

PATERNAL GRIEF AND THE PUBLIC EYE: CICERO
AD FAMILIARES 4.6

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IN THE MONTHS AFTER CICERO'S DAUGHTER TULLIA DIED in late January or early February of 45, his prolonged grief for her was judged by his contemporaries to be excessive and suspect. But Cicero's critics inferred his grief rather than observing it, because soon after the event Cicero withdrew to his villa at Astura, where he was far out of the public eye and reluctant even to receive visitors. Atticus reported anonymous criticisms from Rome (*Att.* 12.20.1, 12.21.5, 12.38a.1 [258, 260, 279]), and L. Luceius makes delicate mention of the public relations problem Cicero's absence was causing in a letter that conditionally reproaches Cicero for his antisocial behavior (*Fam.* 5.14 [251]).¹ If Cicero is avoiding the city to better spend his time in literary productivity, then Luceius excuses him. But if Cicero has abandoned himself to tears and sadness (*lacrimis ac tristitiae te tradidisti*), then Luceius must take him to task (5.14.1–2). Luceius' letter shows that Cicero's lack of visibility was the subject of speculation; also that it was taken as evidence of weakness by some, and that explanation from Cicero would be necessary to dispel this unflattering conclusion, even among his friends.

Another letter that takes Cicero to task for his grief is extant, along with its reply. S. Sulpicius Rufus wrote Cicero a letter of condolence in mid-March that includes pointed rhetorical questions and instruction such as *quid est quod tanto opere te commoveat tuus dolor intestinus? ... quid est quod tu aut illa cum fortuna hoc nomine queri possitis? ... denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse* ("Why does your inward pain move you so greatly? ... How, in this matter, can either you or she quarrel with fate? ... Finally, do not forget that you are Cicero," *Fam.* 4.5.2 and 5 [248]). Sulpicius' stern approach to consolation is not out of the ordinary, and despite his use of Cicero's name, much of the letter's content is thoroughly conventional.²

His penultimate piece of advice, however, applies specifically to his addressee's peculiar circumstances: *noli committere ut quisquam te putet non tam filiam quam*

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¹Numbers in square brackets refer to Shackleton Bailey 1965–70 and 1977. Cicero's letters and other works are quoted from the OCT editions, except *De divinatione* and *De senectute* quoted from Falconer 1923[1964], and the *Tusculan Disputations*, quoted from Dougan and Henry 1905–34. Except where noted, translations are my own.

²For a survey of topoi and techniques in consolation literature, see Kassel 1958, especially his analysis of *Fam.* 4.5 (98–103), and Fern 1941; see Scourfield 1993: 15–30 for a convenient overview of the consolatory tradition in antiquity. For discussion of consolation in Cicero's letters, see Hutchinson 1998: 49–77 and Wilcox 2005: 237–255.

rei publicae tempora et aliorum victoriam lugere ("Don't make the mistake of letting anyone think that you mourn not so much for your daughter as for the downfall of the republic and the victory of others," *Fam.* 4.5.6)

The reproaches from Lucceius and Sulpicius indicate two distinct but interrelated aspects of Cicero's dilemma. This article aims at reaching a deeper understanding of how Cicero met these reproaches, and specifically, why and how he replied to Sulpicius as he did in *Ad familiares* 4.6. To understand *Fam.* 4.6, we must examine the method and generic setting of Cicero's argument. We also need to take into account Roman expectations for the public deportment of bereaved fathers and Cicero's peculiar political circumstances at the time of Tullia's death.³ These considerations are interconnected, but in what follows I will take up each in turn, alternating between "big picture" questions about Roman culture and a close focus on Cicero's text.

I. THE ARGUMENT BY *EXEMPLUM* AT *AD FAMILIARES* 4.6.1–2

In his reply to Sulpicius, Cicero defends his continued grief by listing as foils for his own plight three famous republican fathers who were bereaved of their sons (*Fam.* 4.6.1–2 [249]):

sed opprimor interdum et vix resisto dolori, quod ea me solacia deficiunt quae ceteris, quorum mihi exempla propono, simili in fortuna non defuerunt. nam et Q. Maximus, qui filium consularem, clarum virum et magnis rebus gestis, amisit, et L. Paulus, qui duo septem diebus, et vester Galus et M. Cato, qui summo ingenio summa virtute filium perdidit iis temporibus fuerunt ut eorum luctum ipsorum dignitas consolaretur, ea quam ex re publica consequabantur. mihi autem, amissis ornamentis iis quae ipse commemoras quaeque eram maximis laboribus adeptus, unum manebat illud solacium quod ereptum est.

But sometimes I am oppressed and I can scarcely resist grief, because the comforts which were not missing for others in similar circumstances, whom I propose to myself as examples, are not available to me. *For Q. Maximus, who lost a son of consular rank, a famous man with many great deeds to his credit, and L. Paulus, who lost two sons in seven days, and your kinsman Galus, and M. Cato, who lost a son of extreme talent and extreme virtue, existed in those times when their worth might console their grief—worth which they derived from the republic.* I, however, already having lost the honors which you have noted, which I attained by extremely hard work, have now been deprived of the one comfort that remained.

All four of the exemplars whom Cicero names here are heroes of the middle republic, and Sulpicius would have known their accomplishments: Fabius Maximus saved Italy from Hannibal; L. Aemilius Paulus overcame the last king of Macedon at Pydna in 168; C. Sulpicius Galus served under Paulus and became consul in

³The distress that Cicero likely experienced from a series of domestic troubles in 46 and 45 (his divorce from Terentia, his ongoing estrangement from his brother and nephew, and his brief, unsatisfactory marriage to Publilia) may well have exacerbated his grief following Tullia's death. Rawson (1975[2001]: 222–229) describes Cicero's family life in this period; however, since none of these domestic misfortunes but Tullia's death created the dilemma that Cicero exploits in *Fam.* 4.6 and which this article examines, those troubles are not addressed here.

166; and M. Porcius Cato, who served in the Hannibalic war at Metaurus in 207, became consul in 195, censor in 184, and successfully supported Paulus' Macedonian triumph against an effort in the senate to block it.⁴

G. O. Hutchinson (1998: 76) notes that Cicero's use of these republican exemplars is an attempt "to prove, not just assert emotionally, that his situation is unparalleled." Cicero's letter "remains a notably robust self-assertion," but it is significant that he offers an argument to support his claim.⁵ Moreover, Cicero's argument neatly refutes an argumentative procedure that he recommends to the would-be consoler at *Tusculan Disputations* 3.56 (tr. Graver 2002: 25):

duplex est igitur ratio veri reperiendi . . . nam aut ipsius rei natura qualis et quanta sit, quaerimus . . . aut a disputandi subtilitate orationem ad exempla traducimus.

Consider: there are two means of bringing out the truth of our circumstances The first is to inquire into the nature of the thing itself, what it is like and how serious it truly is The second is to move away from the subtleties of argumentation and turn to examples.

As Hutchinson points out, Servius' letter had concentrated on the first approach, urging Cicero to take the true measure of his misfortune and to realize its paltry significance in the grand scheme of things.⁶ In his reply, however, Cicero implies that "inquir[ing] into the nature of the thing" has invalidated consolation by example. Despite the "similar circumstances" of his bereavement to those of past fathers, the changed nature of the republic has made them incomparable to him.

