrian) loathing for Egyptians is vividly depicted in the reproach of the author writing from the Chora in Greek to his “brothers”: “Perhaps, brothers, you consider me to be some barbarian or an inhuman Egyptian” (*P. Oxy.* 1681, part xiv, 1920: 141–143: ἴσως με νομίζετε, ἀδελφοί, βάρβαρον τινα ἢ Αἰγύπτιον ἀνάνθρωπον εἶναι).

⁵¹ The Macedonian Empire was a brilliant shooting star in its brevity, but its light still burned divided among its *disiecta membra*: see *Preface* 10.37–42. There follows immediately an excursus on Lagid military strength and financial robustness, and then a perfunctory note that the other successor kingdoms did not fall far short of these levels. The following section (*Preface* 11.43) goes on to state Appian’s intention of pursuing the study of Roman history, inasmuch as through their superior bravery, hard work, and endurance (ἀρετῇ, φερεπονία, and ταλαιπωρία) they swept up all the previous powers.

⁵² Bernard 1969: 102–107.

what survives Appian maintains a pregnant silence about non-Greek Egypt, even where some sort of comment seems appropriate or necessary.⁵³ When, therefore, Appian carefully exempts Egypt from Pompey's defeat, what he is really doing is insulating Alexandria (he would have no reason to exculpate native Egyptians).

There are many parts of Appian's history which still require exegesis. His inclusion of the story of Pompey's allies is perhaps best explained as an affective response to his position in life as an Alexandrian provincial in a larger Roman empire. More work is needed on his treatment of the other remnants of the Macedonian Empire in the ethnic books of the *Roman History*; and someone should take a closer look at the *synkrisis* of the lives of Alexander and Caesar at the end of *B Civ.* 2. It invariably gets written off as an inferior attempt at what Plutarch did successfully. Inferior it may be, but why is it in his history? There is nothing else like it in the extant portions, nor hinted at in the lost parts. To sketch its flaws and inadequacies and then dismiss it is too easy. To say he was trying to rival Plutarch is probably true, but also not enough. We now know Appian takes a more than ordinary interest in Egypt and Macedonia (which are united through Alexander, of course), and a sensible next avenue of research would be to look at the *synkrisis* with the new understanding we now possess from our examination of the story of Pompey's allies at Pharsalus.

VI. APPENDIX ON APPIAN'S SOURCES

Although I have no intention of reopening general discussion of Appian's sources or his methods of using them (the topic has been fully discussed elsewhere),⁵⁴ I wish to address two source issues specific to the Pharsalus narrative in response to questions raised by the anonymous reviewers of this article. Appian shows strong evidence of having consulted (at least) Book 3 of Caesar's *Bellum civile*, and he probably also looked at Lucan's *Pharsalia*, though the evidence for this is weaker.

Did Appian Look at Caesar's Bellum civile?

Appian twice lists Caesar's and Pompey's forces in his narrative of the Pharsalus campaign, once starting at 2.49.200 and again at 2.70.289. That he does it twice is interesting in itself, for the lists do not simply report changes in forces over time (though they do reflect changes). The second list appears to be a typical catalog of contestants before the narrative of a major battle. The first, however, requires closer scrutiny. It is not just a catalog before the fighting at Dyrrhachium, since it substantially precedes that battle narrative. In fact, the position of the

⁵³ Bucher 1997: 19–20.

⁵⁴ I compiled a catalog through about 1995: see Bucher 1997: 243, n. 2. McGing (1993: 496–501) offers sober discussion with bibliography.

