1 May 2011

Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2011 11:45:55 -0400
From: Wayne Mitzen <ajawamnet[at]comcast.net>
To: jya[at]pipeline.com
Subject: NETSEC crypto thing...

Interesting page ya got there - http://cryptome.org/0003/fbi-backdoors.htm

I was the hardware guy at netsec... I still have the original proto hifn card.

Here's a screenshot of the Protel file:

http://home.comcast.net/~ajawamnet/VA7751.jpg

There's a post I made on Schneier around the time the story broke:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/12/did_the_fbi_pla.html  -

just search for wam...here's a clip:

"I'm not really saying anything about the possibility of covert channels or back doors, or some other third thing (spongebob movie) that  may have occurred during that time.

I was one of the early employees at netsec - number 16 I think. But I was not privy to most of went on there - way beyond my pay-scale.

But I will say that the only reason that I recall Jason being hired, Angelos splitting the stack, and the credit that NETSEC has in the source (multiple OBSD source files thank NSTI - check crypto.c) was that we were using OBSD, wanted hardware accelerated crypto, and needed to do it in the kernel, since the tests of userland drivers/code were not giving the performance we needed.

I recall about 11 Mb performance with software, I recall getting close to the PCI limit when Jason, Angelos and other OBSD developers did their thing. I recall sitting in on the meeting where Jason suggested we get Angelos to split IPSEC to support hardware crypto in the kernel. I recall Jason writing a PPort routine to program the EEPROM (my brandy new B-K programmer smoked/DOA) that unlocked the HiFn chip.

I recall meeting with one of the FIPS labs, meeting the guy that was one of the team that authored the FIPS stuff. I recall meeting the CEO of Bluesteel whom flew in to meet us to support his chips (now Broadcom).

I recall the reason the OBSD was used by netsec was that Theo is very strict on who and what goes into the source tree. Many other hardware devices I designed also used OBSD. I recall a later design being limited by the threading model that OBSD used. Again not being even a network or software novice, I was told that this was due to security.

And as I mentioned in my first post to the question "why OBSD..." that's what I recall. "

The day after I got a call from a DOJ contractor (how I found out) I got a call from Jason with a WTF? Don't blame him.

--

WAM

http://home.comcast.net/~ajawamnet

http://home.comcast.net/~ajawamnet/marketturd.htm

------------

More information on my services can be found at:

http://home.comcast.net/~ajawamnet/wc/wamcover.htm

------------------------

"Success is going from failure to failure without a loss of enthusiasm."

~~ Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (1874-1965)

"I've failed at so many things so many times I make Abraham Lincoln look like Bill Gates"

~~ Wayne Mitzen (1959-  )

"When you do things right, people won't be sure you've done anything at all."

~~ God, in Futurama episode "Godfellas"

"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not even sure about the universe."

~~ Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

"Some scientists claim that hydrogen, because it is so plentiful, is the basic building block of the universe. I dispute that.

I say there is more stupidity than hydrogen, and that is the basic building block of the universe."

~~ Frank Zappa (1940-1993)

16 April 2011

Date: Sat, 16 Apr 2011 12:01:34 -0600
Subject: some facts on the OpenBSD FBI backdoor story
From: "Zooko O'Whielacronx" <zooko[at]zooko.com>

Marsh Ray did a good job of digging up a few facts:

http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography[at]randombit.net/msg00382.html
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography[at]randombit.net/msg00411.html
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography[at]randombit.net/msg00373.html

He found a previously undisclosed vulnerability in IPsec from the time period under investigation, in which Jason Wright played a part.

What he found is consistent with the hypothesis that Angelos Keromytis and Jason Wright conspired to insert and hide the IPsec authentication-disabled vulnerability. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that Keromytis made an innocent mistake and Wright intentionally exploited it. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that they both made innocent mistakes.

One can't discern whether a bug like this is deliberate or accidental -- it is too easy to make them accidentally. But, the OpenBSD project failed to disclose this vulnerability, and investigation of that fact might be more fruitful. Someone should ask Jason Wright, Theo de Raadt, and others who were responsible at that time why they didn't.

16 April 2011

Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2011 23:06:24 -0700
Subject: Cold issue?
From: Doug Bostrom <dbostrom[at]clearwire.net>
To: jya[at]cryptome.org

I have no idea if this controversy is still seething or on the boil, but this evening via Cryptome I ran across Greg Perry's remarks to you concerning OpenBSD:

"I personally hired and managed Jason Wright as well as several other developers that were involved with the OpenBSD Project, I am intimately familiar with OpenBSD having used it for a variety of commercial products over the years, and I arranged the initial funding for the cryptographic hardware accelerated OCF and gigabit Ethernet drivers by way of a series of disbursements of equipment and development monies made available via NETSEC (as well as my own personal donations) to the OpenBSD Project."

http://cryptome.org/0003/fbi-backdoors.htm

Those things are all true. I was on scene at NetSec during the time frame of concern, working with Greg.