Susan Treggiari (1998: 20) summarizes *Fam.* 4.6 thus: "[Cicero] finds that the retirement from public life forced on him by Caesar's victory means that he has no distraction from grief He names various men whose grief for their sons was assuaged by their position in the state, *dignitas*." *Dignitas* is a key term here. Treggiari glosses it as a man's "position in the state." P. A. Brunt's examination of Cicero's correspondence to Atticus at another time of crisis shows that Cicero's notion of *dignitas* combines the public estimation of a man with what he believes to be right action. Cicero is anxious to do what he deems to be right (*honestum*) and what will fulfill his duty (*officium*); he is nevertheless also concerned with what others will think of him.⁷

⁴Oppermann (2000: 161–162) gives a fuller resume of these fathers. Galus, whose accomplishments are more modest than those of the other members of the list, is probably included in compliment to Cicero's addressee, although he appears again in a list of bereaved fathers at *Amic.* 9. On how Cicero knew of his loss, see Münzer 1999: 373–374. The trio listed here is much abbreviated from the catalog of bereaved Romans that appeared in Cicero's *Consolatio* (Hier. *Ep.* 60.5.3 = Scourfield 1993: 49); on the relative date of that work and this letter, see Oppermann 2000: 163–164 with references.

⁵Treggiari (1998: 20: "Cicero is able to rebut [Sulpicius'] argument") and Oppermann (2000: 160–165) concur that the letter makes an argument by example.

⁶Servius had proposed only himself (*Fam.* 4.5.4) and Cicero (4.5.5, quoted in text above) as exemplars.

⁷Brunt (1986: 14–17) shows how Cicero's decision-making process in 49 B.C. as it is reflected in the letters to Atticus is consonant with the doctrine of Panaetius which he espouses in *De officiis*.

Shortly before Tullia's death, Cicero wrote one letter in response to two letters from a Pompeian exile and former client named Plancius, who had sent congratulations on his new marriage to Publilia in one and congratulations on Cicero's retention of his "previous standing" (*pristina dignitas*) in the other. Cicero only briefly acknowledges Plancius' congratulations on his marriage, but comments at some length on the second subject.⁸ He emphasizes the constraints that Caesar's autocracy had placed on him (*Fam.* 4.14.1 [240]):

ego autem, si dignitas est bene de re publica sentire et bonis viris probare quod sentias, obtineo dignitatem meam; sin autem in eo dignitas est, si quod sentias aut re efficere possis aut denique libera oratione defendere, ne vestigium quidem ullum est reliquum nobis dignitatis . . .

If it is *dignitas* to think rightly for the republic and for the *boni* to approve your views, then I retain my *dignitas*. However, if *dignitas* lies not there, but in that you are able to bring about what you think, or even to defend it with free speech, then not even a trace of *dignitas* remains for me . . .

In *Fam.* 4.6, Cicero's argument from the republican exemplars suggests that the pragmatic and public dimensions of *dignitas*, rather than retaining the moral higher ground, have become paramount. He implies that without political influence or a place from which to speak, holding the right sentiments is meaningless. The most significant change in Cicero's fortunes between the time of writing the letter to Plancius and *Fam.* 4.6 was Tullia's death, so it is natural to ask whether the death of Cicero's beloved daughter was the blow that unmoored Cicero so completely as to destroy the significance of thinking rightly and being approved by right-thinking men. We will postpone consideration of this question, however, until we have a better picture of the difficult circumstances surrounding Cicero even before his daughter's death. To show the severity and complexity of Cicero's dilemma, we must look both at the cultural expectations for manly, aristocratic behavior in general and then in bereavement. Finally, we can examine the peculiarity of Cicero's own situation at the time of Tullia's death.

IIA. CICERO'S DILEMMA: *DIGNITAS* AND THE PUBLIC EYE

To understand the dilemma Cicero was faced with when his daughter died, we must take into account the enormous importance of visibility for the republican aristocrat. For a Roman man to be considered virtuous, he not only had to act virtuously: he had to be *seen* doing so.⁹ Writing as a father, Cicero remarks on the advantage of acquiring a reputation early (*Off.* 2.44):

⁸ Cicero returns, obliquely, to the subject of his divorce and remarriage in the penultimate section of this letter (*Fam.* 4.14.3), where he compares the damage wrought to his household (apparently by Terentia: so Shackleton Bailey 1977: 2.407) to the sad state of affairs in the republic and justifies his new marriage as a fortification of his interests against the "treachery" of old connections: see Rawson 1975[2001]: 224–225.

⁹ For *virtus* as "public excellence," see Lendon 1999: 310; for a fuller discussion, Earl 1967[1984]: *passim* and, for example, 23: "The service of the state required private virtues, but in their public

nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero, arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur, atque in eum quid agat, quemadmodum vivat inquiritur, et, tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec dictum eius esse nec factum.

For if someone has cause from a young age for fame and reputation, whether received from his father (which I think is the case for you, my Cicero) or because of some chance and accident of fate, the eyes of all are fixed on him. What he does and how he lives is a matter of interest and, as though he moved in an extremely bright light, no word or act of his can be hidden.

Of course, for an ambitious young man without the advantages of illustrious parentage or early, accidental fame, getting seen by “the eyes of all” was essential for the progress of his career. Cicero testifies to this point in his defense of Plancius (*Planc.* 66):

nam postea quam sensi populi Romani auris hebetiores, oculos autem esse acris atque acutos, destiti quid de me audituri essent homines cogitare; feci ut postea cotidie praesentem me viderent, habitavi in oculis, pressi forum; neminem a congressu meo neque ianitor meus neque somnus absterruit.

After I learned that the Roman people have rather dull ears, but sharp, keen eyes, I stopped thinking about what men would hear about me. From then on I made sure they would see me in person every day: I lived in their eyes, I assailed the forum; neither my doorman nor sleep refused anyone access to my company.¹⁰

The *novus homo* from Arpinum who became consul, Cicero was undoubtedly well-attuned to the necessity of enacting the role of good citizen in the public eye and he was experienced in making the most of his opportunities to do so. But members of the oldest and most prominent families also strove to perform on the public, civic stage. *Dignitas* was a prized reward. Not only the offices of the *cursus honorum* and actions in the courts, but the *pompae triumphales* of returning victors, the construction of temples and other public works, and aristocratic tombs adorned with *elogia* that compared and exalted the deeds of generations, all showcased aristocratic virtues even as they generated further *dignitas*.¹¹ Members

application.” Cf. McDonnell 2003: 240, arguing that Earl retrojects late republican definitions on his earlier sources. McDonnell (2003: 238–240) shows, however, that while *virtus* is primarily a martial quality through the time of Marius, its use as an “all-embracing ethical term” is frequent in Cicero (e.g., *Off.* 3.13, *De or.* 3.136, *Mur.* 30, *Imp. Pomp.* 64). On visibility required for virtue, see Frederick 2002a: 236–253 and Barton 2002: 216–221.

¹⁰He continues (*Planc.* 66): *itaque, si quam habeo laudem, quae quanta sit nescio, parta Romae est, quaesita in foro, meaque privata consilia publici quoque casus comprobaverunt, ut etiam summa res publica mihi domi fuerit gerenda et urbs in urbe servanda* (“And thus, if I am worthy of praise—however much I cannot say—it was won at Rome, obtained in the forum. And public events, too, determined my personal plans, so that even the highest matters of state had to be waged in my home, and in the city, the city was to be preserved [*viz.*, not in a province by military action]”).