first list in Appian's narrative—between notice of Caesar's first dictatorship in 49 and his crossing to Epirus—serves no evident purpose; it might as easily have fallen anywhere among the preliminaries to the campaign, or (better) just before the fighting at Dyrrhachium begins. Where it does fall, however, corresponds exactly to the point in the narrative at which we find an analogous list in Caesar's account (*B Civ.* 3.3–5). I make the obvious inference: Appian adopted Caesar's selection and ordering of material throughout an extended passage. If we suppose that simple chronology drove Appian to relate Caesar's dictatorship and then his crossing to Epirus immediately afterwards, nothing in the chronology compelled Appian to place a list of forces right between them as Caesar does.⁵⁵ What is more, Appian's list broadly follows Caesar's in its tripartite arrangement (exactions of men, ships, and money;⁵⁶ list of citizen and allied forces;⁵⁷ and general naval arrangements culminating in both lists with the statement that M. Bibulus was in overall command)⁵⁸ and in portions of the smaller-scale structure of the lists such as arrangement under subheadings and in phrasing. To be sure, Appian did not transcribe Caesar's text, but our understanding of Appian's working methods is now sophisticated enough that this is no reason not to see him as working from Caesar here (see the works listed above, 51, n. 6); Appian omitted some things and added others as it pleased him or as the effectiveness of his narrative required. The similarities in the macrostructure and the microstructure of the two passages under examination furnish powerful evidence that Appian used Caesar—a short, one-book portion of the elegantly simple Latin account of one of the participants in the battle.

⁵⁵ Caesar dict. I: App. 2.48.196 = Caes. 3.1.1; Caesar abdicates after eleven days, holding elections returning himself and Servilius Isauricus consuls: App. 2.48.196 = Caes. 3.1.1, (picked up again at 3.2.1); return of exiles: App. 2.48.198 = Caes. 3.1.4–5; debt policies: App. 2.48.198 = Caes. 3.1.2. Caesar then adds a notice (Caes. 3.2.2–3) of sending his troops on to Brundisium and offers a brief list of his own forces which Appian has omitted. Then come the lists in question. Caesar then relates that he gave a speech, and that his troops embarked in high spirits (*conclamantibus omnibus imperaret quod vellet*, Caes. 3.6.1); Appian relates that Pompey and Caesar offered set speeches (2.50.205–53.220) and that Caesar embarked with the enthusiastic support of his troops (2.54.221): ἀναβοήσαντος δὲ σὺν ὀρμῇ τοῦ στρατοῦ παντὸς ἄγειν σφᾶς.

⁵⁶ App. 2.49.200 = Caes. *B Civ.* 3.3.1–2: *Pompeius annum spatium ad comparandas copias nactus ... magnam ... classem coegerat, magnam omnibus locis aedificandam curaverat, magnam imperatam ... pecuniam exegerat.* = ὁ δὲ Πομπήιος πάντα τὸν χρόνον τόνδε ναῦς ἐποιεῖτο καὶ στρατὸν αἰεὶ πλεῖονα καὶ χρήματα συνήγε.

⁵⁷ Legionary forces App. 2.49.201 = Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4.1–2; allied auxiliaries App. 2.49.202 = Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4.3–6. Some similarities in phrasing: *sagittarios Creta* = τοξόται τε Κρήτες; [sc. *equites*] ... *Gallus Germanosque* = ἱππεῖς τέ τινες Κελτῶν; *CC ex Syria a Commageno Antiocho* = Κομμαγεννοὶ τε ὑπ' Ἀντιόχου.

⁵⁸ App. 2.49.204 = Caes. *B Civ.* 3.5.2–4. Some suggestive similarities of phrase: *Praeerat Aegyptiis navibus Pompeius filius, Asiaticis D. Laelius et C. Triarius, Syriacis C. Cassius. Rhodiis C. Marcellus cum C. Coponio, Liburnicae atque Achaicae classi Scribonius Libo et M. Octavius. Toti tamen officio maritimo M. Bibulus praepositus cuncta administrabat; ad hunc summa imperi respiciebat* = ναύαρχοι τε πολλοὶ κατὰ μέρη, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς Μάρκος Βύβλος.

Did Appian Look at Lucan's Pharsalia?