Some might say Greg's antennae are too finely sensitive to any intimation of governmental interference in our communications. I have no notion of the veracity of his conjectures regarding back doors in OpenBSD, but I do know that every circumstance he's mentioned in connection with this affair of which I have personal knowledge is true and correct.  As we've learned so many times, the reality of such matters has usually proven to easily exceed pretty much everything short of "the CIA put a radio in my head."

21 December 2010. A sends:

Just to point out that one of the ex-developers involved in that period has posted some background info. You can contact Mickey yourself for more information:

how i stopped worrying and loved the backdoor

http://mickey.lucifier.net/b4ckd00r.html

By the way, anybody want to elaborate how Theo de Raadt has been hiding 2 donations accounts from Canadian Tax Revenue Services for years now?

(Paypal and the German account  IBAN: DE91 7007 0024 0338 1779 00
BIC: DEUT DE DBMUC
Name: Theo de Raadt
Address: Deutsche Bank, Marienplatz 21
80331 München, Germany

Inside Germany, instead use:

Name: Theo de Raadt
Bank: Deutsche Bank München
BLZ: 70070024
Konto: 338177900

From outside Europe:

SWIFT: DEUTDEDBMUC
Account: 7007 0024 0338 1779 00
Name: Theo de Raadt
Address: Deutsche Bank, Marienplatz 21
80331 München, Germany

__________

20 December 2010. Gregory Perry further responds with the truth about the FBI:

From: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry[at]GoVirtual.tv>
To: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Subject: RE: OpenBSD Crypto Framework
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 14:33:54 +0000

The issue of retribution has been ongoing on for over a decade at this point, the FBI is a lawless and corrupt organization with little hope for rehabilitation.  Maybe one day the Congress will issue a subpoena into their domestic ops and related skullduggery.

_________

From: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2010 9:06 AM
To: Gregory Perry
Subject: RE: OpenBSD Crypto Framework

Thanks very much for responding. If you care to do so, we would like to hear of any retribution for dislosing the hole. Wikileaks we're not but quieter. Anonymous is our best source.

20 December 2010. Gregory Perry responds:

From: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry[at]GoVirtual.tv>
To: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Subject: RE: OpenBSD Crypto Framework
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 02:17:23 +0000

I really wish Theo hadn't made that email public, it's really stirred up things quite a bit in the mainstream media.

To put things into perspective, the salient points to consider are:

1)  I sent a private letter to Theo Deraadt, urging him to perform a source code audit of the OpenBSD Project based upon the allegations contained within the original email you referenced;

2)  Theo then sent, without my permission and against my wishes, the entire contents of that email with my contact particulars to a public listserver, which ignited this firestorm of controversy that I am now seemingly embroiled in;

3)  If I had this to do over again, I would have sent an anonymous postcard to Wikileaks probably;

4)  I have absolutely, positively nothing to gain from making those statements to Theo, and only did so to encourage a source code audit of the OpenBSD Project based upon the expiry of my NDA with the FBI; and,

5)  Being in any limelight is not my bag at all.

I personally hired and managed Jason Wright as well as several other developers that were involved with the OpenBSD Project, I am intimately familiar with OpenBSD having used it for a variety of commercial products over the years, and I arranged the initial funding for the cryptographic hardware accelerated OCF and gigabit Ethernet drivers by way of a series of disbursements of equipment and development monies made available via NETSEC (as well as my own personal donations) to the OpenBSD Project.

Although I don't agree with what Theo did last week, I will say that he is a brilliant and very respected individual in the computer security community and he would have in no way agreed to intentionally weaken the security of his project.  Theo is an iron-fisted fascist when it comes to secure systems architecture, design, and development, and there is no better person than him and his team to get to the bottom of any purported issues with the OpenBSD security controls and its various internal cryptographic frameworks.

Many, many commercial security products and real time embedded systems are derived from the OpenBSD Project, due to Theo's liberal BSD licensing approach contrasted with other Linux-based operating systems licensed under the GPL.  Many, many commercial security products and embedded systems are directly and proximately affected by any lapse in security unintentional or otherwise by the OpenBSD Project.  Almost every operating system on the planet uses the OpenSSH server suite, which Theo and his team created with almost zero remuneration from the many operating systems and commercial products that use it without credit to the OpenBSD Project.  Given the many thousands of lines of code that the IPSEC stack, OCF, and OpenSSL libraries consist of, it will be several months before the dust settles and the true impact of any vulnerabilities can be accurately determined; it's only been about 96 hours since their source code audit commenced and your recent article points to at least two vulnerabilities discovered so far.

I wish Theo and his team the best of success with their project and endeavors.

Kind regards

Gregory Perry
Chief Executive Officer
GoVirtual® Education
http://www.GoVirtual.tv
P: 540-645-6955 x111
F: 877-648-0555
C: 540-931-9099
E: Gregory.Perry[at]GoVirtual.tv

GoVirtual® Education
10400 Courthouse Rd. #280
Spotsylvania, Virginia 22553

"VMware Training Products and Services"

Subscribe to the GoVirtual® Newsletter

15 December 2010. A3 sends a link to a refutation of Perry's claims by Jason Wright, one accused by Perry:

http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=129244045916861&w=2

15 December 2010. A sends a link to a report on Perry's affirmation of his claims and new ones's well:

http://blogs.csoonline.com/1296/an_fbi_backdoor_in_openbsd

15 December 2010. A1 and A2 send an account of denials by named participants and a fruitless effort to contact Perry:

http://www.itworld.com/open-source/130820/openbsdfbi-allegations-denied-named-participant

A pointer to any response from Perry would be appreciated. Send to: cryptome[at]earthlink.net.