¹¹For the equivalence of *virtus* and *dignitas*, or *dignitas* as the outward result of *virtus*, see Hellegouarc’h 1963: 398.

of the elite celebrated and increased their individual and familial renown by making themselves visible, subject to the gaze of their peers and of the masses.

Maintaining his public visibility, which was a necessity for maintaining his *dignitas*, became a serious challenge for Cicero after he reconciled with Caesar following the Pompeian defeat at Pharsalus. Without any public role to play, he struggled to find means of proving his virtue that would be observed and broadcast, and thus preserve or rescue his reputation as an honorable citizen. The difficulty of his position acquired a new dimension in the first months of 45 B.C., when his daughter Tullia died.

IIB. CICERO'S DILEMMA: BEREAVEMENT AND RITUAL

Susan Treggiari's recent consideration of Cicero's bereavement provides a useful contrast to my own reading of *Fam.* 4.6. Treggiari (1998: 14) uses Tullia's death as a case study for how Cicero dealt with the conflicting demands of affection and duty, "the tension between what people actually felt and what they or others thought they ought to feel and consequent conflicts about behavior." She marks his passage through three universal stages of grieving evidenced in his letters in order to see how Cicero coped with the "tightrope act" of "mourning in private and in public."¹² Cicero's grief has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention. But it is also worth exploring what Cicero did and what he said that he was doing during his bereavement as an inquiry set apart from asking what he felt. Without denying the sincerity or depth of Cicero's grief, that is the first way in which I would differentiate my inquiry from Treggiari's. I want to examine the rhetoric of Cicero's mourning, rather than its content.¹³

Secondly, I disagree with the assumption that behavior *follows* from feelings and social pressures which Treggiari's phrasing ("consequent conflicts") suggests. Rather, I would contend that behavior, especially ritualized behavior, is often productive of feelings. Ritual actions that attend the death of loved ones can provide solace. As Catherine Bell has written (1997: 160), quoting anthropologist Barbara Myerhoff: "not only is seeing believing, doing is believing."

We must take account of the efficacious, therapeutic dimension of ritual action to understand how ancient Romans experienced bereavement. The publicly observed refusal to grieve demonstratively was a ritualized, decorous form of mourning for Roman fathers. What is honorable is consolatory; this unarticulated ideal underlay the regulation of mourning periods by gender and enabled the claim that innumerable fathers went from the bier to business with nary a tear.¹⁴

¹² Also see Jäger 1986: 332–335 for the correspondence as a means of charting Cicero's progress through the three psychological stages of grief. Erskine (1997: 36–39) also describes Cicero's "way[s] of coping" with grief, especially reading and writing philosophy.

¹³ Davies (2002: 2–3) uses the phrase "rhetoric of death" to refer to all the discourses and social practices surrounding death that engage in "the task and traditions of persuasion." Like Davies, I do not intend "rhetoric" or "rhetorical" to connote "cant and emptiness" or "sophisticated cynicism."

¹⁴ Sen. *Ep. Mor.* 99.6, *Marc.* 14.1, *pace* Prescendi 1995: 150 on Sen. *Ep. Mor.* 63.13. On the effects of social performance on the performer ("belief in the part one is playing"), see Goffman 1976: 89–90

When the imperative for a Roman republican aristocrat to perform his virtue in public is taken into consideration, together with the importance of the Roman father's publicly observed refusal of grief, the complexity of Cicero's situation becomes clear. Because he could not engage in political activity, Cicero could not decorously mourn his daughter, nor could he recuperate from the loss of face that resulted from his lack of visibility.

III. EXEMPLARITY IN LIFE AND TEXT

Just as cultures and their performances have been productively reinterpreted as texts, the texts produced by Cicero can be considered performances.¹⁵ We have already noted Cicero's keen apprehension of the significance of performing in public venues the role of good Roman republican and his skill at perceiving and using opportunities to do so. These public performances of virtue were not only meant to benefit the commonwealth by ensuring its right governance, or their actors by increasing their *dignitas*. Observation of the exemplary conduct of men in public life, whether generals, statesmen, or men thrust onto the public stage by force of circumstance, was felt to have a salutary effect on public morals.

Roman education was founded on imitation and emulation. Men whose actions dramatically expressed the realization of a behavioral ideal provided an object of emulation for future generations. Consequently, especially fine instances of virtue were preserved and recounted as anecdotes. Known as *exempla virtutis*, these stories are a different manifestation of the same priorities that motivated practices like *contubernium* and *tirocinium fori*. *Exempla* were the written version of the moral education that following a senior officer or advocate through his daily routine was intended to provide.¹⁶

For an exemplary action to be recorded, of course, it had to be observed. And so we see again why members of the Roman elite lived by the necessity of acting well their part before a series of attentive audiences. The citizen who dedicated his life to public service had the most opportunity to be observed not only by his own household and clients, but by armies abroad and the Roman people at home.¹⁷ Living in the public eye was requisite both for renown while a man lived and for a reputation that would endure after death.¹⁸ Perhaps even more securely

and Geertz 1973: 113–114; on cultural relativity of the ritual performance of grief, see Davies 2002: 46–47.

¹⁵ On culture as text: Geertz 1973: 5, 9, 10 and *passim*; also Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000: 10–17 and *passim*. On text as performance: Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000: 4.

¹⁶ Cic. *Off.* 2.46; Mayer (1991: 143–144) notes *contubernium* and *tirocinium fori* as imitative practices that trained youthful members of the elite and reminded their elders of their exemplary role.

¹⁷ Cicero reminded Brutus after Porcia's suicide (*Ad Brut.* 17.2): *tibi nunc populo et scaenae, ut dicitur, serviendum est; nam cum in te non solum exercitus tui sed omnium civium ac paene gentium coniecti oculi sint* ("You must now serve the people and the stage, as they say. For now the eyes of not only your army but all the citizens and nearly all peoples are fixed on you ..."). Hutchinson (1998: 61, n. 17) gives additional instances of this "alarming use of eyes."

¹⁸ On Aemilius' renown, see Polyb. 31.22: "Ὅτι τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον σημεῖον τῆς Λευκίου Αἰμιλίου προσιρέσεως μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον ἐγένετο πᾶσιν ἔκδηλον· οἷος γὰρ ὁ τρόπος ζῶντος

than dedications on temples or *elogia* on the family tomb could preserve a man's name, becoming enshrined in popular memory as an *exemplum virtutis* was a means of achieving immortality, and the ideal outcome of a life lived in the public eye. And so historical *exempla* found in literary texts, whether letters, histories, or handbooks, had a double function. They offered moral lessons to their readers, and they also immortalized the virtue of their subjects.¹⁹

The basic rhetorical function of *exempla*, of course, is to make or support an argument, as does the *exemplum* that Cicero offers Sulpicius at *Fam.* 4.6.²⁰ In addition to the overt argument that Cicero makes, however, he makes a more subtle point: by naming these three paternal exemplars, he praises them, showing implicitly how exemplary behavior can benefit the *dignitas* of a man or a family for generations. To understand the full force of Cicero's argument in *Fam.* 4.6, we must consider both the specific circumstances and the stature of the fathers to whom Cicero compares himself.