Did Appian have Caesar call his men to tear down their camp because Lucan did? I am convinced that Lucan had Caesar give the order in the striking manner in which it is phrased for the literary purpose of delineating Caesar's character, and that it is therefore a fiction. Appian's version does not track Lucan's perfectly, but because I take Lucan's version to be fictional and original, I don't think Appian took it over from another author. Logically, Appian might have gotten it from Lucan at second hand, but this sort of uneconomical multiplication of sources perversely ignores a good, if imperfect, match with an extant author's work. Appian's alteration of Lucan's conceit is due to the distorting effect of Appian's own literary purposes in the Pharsalus narrative. It is not difficult to imagine an author like Appian importing memorable material recalled from a lifetime of casual reading, or even a campaign of directed reading in preparation for composition. Again, this is already attested in Appian's portfolio of compositional methods, thanks to Brodersen's perceptive eye.⁵⁹

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS
CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
2500 CALIFORNIA PLAZA
OHAMA, NE 68178
U.S.A.

bucher@creighton.edu

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Backhaus, W. 1976. "Der Hellenen-Barbaren-Gegensatz und die hippokratische Schrift *Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων*," *Historia* 25: 170–185.
- Balsdon, J. P. V. D. 1979. *Romans and Aliens*. Chapel Hill.
- Bernand, É. 1969. *Inscriptions métriques de l'Égypte gréco-romaine. Recherches sur la poésie épigrammatique des grecs en Égypte. Annales Littéraires de l'université de Besançon* 98. Paris.
- Briscoe, J. 1973. *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI–XXXIII*. Oxford.
- Brodersen, K. 1988. "Appian und Arrian. Zu einer Vorlage für Appians *Emphyilia* II 619–649," *Klio* 70: 461–467.
- Broughton, T. R. S. 1951–86. *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*. New York (= *MRR*).
- Bucher, G. S. 1997. *Prolegomena to a Commentary on Appian's Bellum Civile, Book 2*. Diss., Brown University, Providence, RI.
- 2000. "The Origins, Program, and Composition of Appian's *Roman History*," *TAPA* 130: 411–458.
- 2003. "Some Observations on the Appianos Sarcophagus," in G. W. Bakewell and J. P. Sickinger (eds.), *Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy Presented to Alan L. Boegehold*. Oxford. 159–172.
- Camp, J., M. Ierardi, J. McInerney, K. Morgan, and G. Umholtz. 1992. "A Trophy from the Battle of Chaironeia of 86 B.C.," *AJA* 96: 443–455.

⁵⁹ Brodersen 1988: *passim*.

- Carter, J. 1993. *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Book III*. Warminster.
- 1996. *Appian: The Civil Wars*. London.
- Coleman, J. E. 1997. "Ancient Greek Ethnocentrism," J. E. Coleman and C. A. Walzin (eds.), *Greeks and Barbarians: Essays on the Interactions between Greeks and Non-Greeks in Antiquity and the Consequences for Eurocentrism*. Bethesda. 175–220.
- Dilke, O. A. W. 1960. *M. Annaei Lucani De bello civili liber VII*. Cambridge.
- Francken, C. M. 1896–97. *M. Annaei Lucani Pharsalia 2*. Leyden.
- Frisch, H. 1946. *Cicero's Fight for the Republic*. Copenhagen.
- Fussell, P. 1989. *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War*. Oxford.
- Gardthausen, V. E. 1891. *Augustus und seine Zeit 1.1*. Leipzig.
- Gargola, D. J. 1997. "Appian and the Aftermath of the Gracchan Reform," *AJP* 118: 555–581.
- Goldmann, B. 1988. *Einheitlichkeit und Eigenständigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian*. Hildesheim.
- Gómez Espelosín, F. J. 1993. "La imagen del bárbaro en Apiano. La adaptabilidad de un modelo retórico," *HABIS* 24: 105–124.
- Gowing, A. 1990. "Appian and Cassius' Speech before Philippi (*Bella Civilia* 4.90–100)," *Phoenix* 44: 158–181.
- 1992. *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio*. Ann Arbor.
- Grenfell, B. P. and A. S. Hunt, et al. 1898–. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. London.
- Hadas, M. 1959. *Hellenistic Culture: Fusion and Diffusion*. New York.
- Hahn, I. 1964. "Appian et le cercle de Sénèque," *A. Ant. Hung.* 12: 169–206.
- 1967. "Appian i Aleksandrija," *VDI* 103: 72–85.
- 1970. "Appianus Tacticus," *A. Ant. Hung.* 18: 293–306.
- 1982. "Appian und seine Quellen," in G. Wirth (ed.), *Romanitas–Christianitas. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Literatur der römischen Kaiserzeit, Johannes Straub zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet*. Berlin. 251–276.
- 1993. "Appian und Rom," *ANRW* II.34.1: 364–402.
- Hall, E. 1991. *Inventing the Barbarian*. Oxford.
- Hammond, N. G. L. 1938. "The Two Battles of Chaeronea (338 B.C. and 86 B.C.)," *Klio* 31: 186–201.
- Hansen, M. H. 1993. "The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography: Fact or Fiction?," *Historia* 42: 161–180.
- 1998. "The Little Grey Horse: Henry V's Speech at Agincourt and the Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography," *Histos* 2.
- Hengel, M. 1980. *Jews, Greeks, and Barbarians*. Tr. J. Bowden. London.
- Hind, J. G. F. 1994. "Mithridates," in J. A. Crook, A. Lintott, E. Rawson (eds.), *CAH* IX². Cambridge. 129–164.
- Jouanna, J. 1981. "Les causes de la défaite des barbares chez Eschyle, Hérodote et Hippocrate," *Ktema* 6: 3–15.
- Kirk, G. S. 1985. *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume I: Books 1–4*. Cambridge.
- Kraner, F., H. Meusel, and F. Hofmann. 1906–11. *C. Iulii Caesaris Commentarii de bello civili*. Berlin. (Repr. 1968 with bibliography added by H. Oppermann.)
- Mackie, H. S. 1996. *Talking Trojan: Speech and Community in the Iliad*. Lanham.
- Magnino, D. 1984. *Appiani Bellorum civilium liber tertius*. Pavia.
- 1993. "Le 'Guerre Civile' di Appiano," *ANRW* II 34.1: 523–554.