15 December 2010. A sent the same URL. Cryptome response:

Thanks for the pointer. Strong stuff, naming names, very unusual, likely to lead to professional suicide. Smells like a hoax or a competitor smear. We wrote last night the alleged author of the allegations for confirmation but have not received an answer. This is not to doubt that the TLAs do this regularly but to admit complicity is exceptional, and if genuine, an admirable public service. If the attribution is a hoax or a smear we'd like to make that known. Have you seen his confirmation or denial anywhere?

He may be in hiding or a sweat hole.

14 December 2010

FBI OpenBSD IPSEC Backdoors or a Hoax?

A sends:

http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=129236621626462&w=2

List:       openbsd-tech
Subject:    Allegations regarding OpenBSD IPSEC
From:       Theo de Raadt <deraadt () cvs ! openbsd ! org>
Date:       2010-12-14 22:24:39
Message-ID: 201012142224.oBEMOdWM031222 () cvs ! openbsd ! org
[Download message RAW]

I have received a mail regarding the early development of the OpenBSD
IPSEC stack.  It is alleged that some ex-developers (and the company
they worked for) accepted US government money to put backdoors into
our network stack, in particular the IPSEC stack.  Around 2000-2001.

Since we had the first IPSEC stack available for free, large parts of
the code are now found in many other projects/products.  Over 10
years, the IPSEC code has gone through many changes and fixes, so it
is unclear what the true impact of these allegations are.

The mail came in privately from a person I have not talked to for
nearly 10 years.  I refuse to become part of such a conspiracy, and
will not be talking to Gregory Perry about this.  Therefore I am
making it public so that
    (a) those who use the code can audit it for these problems,
    (b) those that are angry at the story can take other actions,
    (c) if it is not true, those who are being accused can defend themselves.

Of course I don't like it when my private mail is forwarded.  However
the "little ethic" of a private mail being forwarded is much smaller
than the "big ethic" of government paying companies to pay open source
developers (a member of a community-of-friends) to insert
privacy-invading holes in software.

----

From: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry[at]GoVirtual.tv>
To: "deraadt[at]openbsd.org" <deraadt[at]openbsd.org>
Subject: OpenBSD Crypto Framework
Thread-Topic: OpenBSD Crypto Framework
Thread-Index: AcuZjuF6cT4gcSmqQv+Fo3/+2m80eg==
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2010 23:55:25 +0000
Message-ID: <8D3222F9EB68474DA381831A120B1023019AC034[at]mbx021-e2-nj-5.exch021.domain.local>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Status: RO

Hello Theo,

Long time no talk.  If you will recall, a while back I was the CTO at
NETSEC and arranged funding and donations for the OpenBSD Crypto
Framework.  At that same time I also did some consulting for the FBI,
for their GSA Technical Support Center, which was a cryptologic
reverse engineering project aimed at backdooring and implementing key
escrow mechanisms for smart card and other hardware-based computing
technologies.

My NDA with the FBI has recently expired, and I wanted to make you
aware of the fact that the FBI implemented a number of backdoors and
side channel key leaking mechanisms into the OCF, for the express
purpose of monitoring the site to site VPN encryption system
implemented by EOUSA, the parent organization to the FBI.  Jason
Wright and several other developers were responsible for those
backdoors, and you would be well advised to review any and all code
commits by Wright as well as the other developers he worked with
originating from NETSEC.

This is also probably the reason why you lost your DARPA funding, they
more than likely caught wind of the fact that those backdoors were
present and didn't want to create any derivative products based upon
the same.

This is also why several inside FBI folks have been recently
advocating the use of OpenBSD for VPN and firewalling implementations
in virtualized environments, for example Scott Lowe is a well
respected author in virtualization circles who also happens top be on
the FBI payroll, and who has also recently published several tutorials
for the use of OpenBSD VMs in enterprise VMware vSphere deployments.

Merry Christmas...

Gregory Perry
Chief Executive Officer
GoVirtual Education

"VMware Training Products & Services"

540-645-6955 x111 (local)
866-354-7369 x111 (toll free)
540-931-9099 (mobile)
877-648-0555 (fax)

http://www.facebook.com/GregoryVPerry
http://www.facebook.com/GoVirtual



To: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry[at]GoVirtual.tv>
From: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Date: 14 Dec 2010, 19:00 ET US
Subject: OpenBSD Crypto Framework


I operate the website Cryptome.org. Your message concerning
OpenBSD Crypto Framework dated December 11, 2010 has
been brought to my attention. We intend to publish it on Cryptome
providing you are willing to authenticate it.

Your message:

http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-techm=129236621626462&w=2

If authentic thanks very much providing public information about 
this breach.

Regards,

John Young
US 212-873-8700

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