IV. EXEMPLAR EXEMPLORUM (PAULUS AT VAL. MAX. 5.10)

Neither in the *Tusculan Disputations*, where a nearly identical list occurs (3.70), nor in this letter to Sulpicius does Cicero recount the stories behind the impressive names. Cicero's aristocratic republican readers did not need to be retold the *exempla* that this group of names evoked.²¹ They already knew the stories, and could supply the significant public circumstances of these fathers' bereavements. But how Cicero's original readers understood these stories is less accessible to us. Consequently, it will be helpful for us to consult a later author, who narrates in some detail the story of a father whom Cicero only names.²²

[αὐτοῦ] ἔδοξάζετο, τοιοῦτος εὐρέθη τὸν βίον μεταλλάξαντος, ὃ μέγιστον εἶποι τις ἂν ὑπάρχειν τεκμήριον ἀρετῆς ("The most convincing and the most honorable testimony to the integrity of Lucius Aemilius Paulus was revealed after his death, for the same reputation which he had enjoyed throughout his life continued unchanged after he had taken leave of it, and this is surely the strongest proof of virtue that can be found," tr. Scott-Kilvert 1979[1987]).

¹⁹ For Cicero's role in creating the standard catalog of *exempla virtutis* used by later authors, see, for example, Bloomer 1992: 4–5 and Riggsby 2002: 167.

²⁰ For the persuasive purpose of *exempla*, see Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.6. Lausberg (1998: 196–197) gathers testimonia on the sources, functions, and form of *exempla*. Brinton (1988: 169–184) examines Cicero's use of *exempla* in ethical discussion, concluding that its emphasis on "the particular case" is Aristotelian, i.e., legitimately philosophical and also persuasive.

²¹ Schoenberger (1914: 21–26) examines Cicero's sources for *exempla*, including Polybius and the Latin annalists, whose works would have been known to other learned members of Cicero's milieu.

²² All the authors who narrate the *exemplum* of Paulus' bereavement, rather than just gesturing toward it as Cicero does, are Augustan or later. Genre probably makes a difference (history narrates, philosophy and letters allude), but an audience less firmly steeped in Roman tradition than the readers Cicero envisioned for his *philosophica* probably also promotes the didacticism of later authors. On this issue, see Bloomer 1992 *passim*, esp. 14–17, 257–259. Prescendi's (1995) brief treatment of Roman paternal grief is marred by handling passages from a wide variety of authors as though they were susceptible of analysis on the same terms.

In the chapter that Valerius Maximus dedicates to "fathers who mourned their sons admirably," the domestic exemplars Horatius Pulvillus, L. Aemilius Paulus, and Q. Marcius Rex are treated, followed by the external exemplars Pericles, Xenophon, and Anaxagoras.²³ Aemilius is the only Roman to overlap from Cicero's lists in the *Tusculans* and the letter to Sulpicius, so his story will serve as our representative *exemplum*.²⁴ Aemilius' fitness for the role of *exemplar exemplorum* is confirmed by Valerius, who singles him out as the most famous instance (*clarissima repraesentatio*) of an extremely fortunate father made extremely miserable (5.10.2).²⁵

As Valerius tells it, Aemilius celebrated his triumph between two funerals. One of his sons died three days before the procession, the other two days after it. Paulus gave proof of his amazing strength of mind (*robur animi*) in supporting this catastrophe by making a speech to the citizens of Rome (Val. Max. 5.10.2):

"cum in maximo proventu felicitatis nostrae, Quirites, timerem ne quid mali Fortuna moliretur, Iovem Optimum Maximum Iunonemque Reginam et Minervam precatus sum ut si quid adversi populo Romano immineret, totum in meam domum converteretur. quapropter bene habet: adnuendo enim votis meis id egerunt ut vos potius meo casu doleatis quam ego vestro ingemescerem."

"When, on the arrival of our greatest happiness, Romans, I feared that Fortune would prepare some evil, I prayed to Best and Greatest Jove and Juno the Queen and Minerva that if any adversity should threaten the Roman people, it might be turned entirely against my own home. Therefore, all is well. For by granting my prayers, the gods have made you grieve for my misfortunes rather than me groan over yours."

In this episode, Paulus heroically and deliberately puts the interests of the state before his own. His behavior accords with the hierarchy Cicero outlines in *De officiis*: duty to the state trumps duty to family or friends (1.160). But Paulus' speech makes an additional exemplary response to adversity. His interpretation of his individual misfortune turns it to the best end available by taking it as a favorable sign for the fortunes of the community.

One of Livy's exemplars, Mucius Scaevola, speaks in a similar way, reinterpreting personal mischance so that it becomes productive for the welfare of the city. Mucius' story in this respect runs parallels to that of Paulus. After Mucius attempts to assassinate the hostile Etruscan king Lars Porsena, and accidentally kills the king's secretary instead, he turns the mistake to his advantage. First,

²³ Val. Max. 5.10: *de parentibus qui obitum liberorum forti animo tulerunt*. The title testifies to the subject's popularity. Significantly, all the parents are fathers, all the children are sons.

²⁴ Cicero mentions Anaxagoras at *Tusc. Disp.* 3.58, discussed below, 283–285. He alludes to Pulvillus at *Dom.* 139, but not specifically as an exemplary father.

²⁵ Livy uses Aemilius as an exemplar repeatedly; he and Perses are *nobilis maxime sortis mortalium exempla* ("especially notable exemplars of the lot of mortals," 45.41.10). On Livy's comparison of the two men, see Chaplin 2000: 117–119. This episode is recounted at Livy 45.41; Sen. *Marc.* 13.3–4; and Vell. Pat. 1.10. On Cicero's lost *Consolatio* as a source for Valerius and Seneca's accounts, see Bloomer 1992: 61–77.

Mucius demonstrates his courage to the king by showing his imperviousness to pain, and then he makes a courageous speech to Porsena that so effectively interprets the meaning of the whole episode that the king immediately sends envoys seeking peace to Rome (2.12.1–13.5). By reinterpreting his awkward situation for its observers, Livy's Mucius turns an unlooked-for outcome into further evidence of his virtue.

Similarly, Paulus interprets his familial misfortune as a safeguard for the good fortune of Rome. It may seem perverse to term the death of a man's children opportune, but Paulus' misfortune could not have been timed better from the standpoint of exemplarity. A *triumphator* entered the city in full view of the public eye. Consequently, his virtuous impassivity received maximum exposure. Whether Paulus' speech to the people is historical or a later invention to make the lesson more pointed, it augments his *dignitas* still more.

We cannot confirm that the historical Paulus made the link between his own misfortune and the fate of the city as explicit as Valerius' character does. But Cicero appeals to Sulpicius' knowledge of the moral of the story as much or more than to the facts. Just by listing Aemilius' name along with the others, Cicero argues that if he had been able to appear in public at the time of his daughter's death, performing the duties of a good citizen, the moral authority that past famous fathers had won by their virtuous impassivity would have accrued to him, too, by association.

In the letter to Sulpicius, therefore, the list of historical exemplars enables Cicero to imply that, deprived of the opportunity to appear in the public eye as the latest in an illustrious line of the virtuous bereaved, his *dignitas*, already threatened, was bound to erode further. Even if his endurance of grief was heroic, no one would know. Endurance that remained invisible could not effectively console Cicero, whose estimation of his own virtue was dependent on its external evaluation.²⁶ Moreover, the further loss of *dignitas* added a fresh source of pain.