- McCall, J. B. 2002. *The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic*. London.
- McGing, B. C. 1993. "Appian's Mithridateios," *ANRW* II 34.1: 496–522.
- Momigliano, A. 1975. *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization*. Cambridge.
- Montiglio, S. 2000. *Silence in the Land of Logos*. Princeton.
- Morgan, J. D. 1983. "Palaepharsalus—The Battle and the Town," *AJA* 87: 23–54, plates 8–11.
- Morris, S. 1992. *Daidalos and the Origins of Greek Art*. Princeton.
- Münzer, F. 1899. "Carfulenus," *RE* II: 1589–1590.
- Paschoud, F. 1981. "La bataille de Pharsale: Quelques problèmes de détail," *Historia* 30: 178–188.
- Pelling, C. B. R. 1980. "Plutarch's Adaptation of His Source-Material," *JHS* 100: 127–140.
- Perrin, B. 1884. "Lucan as Historical Source for Appian," *AJP* 5: 325–330.
- Philipp, H. 1933. "Mutina," *RE* XVI: 942–946.
- Rice Holmes, T. 1923. *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire*. 3 vols. Oxford.
- 1928–31. *The Architect of the Roman Empire*. 2 vols. Oxford.
- Rossi, A. 2000. "The Camp of Pompey: Strategy of Representation in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*," *CJ* 95: 239–256.
- Saddington, D. B. 1982. *The Development of the Roman Auxiliary Forces from Caesar to Vespasian (49 B.C.–A.D. 79)*. Harare.
- Shackleton Bailey, D. R. 1977. *Epistulae ad familiares* 2. Cambridge.
- Stockton, D. L. 1971. *Cicero: A Political Biography*. Oxford.
- Syme, R. 1952. *The Roman Revolution*. Revised edition. Oxford.
- Veh, O. tr. 1989. *Appians römische Geschichte II: Die Bürgerkriege*. Notes and introduction by K. Brodersen. Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur 27. Stuttgart.
- von Blumenthal, A. 1942. "Paian," *RE* XVIII: 2340–62.
- Walsh, P. G. 1961. *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods*. Cambridge.
- Weissenborn, W., M. Mueller, and O. Rossbach. 1959. *Ab urbe condita libri*. Stuttgart.