V. CICERO'S RESPONSE: PERFORMING THE SELF IN TEXT

Since he was politically inactive at the time of Tullia's death, Cicero was unable to display mastery of his grief in a fitting public venue. Close attention to the *exemplum* Cicero uses in *Fam.* 4.6 has shown how much greater a handicap this political disenfranchisement became for him in 45. Nevertheless, in the months that followed, he was criticized for his lack of public appearances. Cicero's frustration with his situation and his attempts to counteract it are amply attested in letters to Atticus. The strategy that he adopted was an intensification of his program of literary and philosophical writing. By representing himself in writing as a good Roman who was persisting in his duty to his countrymen, he also sought

²⁶ See Barton 2002: 220, with references: "Being, for a Roman, was being seen." See Habinek 1998: 45–59 on the link between *existimatio* and *exemplum* and Roller 2004: 3 and 5 on the requirement for eye-witnesses in *exempla*.

to perform his self-control and conquest of grief.²⁷ Just as his exemplars had continued in their duties without interruption, so Cicero attempted to represent himself as undeterred by his loss and engaged in literary endeavors that were a kind of public business. In 44, he explained his role as advocate for philosophy as a response to the upheavals in the state, which he had been unable to help remedy by direct political action (*Div.* 2.6).²⁸ When Cicero made this explanation, however, he was probably looking back at a period of political retirement that had turned out to be temporary.²⁹ In a letter to Atticus written in May of 45, Cicero explains his strategy with less aplomb (*Att.* 12.38a.1 [279]):

quod putas oportere pervideri iam animi mei firmitatem graviusque quosdam scribis de me loqui quam aut te scribere aut Brutum, si qui me fractum esse animo et debilitatum putant sciant quid litterarum et cuius generis conficiam, credo, si modo homines sint, existiment me, sive ita levatus sim ut animum vacuum ad res difficilis scribendas adferam, reprehendendum non esse, sive hanc aberrationem a dolore delegerim quae maxime liberalis sit doctoque homine dignissima, laudari me etiam oportere.

You think it fitting that my strength of mind be seen clearly and you write that certain people are talking about me more harshly than either you or Brutus has written. As for that, if those who think me broken-spirited or paralyzed knew how much and what kind of literature I am producing, I believe that, if they were reasonable beings, they would judge that I ought not be reproached, whether I have so far recovered that I may bring an unimpeded mind to writing about difficult topics, or because I have assigned myself that distraction from distress that is most honorable and most worthy of a learned man.

In both passages, Cicero clearly perceives that his *dignitas* is at stake (*nec, quid . . . quod . . . me dignum; quae . . . dignissima*), although the passage from *De divinatione* strikes a self-assured tone whereas the letter to Atticus suggests exasperation. Of course, the letter was written to a friend, with greater expectation of sympathy and at least some expectation of privacy.³⁰

²⁷ The role of Cicero's lost *Consolatio* as part of this program is uncertain. Cicero writes that he will send it to Atticus when it has been copied (*Att.* 12.14.3 [251]), perhaps suggesting that a modest circulation was envisioned. But he adds that the writing itself, not the contents, provided him with relief. If the work were circulated, and Cicero's reference to it by title at *Tusc.* 3.70 (below, 279) does suggest circulation, it might have been with the hope that Cicero's strength of mind would be inferred from his rapid rate of production, rather than from the work's content.

²⁸ *Cic. Div.* 2.6: *Ac mihi quidem explicandae philosophiae causam adtulit casus gravis civitatis, cum in armis civilibus nec tueri meo more rem publicam nec nihil agere poteram nec, quid potius, quod quidem me dignum esset, agerem, repperiebam* ("Indeed, the grave misfortune of the city brought me to the project of explaining philosophy, since during the civil war I was not able to look after the republic as was my custom, nor could I be idle, nor could I discover anything I would rather do, at least, anything that was worthy of me").

²⁹ Powell (1995: xvi) dates *De divinatione* to January–March 44.

³⁰ Many scholars have remarked on the insights that Cicero's personal letters afford us. P. A. Brunt (1986: 12) writes, "from his pen alone we have not only public writings and correspondence with individuals, from whom, as from his audiences or readers, he might wish to disguise his true thoughts, but a great number of intimate letters . . . [at some periods of his life] his intimate correspondence

VI. CICERO'S SPIN: MANIPULATION AND OMISSION IN *FAM.* 4.6

We now have the cultural context that enables us to appreciate more fully the complexity of Cicero's circumstances, and that shows us how his ongoing production and circulation of rhetorical and philosophical works provided the means for his management of this new loss. Given this context, we can now see more precisely how Cicero's argument by example in *Fam.* 4.6, while powerful, is nevertheless tendentious. The same rhetorical packaging that enables us to give Cicero's argument a fair hearing by helping us properly take into account the cultural requirements incumbent on an aristocratic male (i.e., demonstrating virtue publicly, including self-controlled grief) also enables us to see how Cicero's self-representation in *Fam.* 4.6 is skewed.

In the letter to Sulpicius, Cicero makes no mention of an obvious difference that separates the historical exemplars he cites from his own experience: they are all fathers bereaved of sons, while he has lost a daughter. Sulpicius had chided Cicero for taking the loss of one little woman (*unius mulierculae animula*, 4.5.4) so greatly to heart when the whole Roman *imperium* was under threat, but in his reply Cicero makes no acknowledgment of the difference between losing a daughter, whose career would impinge on affairs of state only indirectly, through her relationships to male relatives, and losing a son, who could directly affect the fortunes of his family through his public service.³¹ The weight placed on a

discloses the real beliefs and feelings present to his conscious mind and no doubt often enough the unconscious prejudices and interests from which they emanated." Yet the *caveat* is important: Cicero's self-representation in letters is not always, or even usually, innocent. Other scholars have been less cautious than Brunt, and casual dismissals of the rhetorical sophistication of the letters are not far to seek. For example, Erskine (1997: 40) writes, "in the *Tusculans* Cicero is, necessarily, more rhetorical" than in letters to Atticus after Tullia's death. But letters, like all other texts, are conditioned by the author's expectations of his audience. (On this "addressee-consciousness," see Altman 1982: 111.) Cicero's argument in *Fam.* 4.6 may be tailored specifically for Sulpicius and is certainly expressed informally, but an argument is *de facto* rhetorical. Likewise, even if Cicero's letter is meant for an audience of one, and Cicero was unable to foresee its future role as part of a posthumous portrait, it was nevertheless a performance of the self. It was also written at a time when there was no guarantee that Cicero's attempts to replace his public persona with a literary corpus would prove adequate, and there was as yet no sign of the reprieve that came a year later, with Caesar's death, when Cicero would put the textual persona he had constructed as a contemplative man of letters into the background and stake his *dignitas* again on his political activities.

³¹Neither Cicero nor any of his correspondents mentions his son Marcus in connection with Tullia's death, although Cicero repeatedly notes the solace that *Sulpicius'* son provides him (e.g., *Fam.* 4.4.5, 4.6.1). On the value Cicero and other Roman fathers placed on their daughters, see Hallert 1990: 61–69 and 1984: 62–69, 76–110, and *passim*. Cicero's affectionate designation of Tullia as *effigiem oris sermonis animi mei* (*Q Fr.* 1.3.3) should not be overplayed. It occurs in a letter written from exile remarkable for its emotionalism (it opens *Mi frater, mi frater, mi frater*), within a passage that praises each member of Cicero's family (Quintus, Tullia, Marcus *filius*, Quintus *filius*, and Terentia) in turn, thoroughly confounding identity and kinship categories to convey depth of emotion. Nonetheless, it is clear that Cicero and Tullia were extremely close: see, for example, *Att.* 10.8.9 [199] and on it, Rawson 1975[2001]: 197.

son's public achievements in the funeral or consolatory context was considerable, to judge from Cicero's other mentions of bereaved fathers.³² For example, at *De amicitia* 9 Laelius opines that the fortitude of Aemilius and Galus, who lost young sons, was less than that of Cato, who lost an adult son (*perfectus et spectatus vir*). His judgment suggests not only that it might be considered harder to lose an adult child, but that there might be more renown attached to bearing such a loss with equanimity.³³

The contrast between Cicero's use of paternal exemplars in the letter to Sulpicius and the *Tusculan Disputations*, written between July and December of 45, can shed further light on his evolving use of *exempla* as a means of argument and self-representation. The *Tusculan Disputations*, a philosophical work in five books composed "in the Greek manner" (*Graecorum more*, 1.7), is concerned with the control and extirpation of the passions and the attainment of happiness through virtue.³⁴ Book 3 of the *Tusculans* is devoted to examining the claim, which Cicero supports, that the wise person is subject to distress (*aegritudo*), and then to proposing and comparing remedies for this pain. Since bereavement is the harshest form of distress (*Tusc.* 3.81), and hardest to cure, Cicero assumes bereavement as the source of distress in his model demonstration of how to offer consolation (*Tusc.* 3.58). At *Tusc.* 3.70, Cicero marshals a list of Roman fathers who, he claims, rejected grief because they felt it was unmanly:

quid qui non putant lugendum viris? qualis fuit Q. Maximus efferens filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus duobus paucis diebus amissis filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione conlegimus. quid hos aliud placavit, nisi quod luctum et maerorem esse non putabant viri?

What about those who think that men should not sorrow? Such a man was Quintus Fabius Maximus, who carried out his son, a consular, for burial; such was Lucius Aemilius Paulus, who lost two sons in the space of a few days; also Marcus Porcius Cato, whose son died as praetor designate, and others like them whom I have gathered in my *Consolatio*. What else made them calm except that they considered sorrow and grief not fitting for a man?

All three of the fathers whom Cicero names rendered services to Rome of such legendary proportions that listing them would be not only unnecessary, but odd. But it is notable that in the first and third instances, Cicero mentions the public

³² Cicero names one or more exemplary bereaved fathers in *Tusculanae disputationes* (3.58, 3.70), the letter to S. Sulpicius Rufus (4.6), *De senectute* (12 and 84), *De amicitia* (9), and *De natura deorum* (3.80). Aemilius Paulus appears in three of these passages (*Tusc.* 3.70, *Amic.* 9, and *Fam.* 4.6). Sons' ranks or virtues are noted in all these passages except *Tusc.* 3.58.

³³ On Roman attitudes toward the death of children, see Golden 1988: 155, 157–159 and, on the sentiments expressed in epitaphs, Nielsen 1997: 177–204.

³⁴ On Cicero's choice of labels for the work (*schola*, *declamatio*, *disputatio*), see Douglas 1995: 198–200. Habinek (1998: 64–66) notes that Cicero tellingly portrays his adoption of hellenic models and ideas as legal guardianship—a protective, conservative measure. White (1995: 225–246) shows how the work draws on the therapeutic emphasis in hellenistic philosophy. On its rhetorical status and practical aims, see also Erskine 1997: 39–47.

offices attained by the deceased sons. Cicero does not specify an audience for the virtuous deportment of these impassive fathers, although *effereus* evokes a funeral context, since *effero* is the technical term used for carrying a bier.³⁵

In the *Tusculans*, Cicero recounts the impassivity of these bereaved fathers in service of the argument that grief is conventional rather than natural, and thus may be rejected altogether. They are cited in support of a different argument in the letter to Sulpicius. There, Cicero claimed that these fathers availed themselves of their high public standing as a consolation that *enabled* them to mourn impassively: "They existed in such times when their worth might console their grief—worth which they derived from the republic" (*Fam.* 4.6.1). The stress that Cicero lays on public stature resulting from public service is emphasized by the description of Fabius Maximus' son as a man of consular rank (*filius consularis*).³⁶ A father whose son has attained the consulship has little left to wish for; while he might grieve for the loss of his son as a beloved individual, his achievement of the highest elected office guarantees the continued glory of the family.³⁷ But Cicero's letter also suggests that the worth that these men derived from the republic is no longer available because the republic is no longer able to grant it. Cicero can therefore excuse his own prolonged and arguably indecorous mourning for Tullia because he has been robbed of the *dignitas* that those earlier heroes had enjoyed, *dignitas* that he too had formerly earned through service to the republic. Moreover, he now lives in a polity so decayed that it can no longer bestow *dignitas* on its servants.

This reading of the letter to Sulpicius vis-à-vis the *Tusculans* confirms that Cicero's claims are not without merit. But the letter's rhetoric is disingenuous nonetheless. Granted that the four republican heroes named in this letter received whatever solace public admiration for their glorious deeds could provide, and that Cicero also deserves and has been robbed of that kind of solace, their losses, nevertheless, were not as similar to Cicero's as he represents them to be. In fact, Cicero may have been uncomfortably aware that neither were his achievements necessarily comparable to those of Maximus, Cato, and Aemilius. His most glorious public service, the preservation of the republic and the creation of a "concord of orders," might be perceived by posterity as short-lived if not ineffectual. Cicero could have

³⁵ OLD s.v. *effero*¹ 3. Bloomer (1992: 68–69) notes an emphasis on the "moment of the funeral" in the story of Horatius Pulvillus, another father interrupted in public service by the news of his son's death. Polybius viewed the public funeral as an exemplary event, which encouraged young men to embrace ideals of heroism beneficial for the state as a whole (6.52–54).

³⁶ Also at *Nat. D.* 3.80; and cf. *Sen.* 12, with Cato speaking: *Multa in eo viro praeclara cognovi, sed nihil admirabilius quam quo modo ille mortem fili tulit, clari viri et consularis . . . nec vero ille in luce modo atque in oculis civium magnus, sed intus domique praestantior* ("I know of many outstanding deeds of that man, but none more admirable than how he bore the death of his son, a renowned man and a consular . . . Nor was he [Maximus] only a great man in the public eye, but inside and at home as well").

³⁷ Even if he predeceased his father, the death of a consular could not be considered premature (*Cic. Cat.* 4.2) and a timely death was less lamentable. On predeceasing one's parents as a mark of *mors immatura*, see Nielsen 1997: 198–202.

given his daughter a public funeral, but it is difficult to know what achievements her *laudatio funebris* could celebrate, and since the glory of her father's deeds could be called into question, he may not have wished to rehearse them.³⁸

Cicero makes only one move in his letter to Sulpicius that may betray the gender of his deceased child. He elaborates at length on the domestic comfort he has now lost (*Fam.* 4.6.2). The association of women with hearth and home suggests that Cicero's loss is from the feminine domain, but he never uses a feminine personal pronoun to refer to Tullia. In the past, he writes, when public crisis threatened to overwhelm him, *habebam quo confugerem, ubi conquirerem, cuius in sermone et suavitate omnis curas doloresque deponerem* ("I had a place where I could flee, where I could rest, in whose conversation and sweetness I could set aside all worries and distress").³⁹ The omission of the feminine gender is all the more notable because Sulpicius' letter had stressed Tullia's conventional gender-appropriate achievements: she witnessed her father's successful career and she married well (*te, patrem suum, praetorem consulem augurem vidisse, adulescentibus primariis nuptam fuisse, Fam.* 4.5.5). Cicero's reply reminds Sulpicius of what his letter had overlooked (*sermo et suavitas*) but without attributing these comforts to a female source (instead *quo . . . cuius*), and Cicero omits any mention of the potential sources of renown that derive from daughters, namely, grandchildren and illustrious sons-in-law.⁴⁰ He only mentions the fame that comes from sons (*Fam.* 4.6.1): *filium consularem, clarum virum et magnis rebus gestis . . . summo ingenio, summa virtute filium* ("a son of consular rank, a famous man with many great deeds to his credit . . . a son of extreme talent and extreme virtue").

The fathers whom Cicero lists became famous as *exempla* because their bereavement was enacted in public on a republican stage, and in his letter he

³⁸ On the expected contents of funeral laudations, see Polyb. 6.53; for Cicero's remarks on laudations see, conveniently, Flower 1995: 134–135. Q. Lutatius Catulus (*cos.* 102) had given the first public funeral for a woman for his mother Popilia (*Cic. De or.* 2.44); Julius Caesar delivered a *laudatio funebris* for his aunt Julia and also his wife Cornelia during his term as quaestor, in 69 B.C. (*Suet. Iul.* 6.1 = ORF³ Nr. 121, fr. 29 = *Caes. fr.* 7 Klotz; also quoted in Kierdorf 1980: 114), but they were both matrons with adult sons and nephews. Tullia's marriages had been unsuccessful and she left no children; the absence of a promising young heir able to deliver the *laudatio* might be one more argument against a public funeral (cf. the familial continuity suggested by Octavian's delivery, at age twelve, of the *laudatio* for his grandmother Julia, recorded at *Suet. Aug.* 8.1).

³⁹ Cf. Cicero's description of Tullia when she had joined him at Brundisium in 47 B.C.; in this letter, she is explicitly female (*Att.* 11.17 [228]): *ego autem ex ipsius virtute, humanitate, pietate non modo eam voluptatem non cepi quam capere ex singulari filia debui sed etiam incredibili sum dolore adfectus tale ingenium in tam misera fortuna versari . . .* ("Moreover, I not only do not take the pleasure that I ought in the virtue, kindness, and loyalty of such a singular daughter, but I am even afflicted with incredible pain, because I have involved such a brilliant spirit in such a wretched situation . . .").

⁴⁰ Cicero never refers to Tullia's death as premature (*mors immatura*), but since she had not produced a living heir, it might well have been considered such: cf. *Prop.* 4.11, in which Cornelia considers her death untimely (*immatura*, 17) even though she has living children, whom she exhorts to continue the family line (69–70); and Pliny on the death of Minicia Marcella, who dies more tragically because still unmarried (*Ep.* 5.16.6).

makes just that distinction between their situation and his own. His further complaint, that now he has lost both his domestic refuge and the consolation public activity could provide, is cast firmly in this opposition between home and forum without making any reference to Tullia's sex.⁴¹ Cicero skilfully emphasizes the contrast between the opportunity for public appearances that Aemilius and the other fathers had with his own invisibility, while he suppresses the unhelpful contrast between the sexes of the deceased. Thus, Cicero evades Sulpicius's implication that his daughter's death is categorically a lesser loss.

Another omission bears brief mention, because it would supply Cicero with an exemplar whose loss more closely resembled his own, in respect to sex: Julius Caesar had lost his adult daughter Julia nine years earlier. Caesar's loss offers such a close parallel to Cicero's bereavement that it is difficult for a modern reader to resist the comparison although, in general, Cicero prefers historical exemplars several generations distant and this preference alone could explain why Caesar's loss of Julia is not mentioned.⁴² Yet given Cicero's generous reaction to Caesar's bereavement when it occurred, his later silence seems more significant. In November of 54, he had written to his brother Quintus, *de virtute et gravitate Caesaris, quam in summo dolore adhibuisset, magnam ex epistula tua cepi voluptatem* ("I took great pleasure from your letter concerning the courage and steadiness that Caesar maintained in extreme grief," *Q Fr.* 3.6 [8].3). Although Cicero and Caesar were officially on good terms in 45, Caesar the autocrat did not occur to Cicero as a man whose behavior ought to be a model for his own. Moreover, Caesar was the creator of the circumstances that had brought about Cicero's dilemma. His defeat of the republican military forces, his failure to lay down the dictatorship and to restore electoral government, and most of all his policy of clemency, which had purchased Cicero's silence, were the factors keeping Cicero out of the public eye where self-control could win admiration.

VII. ALTERNATIVE EXEMPLARS

Eventually, of course, Cicero's efforts at circulating publicly by means of his writing worked, although his attacks on Mark Antony, Caesar's autocratic successor, were the immediate guarantee of lasting fame, rather than his philosoph-

⁴¹ Hutchinson (1998: 76) notes that Cicero "frequently employs this organization of his experience." Other occurrences include *Tusc.* 1.84, *Att.* 12.28.2 [267], *Acad. post.* 11. In none of these passages is Tullia's death referred to overtly. To Hutchinson's remark I would add that this conjunction of home and forum appears better taken as rhetorical and euphemistic shorthand than as evidence for a deeply felt division of the private and public spheres.

⁴² Caesar's admirable response to Julia's death did become a part of the later consolatory tradition (e.g., *Sen. Marc.* 14.3), but silence about it in contemporary sources suggests that he did not advertise his self-control at the time. According to Plutarch (*Vit. Pomp.* 53.4; cf. *Vit. Caes.* 23.4), the Roman people buried Julia in the Campus Martius more out of pity than to show honor either to Pompey or Caesar.

ical works.⁴³ Shane Butler has argued that Antonius' public display of Cicero's mutilated head and hands was a gravely miscalculated means of revenge, since ironically, it laid emphasis on the independence of Cicero's words from the body that had produced them (2002: 121–123). The difference in value between political duties performed in person and the circulation of the self by textual means was arguably diminishing over the whole course of Cicero's career, but the process seems to have accelerated in the last year of his life. Yet in the eighth *Philippic*, a speech that was circulated but not delivered, Cicero can still exclaim: *O di immortales! quam magnum est personam in re publica tueri principis! quae non animis solum debet sed etiam oculis servire civium* ("Oh immortal gods, how great a task it is to maintain the persona of a chief citizen of the republic! For this persona ought to serve not only the hearts but also the eyes of the citizens," *Phil.* 8.29).⁴⁴ The performance of aristocratic duties before the "eyes of all" still mattered.

It is difficult to say how fully Cicero expected self-representation through publication and circulation of his works to replace his literal self with a literary corpus. It is uncertain, too, whether he aimed deliberately at becoming not only exemplary in life, but a literary *exemplum* immortalized through anecdote. It is easier to demonstrate his apprehension of the rhetorical power of the *exemplum*, namely that it could persuade a reader or hearer of the author's virtue by association. In a recent article, Mary Jaeger has written insightfully about a digression in *Tusculans* 5, in which Cicero recounts his discovery of Archimedes' tomb when he was quaestor in Sicily, in 75 B.C. Jaeger (2002: 60) argues that Cicero, writing in 45, "uses his past self [the Cicero of 75] as an *exemplum*."

Cicero had a good sense of the redemptive possibilities offered by history, but he also knew that winners of the moment, such as Caesar, might remain history's heroes. This consideration may have contributed to his choice to feature Greek exemplars rather than Roman in the *Tusculans'* central passage on consolation for bereavement (3.58), where he recommends listing inspirational exemplars as one step in the consolatory procedure. He then provides a list of exemplars, all of whom were fathers, none of whom was Roman, and two of whom are mythical rather than historical: Telamon, the father of Ajax; Theseus, the father of Hippolytus; and Anaxagoras, the philosopher from Clazomenae.⁴⁵ Greek philosophers and fathers of tragic heroes make less immediate exemplars of virtuous resistance to

⁴³ Butler (2002: 121) observes that in the *Second Philippic*, Cicero was "writing his own place in history" even as he made Antony "the object of memory."

⁴⁴ Treggiari (1998: 23, n. 90) cites this passage (*Cic. Phil.* 8.29) to show the pressure Cicero felt to repress his grief and to conduct business as usual after his daughter's death.

⁴⁵ The circumstances of Anaxagoras' bereavement are unclear, as is its temporal relationship to his conviction for impiety; the two events are juxtaposed in Diogenes Laertius' account, but that may be due to the similarity of Anaxagoras' responses to each (2.13): "Ὅτε καὶ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῷ προσαγγελέντων, τῆς τε καταδίκης καὶ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν τελευτῆς, εἰπεῖν περὶ μὲν τῆς καταδίκης, ὅτι ἄρα "Κάκεινον κάμου θάνατον πάλαι ἢ φύσις κατεψηφίσατο," περὶ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν, ὅτι "Ἦιδειν αὐτοὺς θνητοὺς γενήσας;" ("When news was brought him that he was condemned and his sons were dead, his

grief than would historical Roman fathers, but they supply readily memorable tag lines that made a useful litany for the daily *praemeditatio futurorum malorum*, which Cicero recommends as a preventive method for dealing with distress (*Tusc.* 3.29–31). Quotations from Greek tragedy also afforded him an opportunity to publish his own Latin translations of those famous fathers' words. By translating, Cicero could verbally transform Greek *exempla* into Roman ones. While he might not be able to duplicate these fathers' circumstances, or imitate their actions, he could easily appropriate their words.⁴⁶

Among the three Greek fathers Cicero names, the historical exemplar Anaxagoras may have particularly appealed. Anaxagoras was a philosophical martyr, condemned by the Athenians for impiety ca 456 B.C., although he was not executed; rather, he resettled and died at Lampsacus. His exercise of virtue took place in public, and Pericles was his patron, but although this surely granted him considerable public visibility, he himself was not an orator, a general, or a statesman. The independence of Anaxagoras' virtue from the state might be thought to disqualify his version of public service and his martyrdom as behavioral ideals for Cicero, since in Rome, the practice of virtue had traditionally been inextricable from the practice of politics. In the context of this traditional way of thinking, Cicero was utterly disenfranchised in the period between the death of Pompey and the death of Caesar. He was disqualified from acting not only as a good citizen, but even as a good man. In fact, Cicero's own writings did much to regularize these traditional Roman ideals and values. But even as he reinvigorated Roman tradition, Cicero also reinvented it, seeking to make philhellenism more palatable to the Roman aristocracy. He did so not by "Hellenizing his own practice, but rather [by] Romanizing Greece."⁴⁷ Cicero's Romanizing adoption of Greek ideals included broadening the range of *exempla virtutis*, models of virtuous behavior, to include Greek thinkers such as Archimedes and Anaxagoras.

Mary Jaeger has shown that when, in *Tusculans* 5, Cicero uses his young self to model behavior for his present self, he also assimilates himself to Archimedes. Cicero demonstrates his own love for inquiry with a biographical anecdote that is embedded in a comparison of Archimedes, whose intellectual satisfactions rendered him blissfully unconcerned with death, to the unhappy tyrant Dionysius (*Tusc.* 61–65). By implication, Cicero arrogates to himself the same virtues that Archimedes possessed. His references in the *Tusculans* to another learned Greek,

comment on the sentence was, 'Long ago nature condemned both my judges and myself to death'; and on his sons, 'I knew that my children were born to die,' Loeb translation, Hicks 1925[1966]).

⁴⁶ *Tusc.* 3.29: *licet enim, ut saepe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere* ("for it is permitted, as we do often, to translate those into Latin"). Cicero does not quote his Roman exemplars (Aemilius *et al.*). His translations of tragic lines can be construed as a display of elite aestheticism. On aestheticism as an alternative to traditional civic participation, see Krostenko 2001: 21–32.

⁴⁷ Habinek 1998: 64; the preceding sentences are also directly indebted to his remarks on Cicero's prime role in "the invention of Latin literature."

the philosopher Anaxagoras, hint at a wish to represent himself as similar to that man also.

Indeed, just as Archimedes served to exemplify the rewards of the contemplative life of inquiry, so too could Anaxagoras. Cicero closes the digression on Archimedes by exclaiming: *age confer Democritum, Pythagoram, Anaxagoram; quae regna, quas opes studiis eorum et delectationibus antepones?* ("Come, compare Democritus, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras; what realms, what riches will you prefer to the pleasures of their studies?," *Tusc.* 5.66). At 3.30, after he has quoted Ennius' Telamon, father of the fallen Ajax and Teucer, and his own translation of Euripides' Theseus, Cicero quotes in Latin what Anaxagoras was reported to have said, on learning of his son's death: *sciebam me genuisse mortalem* ("I knew that I had fathered a mortal"). Caesar's autocracy had made traditional Roman exemplars of mourning inimitable by Cicero. But in translating the words of a virtuous Greek philosopher and father, Cicero may also have contemplated the translation of virtue itself from its traditional civic and military venues into a domestic arena that by the testimony of text could be made more visible, paradoxically, than the forum.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In this article, without denying the seriousness of Cicero's grief, we have seen how the argument by *exemplum* that Cicero advances in *Fam.* 4.6 participates in his ever-evolving project of self-representation. Modern readers have probably found more of interest in the struggle against grief revealed in Cicero's letters than they would have found (or that would be there to find) if he had been able to perform his mourning in public as Aemilius Paulus had. Until recently, however, scholars' preoccupation with recording Cicero's progress through grief has made it difficult to account for and evaluate his other, more successful struggle, namely, his effort to find an avenue for performing virtue that was outside political activity but could still capture the public eye. His writings in this period inaugurated a new way of performing virtue and of earning *dignitas*. Cicero was never considered exemplary for his conquest of grief, but *Fam.* 4.6 forecasts a different way in which Cicero became a model for his successors. Both Pliny and Seneca use *exempla* in their letters to represent themselves, indirectly, as exemplars of virtue.⁴⁸

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⁴⁸This claim must await another paper, however; see, for example, Sen. *Ep. Mor.* 11.10 and Plin. *Ep.* 4.23. A related discussion is Habinek 2000: 268–272, likening Seneca's struggle to redefine *gloria* under the principate as akin to Cicero's efforts at the redefinition of such terms.

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